ASÂRA

OF

HÂSARVAJNA.

श्रीभासर्वज्ञप्रणीतः

न्यायसारः

PUBLISHED BY

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NYÂYASÂRA

OF

BHÂSARVAJNA.

EDITED

with Notes

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न्यायसारः

महाम्बापुरस्थविश्वविद्यालये बि. ए. इतिपदसम्भावितेन
श्रीलन्दनराजधानीपुरस्थमध्यमन्दिरेतिख्यातधर्म-
शास्त्रप्रवर्तकसमाजान्तःपातिना वैद्योपना-
मकायुर्वेदमहोपाध्यायश्रीप्रभुराम-
तनुजन्मना विश्वनाथेन
संस्कृत आंग्लभाषया
विवृतश्च.

मुंबापुर्यां

तुकाराम जावजी इत्येतेषां निर्णयसागरमुद्रणयन्त्रे मुद्रयित्वा प्रकाशितः ।

शाके १८३२ साधारणनामसंवत्सरे ।

PREFACE.

While I was a student in the college, I took delight in studying the *Nyâya*, in which I felt keen interest, especially owing to the able lectures on the subject by the late Shastri Bhimâchârya whose very deep study of the subject has resulted in his *Nyâyakosh.* In 1902 I was a guest of Professor Deussen in Germany and in his company I attended the Oriental Congress at Hambürgh where I made acquaintance of many able Sanskritists especially of Professors Jolly, Eggling, Macdonell and Bendal, and found an occasion to come in contact with the late lamented Professor Cowell, whose profound knowledge of the Nyâya, the Vedánt and Buddhism has remained unequalled in the West. During my visit to him in Cambridge we twice discussed some knotty points in the Nyâya Muktâvali and as a result thereof, he advised me to undertake an edition of a good Nyâya Work. In the month of October of the same year I visited Prof. Eggling in Edinburgh. He also advised me to do the same and by way of encouragement, he proposed and got me elected a research student of his University, so as to make me concentrate for an year my studies of Sanskrit literature to that subject. Since then for about an year and a half I worked over several manuscripts in the India Office Library. About the middle of 1903 I undertook to prepare an edition of न्यायसारः of भासर्वज्ञः.

I collected in all six copies of the work, four of which are in the Library of the India Office in London, and two were found in India.

1 The first, a copy only of the text in the India Office Library, is written in Nagari Characters with several letters in Jainic form. These are folios, $9\frac{1}{2}$ in all, from 19 to 28 in continuation of *Keshava Mishra's Tarka Paribhâshâ* which is completed in the middle of folio 19. Both the works are copied by the same scribe. The portion of the *Tarkapâribhashâ* seems to have been very much used and studied, as appear from marginal notes made on that portion of the MS. The portion of न्यायसारः has remained untouched. The MS. is tolerably correct except in the last page where there is a repetition of two lines and twice over of one line. It is written on very strong paper $12'' \times 6''$ with 15 lines on each page. The colophones at the end of the *parichhedas* are very short and simple. They give no information

as to the author except his name and he is described as परमाचार्यतार्किकसार्वभौमः. This shows that, by the time this MS. was copied, the author was recognised as an able and much respected scholar of Nyâya Philosophy. This MS. I have noted as **B.**

2 The second is a copy of the commentary interposed with the text. The commentary is by भट्टराघवः son of सारङ्गः. This was composed, according to Professor Hall in S'ake year 1174 or 1252 A. D. This manuscript goes as far as the end of second *Parichheda* only. The MS. is very old and very slovenly written, but it is mostly correct. Rághava is a bold writer with flashes of originality and independence. Whenever he differs from his author, he is clear and strong in his view. This copy I have noted as **R.**

3 The third MS. is that of the न्यायतात्पर्यदीपिका a commentary on न्यायसारः by जयसिंहसूरिः pupil of महेन्द्रसूरिः who again was a pupil कृष्णार्षिः who seems to have flourished in the year 1037 A. D. He is known to be the author of सप्तपदी and is mentioned in the प्रवचनपरीक्षा of धर्मसागरः. This copy I have noted as **C.**

4 Besides these three, there is a fourth copy in the India office Library and it is known as Gaikwar's copy. This is very old in appearanee but to my mind it is not so. The person who sold it to the learned collector of MSS. seems to have used the artifice of putting it in a smoky and dirty place which has given it, the oldish appearance. It is a copy of the above No. 3 and often incorrect. This I have noted as **G.**

5 The fifth copy which I saw, belongs to the Library of the Deccan College and was procured for me by Mr. E. T. Giles sometime Director of Public Instruction: Bombay. I have, noted this as **D.**

6 A copy of this work, a very recently made, is in the Library of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society and it was kindly lent to me by the Hon. Secretary Mr. Haigh. This came in my hands very late, after almost the whole of the text was printed. I have however compared it with my text and made such use of it as was possible. I have noted it as **E.**

7 A seventh copy of this was seen by me at Benares in the Queen's College Library. I could not go through it, as in spite of the strong recommendation of Mr. E. I. Giles, the principal of the college could not be induced to allow me to bring it to Bombay.

The first four copies aforesaid, belong to the India Office Library of London and my thanks are due to the Librarian Mr. Thomas for allowing me the use of them in London and also procuring the same to me in Bombay on my return.

I intended to write an introduction discussing the comparative methods of reasoning used in eastern and western systems of logic and had collected some materials for the same. Engagements, over which I had no control, and several difficulties which I had not anticipated, so much hampered my work, that for years together I had either to completely put aside this work or had to do it at long intervals only. The printing of the text and the notes had been completed for over a year and yet I have found no time to put the introduction in shape. I have therefore thought it proper to publish the work without it with a hope, however, that in no distant future I may be able to put it before the public.

BOMBAY:
22 Cathedral Street,
13th September 1910.

VISHVANATH P. VAIDYA.

न्यायसारः ।

श्रीशंभवेनमः ।

प्रणम्य शम्भुं जगतः पतिं परम्[1]
समस्ततत्वार्थविदं स्वभावतः ।
शिशुप्रबोधाय मयाऽभिधास्यते
प्रमाणतद्भेदतदन्यलक्षणम् ॥

[2]सम्यगनुभवसाधनं प्रमाणम् । सम्यग्ग्रहणं संशयविपर्ययापोहार्थम् । तत्राऽनवधारणं ज्ञानं संशयः । स च समानधर्माऽनेकधर्मविप्रतिपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिकारणभेदात्पंचधा भिद्यते । तद्यथा । समानधर्मात्किमयं स्थाणुः स्यात्पुरुषो वेति । १ । अनेकधर्मादाकाशविशेषगुणत्वात्किमयं शब्दो नित्यः स्यादनित्यो वेति । २ । विप्रतिपत्तेरेके[3] भौतिकानींद्रियाण्याहुरन्ये चा[4]ऽभौतिकानीति । ३ । उपलब्धेः किं सदुदकमुपलभ्यत उताऽसदिति । ४ । अनुपलब्धेः किं विद्यमानः पिशाचो नोपलभ्यते किं वाऽविद्यमानः[5] । ५ । अनवधारण[6]त्वादूहाऽनध्यवसाययोर्न संशयादर्थान्तरभावः[7] । तद्यथा वाह्यालीप्रदेशे पुरुषेणाऽनेनभवितव्यमित्यूहः । किंसंज्ञकोऽयं वृक्ष इत्यनध्यवसायः ॥ मिथ्याऽध्यवसायो विपर्ययः । तद्यथा । द्वौ चन्द्राविति । सुप्तस्य गजदर्शनं

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1 परं C, R, D. वरं B.
2 ससम्यग° D.
3 के° G. R; को° B.
4 चा°. C. च° B. त्व° D.
5 अविद्यमान इति° D.
6 त्वा° B. त्वाविशेषात् C.
7 भावः° B. भाव इति° C, D.

चेति ॥ [1]स्मरणज्ञानव्यवच्छेदार्थमनुभवग्रहणम् ॥ प्रमातृप्रमेयव्यवच्छेदार्थं फलाद्भेदज्ञापनार्थं च साधनग्रहणम् ॥ सम्यगनुभवः प्रमा । [2]प्रमाकरणं प्रमाणम् । प्रमाश्रयः प्रमाता । प्रमाविषयः प्रमेयमिति ॥ तत्त्रिविधम् । प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमागम इति ॥

तत्र सम्यगपरोक्षानुभवसाधनं प्रत्यक्षम् । तद्द्विविधम् । योगिप्रत्यक्षमयोगिप्रत्यक्षं चेति ॥ तत्राऽयोगिप्रत्यक्षं प्रकाशदेशकालधर्माद्यनुग्रहादिन्द्रियार्थसंबंधविशेषेण स्थूलार्थग्राहकम् । तद्यथा । [3]चक्षुःस्पर्शन[4]योगाद्घटादिद्रव्यज्ञानम् । संयुक्तसमवायात्ताभ्यां [5]घटत्वादिसंख्यापरिमाणादिज्ञानम् । चक्षुषैव रूपज्ञानम् । स्पर्शनेनैव स्पर्शज्ञानम् । घ्राणेनैव गन्धज्ञानम् । रसनेनैव रसज्ञानम् । मनसैव सुखादिज्ञानम्[6] ॥ एतेषु संख्यादिष्वाश्रितानां सामान्यानां स्वाश्रयग्राहकैरिन्द्रियैः संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायाद्ग्रहणम् ॥ [7]श्रोत्रसमवायात् श्रवणेनैव शब्दज्ञानम् ॥ [8]तदाश्रितसामान्यज्ञानं समवेतसमवायात् ॥ [9]तदेतत्[10]पंचविधसंबंधसंबद्धविशेषणविशेष्य[11]भावाद्दृश्याभावसमवाययोर्ग्रहणम् । तद्यथा । घटशून्यं भूतलम् । इह भूतले घटो नास्तीति । [12]तथाहि तंतवः पटसमवायवंतः । तंतुषु पटसमवाय इति । इत्येवं [13]सर्वांश उदाह-

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1 स्मरण° B. C. स्मरणा° R.

2 D omits the whole phrase.

3 चक्षुःस्पर्शन° D.

4 योगात्° B. संयोगात्° C.

5 घटत्वसंख्या° D.

6 ज्ञानमिति° D.

7 श्रोत्रसमवायात् श्रवणेनैव शब्दज्ञानम्° G; श्रोत्रसमवायात् शब्दग्रहणम्° B, D.

8 तदाश्रितसामान्यज्ञानं समवेतसमवायात्° C; समवेतसमवायात्तदाश्रितसामान्यज्ञानम्° B.

9 तद्देतत्° B; तत् C; एतत् D.

10 पंचविध° B; पंच° C, D.

11 भावाद्दृश्याभावसमवाययोर्ग्रहणम्° C. R, D. भावाद्दृश्यते समवायार्थग्रहणम्° B.

12 तथाहि······पटसमवाय इति° B, D. and G omit this. R. has it.

13 एवं सर्वत्रोऽदा° D.

रणीयम् । समवायस्तु क्वचिदेवग्रहणम् । [1]यथा इह घटे रूपसमवायः । रूपसमवायवान्घटः ॥

योगिप्रत्यक्षं तु देशकालस्वभावविप्रकृष्टार्थग्राहकम् ॥ तच्च द्विविधम् युक्तावस्थायां वियुक्तावस्थायां चेति ॥ तत्र युक्तावस्थायामात्मान्तःकरणसंयोगादेव धर्मादिसहिता[2]ऽशेषार्थग्रहणम् ॥ वियुक्तावस्थायां तु चतुष्टयत्रयद्वयसन्निकर्षाद्ग्रहणं यथा[3]संभवेन योजनीयम् ॥ अत्रै[4]वार्षमन्तर्भूतम् । प्रकृष्ट[5]धर्मजत्वाऽविशेषादिति ॥

तच्च द्विविधम् । [6]सविकल्पं निर्विकल्पं च ॥ तत्र [7]संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबंधोल्लेखेन ज्ञानोत्पत्तिनिमित्तं सविकल्पम्[8] [9]यथा देवदत्तोयं दंडीत्यादि ॥ [10]वस्तुस्वभावमात्रावभासकं निर्विकल्पम्[11] यथा प्रथमाक्षसन्निपातजं ज्ञानम् । युक्तावस्थायां योगिज्ञानं च ॥

इति न्यायसारे प्रथमः परिच्छेदः ॥

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1 यथारूपसमवायवान्घटः । इह घटे रूपसमवाय इति ।

2 सहिता° B; सहितात्° C, G, R;

3 संभवेन° R, C. संभावन° B.

4 वार्षमन्त° B, C. वार्षमप्यन्त° R.

5 धर्मजत्वा° C. धर्मज्ञता° B,

6 सविकल्पकम् निर्विकल्पके° D.

7 संज्ञासंज्ञि° B, R, D; संज्ञादि° C.

8 कल्पकम्° D.

9 यथा देवदत्तोयं दंडीत्यादि° B, C; तदयंपरमाणू रूपवानित्यादि° R.

10 वस्तुस्वरूप° D.

11 कल्पकम् D.

सम्यगविनाभावेन परोक्षानुभवसाधनमनुमानम् ।। स्वभावतः साध्येन साधनस्य व्याप्तिरविनाभावः[1] । स द्विविधोऽन्वयव्यति[2]रेकभेदात् ।। साध्यसामान्येन साधनसामान्यस्य व्याप्तिरन्वयः । साधनसामान्याभावेन साध्यसामान्याभावस्य व्याप्तिर्व्यतिरेकः ।। साधनं लिङ्गम् । तच्च[3] द्विविधम् दृष्टं सामान्यतोदृष्टं च । तत्र प्रत्यक्षयोग्यार्थानुमापकं दृष्टम् यथा धूमोऽग्नेरिति । स्वभावविप्रकृष्टार्थोऽनुमापकं सामान्यतोदृष्टम् यथा रूपादिज्ञानं चक्षुरादेरिति ।।

तत्पुनर्द्विविधम् । स्वार्थं परार्थं चेति । तत्र परोपदेशानपेक्षं स्वार्थं । परोपदेशापेक्षं परार्थम् । परोपदेशस्तु पंचावयवं वाक्यम् ।।

प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनान्यवयवाः ।।

तत्र प्रतिपिपादयिषया पक्षवचनं प्रतिज्ञा यथा[4] शब्दोऽनित्यः ।।

साधनत्वख्यापकं लिंगवचनं हेतुः[5] । स[6] त्रिविधः । अन्वयव्यतिरेकी केवलान्वयी केवलव्यतिरेकी चेति ।। तत्र पंचरूपोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकी । रूपाणि तु पक्षधर्मत्वं सपक्षेसत्त्वम् विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तिरबाधितविषयत्वमसत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं च ।।

तत्र साध्यधर्मविशिष्टः[7] पक्षः । तत्र व्याप्यवृत्तित्वं हेतोः पक्षधर्मत्वम् ।। साध्यसमानधर्मा धर्मी सपक्षः । तत्र सर्वस्मिन्नेकदेशेवा[8] हेतोर्वृत्तिः सपक्षेसत्त्वम् ।। साध्यव्यावृत्तधर्मा धर्मी विपक्षः । तत्र सर्वस्मि[9]न्विपक्षे हेतोरवृत्तिर्विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तिः ।। प्रमाणाऽविरोधिनि[10] प्रतिज्ञाते[11]-

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1 अविनाभावः C, D. अनादिभावः B.

2 °विधोऽन्वय G, C. विधः । अन्वय° B, D.

3 तच्चद्वि° B, D. तद्विवि° C, R, G.

4 यथा अनित्यः शब्द इति D.

5 Here D. adds यथा तीव्रादिधर्मोपेतत्वात् ।

6 सच° D.

7 °विशिष्टो धर्मी° C, G, D.

8 सर्वस्मिन्नेकदेशेवा C, G, D. सर्वस्मिन्° R.

9 समस्तेपि° C, G.

10 प्रमाणाऽविरोधिनि° C, G. प्रमाणाद्विरोधिनि° B.

11 प्रतिज्ञातेऽर्थे° B, R, D; प्रतिज्ञातार्थे° C, G.

ऽर्थे हेतोर्वृत्तिरबाधितविषयत्वम् ॥ साध्यतद्विपरीतयोः साधनस्या[1]ऽत्रिरूपत्वमसत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम् ॥

स द्विविधः । सपक्षवृत्तिभेदात् तद्यथा शब्दोऽनित्यः कार्यत्वादिति [2]सपक्षव्यापकः । सामा[3]न्यवत्वे सति-अस्मदादिबाह्येन्द्रियग्रा[4]ह्यत्वादिति सपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः ॥

पक्षव्यापकः सपक्षवृत्तिरविद्यमानविपक्षः केवलान्वयी । स[5] पूर्ववद्द्विविधः । तद्यथा विवादास्पदीभूतान्यदृष्टादीनि कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षाणि प्रमेयत्वात्करतलादिवदिति [6]सपक्षव्यापकः । सैव प्रतिज्ञा मीमांसकानामप्रत्यक्षत्वादस्मत्सुखादिवदिति सपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः ॥

[7]केवलव्यतिरेकी यथा पक्षव्यापकोऽविद्यमानसपक्षो विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तः । [8]स चाऽप्रसंगोन्नेयी प्रसंगोन्नेयी च । [9]सर्वं कार्यं सर्ववित्कर्तृपूर्वकं कादाचित्कत्वात्[10] यथाऽऽकाशे[11] । प्रसंगद्वारेण[12] यथा नेदं निरात्मकं जीवच्छरीरमप्राणादिमत्त्वप्रसंगाल्लोष्ठवदिति ॥

एतेन हेत्वाभासानामहेतुत्वं भवति । [13]यतो हेतु[14]त्वलक्षणर-

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1 साधनस्यापि C, G. साधनस्य त्रि° B. साधनस्यात्रि° D, R.

2 सर्वसपक्ष° D.

3 अनित्यः शब्दः सामान्यत्वे D.

4 ग्राह्यत्वात् G, C, D. वाह्यत्वात् B.

5 केवलान्वयी पूर्ववद्द्विविधः° C, G, R. स पूर्वं द्विविधः B.

6 D omits सपक्षव्यापकः

7 D puts केवलव्यतिरेकी after व्यावृत्तः in the sentence.

8 D omits this from the body of the text but puts in the marginal note viz. केवलव्यतिरेकी द्विधा. अप्रसंगोन्नेयी प्रसंगोन्नेयी च । पूर्वं अप्रसंगोन्नेयिनमाह ।

9 D puts सर्वं कार्यं after पूर्वकम्, and यथा in the beginning of the sentence.

10 D adds यत्सर्ववित्कर्तृकं न भवति तत्कादाचित्कमपि न भवति in the body of the text; but it must be an annotation put in by mistake of the scribe.

11 D. आकाशम् ।

12 puts in वा.

13 C, G and D omit यतो°.

14 D omits त्व°.

हिता हेतुवदाभासमाना हेत्वाभासाः । ते [1]चानेकप्रकारा असिद्धविरुद्धाऽनैकान्तिकाऽनध्यवसितकालात्ययापदिष्टप्रकरणसमाः ॥

तत्राऽनिश्चितपक्षवृत्तिरसिद्धः । पक्षविपक्षयोरेव वर्तमानो विरुद्धः । [2]पक्षसपक्षविपक्षवृत्तिरनैकान्तिकः । साध्याऽसाधकः पक्ष एव वर्तमानोऽनध्यवसितः । प्रमाणबाधिते पक्षे वर्तमानो हेतुः कालात्ययापदिष्टः। स्व-परपक्षसिद्धावपि त्रिरूपो हेतुः प्रकरणसमः॥ यद्यपि चैषां सूक्ष्मा भेदा अनंतत्वान्न शक्यन्ते वक्तुं तथापि स्थूलां दृष्टिमाश्रित्य कियंतो भेदाः प्रदर्श्यन्ते ॥

[3]असिद्धस्तावत् । स्वरूपासिद्धो यथाऽनित्यः शब्द[4]श्चाक्षुषत्वात् । १ । व्यधिकरणाऽसिद्धो यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः [5]पटस्य कृतकत्वात् । २ । विशेष्याऽसिद्धो यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः सामान्यवत्त्वे सति चाक्षुषत्वात् । ३ । विशेषणाऽसिद्धो यथाऽनित्यः शब्दश्चाक्षुषत्वे सति सामान्यवत्त्वात् । ४ । [6]विभागाऽसिद्धो यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः प्रयत्नान्तरीयकत्वात् ।५। आश्रयाऽसिद्धो यथाऽस्ति प्रधानं विश्वपरिणामित्वात् । ६ । आश्रयैकदेशाऽसिद्धो यथा नित्याः प्रधानपुरुषेश्वरा अकृतकत्वात् । ७ । व्यर्थविशेष्याऽसिद्धो यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वे सति सामान्यवत्त्वात् ।८। व्यर्थविशेषणाऽसिद्धो-यथाऽ[7]नित्यः शब्दः सामान्यवत्त्वे सति कृतकत्वात् । ९ । संदिग्धाऽसिद्धो यथा धूमबाष्पादिविवेकाऽनिश्चये कश्चिदाहाऽग्निमानयं प्रदेशो धूमवत्त्वात् । १० । संदिग्धविशेष्याऽसिद्धो यथाऽद्यापि रागादियुक्तः कपिल[8]ः पुरुषत्वे [9]सत्यद्याप्यनुत्पन्नतत्वज्ञानत्वात् । ११। संदिग्धविशेषणाऽसिद्धो यथाऽद्यापि रागादियुक्तः कपिलः

1 D omits ते चानेक···रा°.

2 पक्षत्रयवृत्तिः° R.

3 असिद्धभेदाः° D.

4 शशविषाणत्वात्°. R.

5 घटस्य° D.

6 भागासिद्धो° D.

7 अयं धूमो दहनजन्यः सामान्यवत्त्वे सति धूमवत्त्वाद्° R.

8 °कः B.

9 °सत्यद्याप्य° C, D. सति सर्वदाप्य° B

सर्वदा तत्वज्ञानरहितत्वे सति पुरुषत्वात् । १२ ॥ एतेऽसिद्धभेदा यदोभयवाद्यसिद्धत्वेन विवक्षितास्तदोभयाऽसिद्धा [1]भवन्ति । यदा त्वन्यतरवाद्यसिद्धत्वेन विवक्षितास्तदान्यतराऽसिद्धा भवन्ति ॥

विरुद्धभेदास्तु सति सपक्षे चत्वारो विरुद्धाः ॥ पक्षविपक्षव्यापको यथा नित्यः शब्दः कार्यत्वात् । १ । विपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः पक्षव्यापको यथा नित्यः शब्दः सामान्यवत्त्वे सत्यस्मदादिबाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात् । २ । पक्षविपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा नित्यः शब्दः प्रयत्नान्तरीयकत्वात् । ३ । पक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्विपक्षव्यापको यथा नित्या पृथिवी कृतकत्वात् । ४ ।

असति सपक्षे चत्वारो विरुद्धाः ॥ पक्षविपक्षव्यापको यथाऽऽकाशविशेषगुणः शब्दः प्रमेयत्वात् । १ । पक्षव्यापको विपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथाऽऽकाशविशेषगुणः शब्दः कार्यत्वात्[2] । २ । [3]पक्षविपक्षैकदेशवृतिर्यथाऽऽकाशविशेषगुणः शब्दः प्रयत्नान[4]न्तरीयकत्वात् । ३ । वि[5]पक्षव्यापकः पक्षैकदेशवृतिर्यथाऽऽकाशविशेषगुणः शब्दोऽपदात्मकत्वात् । ४ ।

ननु चत्वार एव विरुद्धभेदा नान्ये ते[6]षामसिद्धलक्षणोप[7]पन्नत्वेनाऽसिद्धत्वात् । नैष दोष उभयलक्षणोपपन्नत्वेनोभयव्यवहारविषयत्वात् तुलायां प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारवत् ॥

अनैकान्तिकभेदास्तु । पक्षत्रयव्यापको यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः प्रमेयत्वात् । १ । पक्षव्यापकः सपक्षविपक्षैकदेशवृतिर्यथा नित्यः शब्दः प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । २ । पक्षसपक्षव्यापको विपक्षैकदेशवृतिर्यथाऽयं [8]गौर्विषाणित्वात् । ३ । पक्षविपक्षव्यापकः सपक्षैकदे-

1 D omits भवन्ति.

2 बाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात् C, D.

3 जयसिंह puts this as second and not third and so does D.

4 D omits न.

5 पक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्विपक्षव्यापकः° B.

6 B omits ते.

7 लक्षणोपपन्नत्वात्° C, D.

8 गौरवं° D.

शवृत्तिर्यथा नायं गौर्विषाणित्वात् । ४ । पक्षत्रयैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथाऽनित्या पृथिवी प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । ५ । पक्षसपक्षैकदेशवृतिर्विपक्षव्यापको यथा द्रव्याणि दिक्कालमनांसि—अमूर्तत्वात् । ६ । पक्षविपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः सपक्षव्यापको यथा न[1] द्रव्याणि दिक्कालमनांस्यमूर्तत्वात्[2] । ७ । सपक्षविपक्षव्यापकः पक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा न द्रव्याण्याकाशकालदिगात्ममनांसि क्षणिकविशेषगुणरहितत्वात् ॥ ८ ॥

अनध्यवसितभेदास्तु । अविद्यमानसपक्षविपक्षः पक्षव्यापको यथा सर्वमनित्यं सत्त्वात् । १ । अविद्यमानसपक्षविपक्षः पक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा सर्वमनित्यं कार्यत्वात् । २ । विद्यमानसपक्षविपक्षः पक्षव्यापको यथाऽनित्यः शब्द आकाशविशेषगुणत्वात् । ३ । विद्यमानसपक्षविपक्षः पक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा सर्वं द्रव्यमनित्यं क्रियावत्वात् । ४ । अविद्यमानविपक्षो विद्यमानसपक्षः पक्षव्यापको यथा सर्वं कार्यं नित्यमुत्पत्तिधर्मकत्वात् । ५ । अविद्यमानविपक्षो विद्यमानसपक्षः पक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्यथा सर्वं कार्यं नित्यं सावयवत्वात् । ६ ।

कालात्ययापदिष्टभेदास्तु । प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धो यथाऽनुष्णोऽग्निः कृतकत्वात् । १ । अनुमानविरुद्धो यथा[3]ऽनित्याः परमाणवो मूर्तत्वात् । २ । आगमविरुद्धो यथा ब्राह्मणेन [4]सुरा पेया द्रवद्रव्यत्वात् क्षीरवत् । ३ । प्रत्यक्षैकदेशविरुद्धो यथा सर्वं तेजोऽनुष्णं रूपित्वात् । ४ । अनुमानैकदेशविरुद्धो यथा नित्याऽऽश्रया द्रवत्वरूपरसगन्धस्पर्शा नित्या अप्रदेशवृत्तिसमानजात्यारंभकत्वे सति परमाणुवृत्तित्वात् तद्गतैकत्ववत् । ५ । आगमैकदेशविरुद्धो यथा सर्वेषां देवर्षीणां शरीराणि पार्थिवानि शरीरत्वादस्मदादिशरीरवत् । ६ ।

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1 त° B. न°. C.

2 C omits अ which is a mistake as shown by the commentary.

3 परमाणवो नित्या मूर्तत्वात्° C.

4 पेयं सुरादि° C.

प्रकरणसमस्योदाहरणं यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः पक्षसपक्षयोरन्यतरत्वात्सपक्षवत् । नित्यः शब्दः पक्षसपक्षयोरन्यतरत्वात् सपक्षवत् ॥

एकत्र तुल्य[1]लक्षणविरुद्धहेतुद्वयोपनिपातो विरुद्धाऽव्यभिचारीत्येके यथा [2]नित्यमाकाशम[3]मूर्तत्वादात्मवत् । एव[4]मनित्यमाकाशमस्मदादि–बाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यगुणाधारत्वात् घटवदिति ॥ स खलु पुरुषविशेषमपेक्षमा[5]णो हेत्वाभासो भवत्यन्यतरासिद्धवत् ॥

सम्यग्दृष्टान्ताभिधानमुदाहरणम् । तद्विविधम् साधर्म्य–वैधर्म्यभेदात् ॥ तत्रान्वयमुखेन दृष्टान्ताभिधानं साधर्म्योदाहरणं यथाऽनित्यः शब्दस्तीव्रादिधर्मोपेतत्वात् । यद्यत्तीव्रादिधर्मोपेतं तत्तदनित्यं दृष्टं यथा सुखादिः ॥ व्यतिरेकमुखेन दृष्टान्ताभिधानं वैधर्म्योदाहरणम् । यदनित्यं [6]न भवति तत्तीव्रादिधर्मोपेतमपि न भवति यथाकाशमिति ॥

[7]एतेनोदाहरणाभासानामनुदाहरणत्वमुक्तं भवति ॥ उदाहरणलक्षणरहिता उदाहरणवदाभासमाना उदाहरणाभासास्तेचानेकप्रकाराः ॥ यथा चाऽनित्यं मनो मूर्तत्वादित्य[8]स्मिन्नेव[9] प्रयोगे सर्वेप्युदाहरणाभासा उच्यन्ते ॥ यन्मूर्तं तदनित्यं दृष्टं यथा-परमाणुरिति साध्यविकलः । १ । यथा [10]कर्मेति साधनविकलः । २ । यथाऽऽकाशमित्युभयविकलः । ३ । यथा [11]खपुष्पमित्याश्र-

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1 तुल्यलक्षण° B. तुल्यक्षण° C.

2 नित्य° B. न्यत्य C.

3 अमूर्तत्वात्° B.C. अमूर्तद्रव्यत्वात्° D.

4 एवम्. B. C omits एवम्.

5 °माणा B. °माणो C.

6 D omits न.

7 D omits. एतेन···भवति.

8 °दित्येतस्मि° D.

9 D omits एव.

10 B here quotes a passage from the commentary of जयसिंह.

11 शशविषाणम् C. D; पुष्ण° B.

यहीनः[1] । ४ । घटवदित्य[2]व्याप्त्यभिधानम् । ५ । यदनित्यं तन्मूर्तं दृष्टमिति विपरीतव्याप्त्यभिधानम् । ६ । इत्येतौ वचनदोषौ ॥ यत्त्व[3]नित्यं न[4] भवति तन्मूर्तमपि न भवति यथा परमाणुरिति साधनाऽव्यावृत्तः । ७ । यथा कर्मेति साध्याऽव्यावृत्तः । ८ । यथा घट इत्युभयाऽव्यावृत्तः ।९। यथा खपुष्पमित्याश्रयहीनः।१०। आकाशवदित्यव्याप्त्यभिधानम् । ११ । यन्न[5] मूर्तं तदनित्यं न भवति यथाऽऽकाशमिति विपरीतव्याप्त्यभिधानम् । १२ । इत्ये[6]तौ वचनदोषौ ॥ अत्राद्याः षट् साधर्म्योदाहरणाभासाः । इतरे षट् वैधर्म्योदाहरणाभासा इति ॥ अन्ये तु संदेहद्वारेणाऽपरानष्टावुदा[7]हरणाभासान्वर्णयंति ॥ संदिग्धसाध्यो यथा महाराज्यं करिष्यत्ययं सोमवंशोद्भूतत्वाद्विवक्षितराजपुरुषवदिति । १३ । संदिग्धसाधनो यथा नायं सर्वज्ञो रागादिमत्त्वाद्रथ्यापुरुषवत् । १४ । संदिग्धोभयो यथा स्वर्गं गमिष्यत्ययं विवक्षितः पुरुषः समुपार्जितशुक्लधर्मत्वादप[8]रिचितदेवदत्तपुत्रवत् । १५ । संदिग्धाश्रयो यथा नायं सर्वज्ञो बहुवक्तृ[9]कत्वात् भविष्यद्देवदत्तपुत्रवत् । १६ । संदिग्धसाध्याऽव्यावृत्तो यथा यो महाराज्यं न करिष्यति स सोमवंशोद्भूतो[10] न भवति यथाऽन्यो राजपुरुषः । १७ । संदिग्धसाधनाव्यावृत्तो यथा यस्तु सर्वज्ञः स रागादिरहितो यथा समस्तशास्त्राभिज्ञ इति । १८ । संदिग्धोभयाव्यावृत्तो यथा यः स्वर्गं न गमिष्यति स समुपार्जितशुक्लधर्मोऽपि न भवति यथा

1 आश्रयविकलः° D.

2 घटवदिति व्याप्त्यनभिधानम् । R.

3 यद्य° B. यत्त्व° R. यन्नि° C, D;

4 D omits न भवति.

5 यदमूर्तं° D.

6 D omits इति.

7 अष्टानुदा° B. अष्टावुदा° C. D;

8 देवदत्तवत् C. D; अपरिचितदेवदत्तपुत्रवत्° B;

9 वक्तृत्वात्° B.

10 °तोपि B. D;

दुःस्थः पुरुषः । १९ । संदिग्धाश्रयो यथा यः सर्वज्ञः स[1] बहुवक्ता न भवति यथा भविष्यद्देवदत्तपुत्रः । २० ॥

दृष्टान्ते प्रसिद्धाऽविनाभावस्य साधनस्य दृष्टान्तोपमानेन पक्षे व्याप्तिख्यापकं[2] वचनमुपनयः ॥ स[3] पूर्ववद्द्विविधः । तथाच तीव्रादिधर्मोपेतः शब्द इति साधर्म्योपनयः । न तथा च तीव्रादिधर्मोपेतः शब्दो न भवतीति वैधर्म्योपेतः ॥

उपनयानंतरं सहेतुकं प्रतिज्ञावचनं निगमनं । तस्मादनित्य एवेति ॥ न चेदमनर्थकम् । साध्यविरुद्धाभावप्रतिपादकप्रमाण-[4]सूचकत्वादिति । न च तदंतरेण साध्यावधारणमुपपद्यते । तथा चोक्तम्

विमृश्य पक्षप्रतिपक्षाभ्यामर्थावधारणं निर्णय इति । गौ. सू. १-१-४१. ॥

निगमनाभिधानमसाधनांगम[5]भ्युपगम्य बाधकं प्रमाणमभ्युपगच्छतो निग्रहस्थानं प्रसज्येत । निगमनार्थत्वाद्बाधकस्य । निगमनार्थविप्रतिपत्तौ हि बाधकप्रमाणोपन्यासोऽभ्युक्तो[6] हेत्वर्थविप्रतिपत्तौ तत्साधकप्रमाणोपन्यासवदिति ॥ सोयं परमो न्यायो विप्रतिपन्नपुरुषप्रतिपादकत्वात् कथाप्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वाच्च ॥

वादिप्रतिवादिनोः[7] पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहः[8] कथा । सा द्विविधा

1 स बहुवक्ता न भवति C. D; सोऽयं न वदति B;

2 प्रतिपादकं D. ख्यापकं C;

3 D omits this whole phrase.

4 Rághava quotes another reading viz. साध्यविरुद्धप्रतिपादकप्रमाणाभावसूचकत्वात्°.

5 B omits ग.

6 °भ्युक्तो B. युक्तो C. D;

7 °नोः C. R;° नः B;

8 प्रतिपक्षग्रहः° B. प्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहः C. R;

वीतरागकथा विजिगीषुकथा चेति । यत्र वीतरागो वीतरागेण सह तत्वनिर्णयार्थं साधनोपालंभौ करोति सा वीतरागकथा वादसंज्ञयैवोच्यते । तथा चोक्तं

प्रमाणं[1]-तर्कसाधनोपालंभः सिद्धान्ताविरुद्धः पंचावयवोपपन्नः पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहो वादः ॥ गौ. सू. १-२-१.

तं प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहीनमपि वा कुर्यात् । प्रयोजनार्थित्वेन-यथा शिष्यो गुरुणा सह प्रश्नद्वारेणेवेत्यर्थः ॥ यत्र विजिगीषुर्विजिगीषुणा सह लाभपूजाख्यातिकामो जयपराजयार्थं प्रवर्तते वीतरागो वा पराऽनुग्रहार्थं ज्ञानांकुरसंरक्षणार्थं च प्रवर्तते सा चतुरंगा वादिप्रतिवादिसभापतिप्राश्निकांगा विजिगीषुकथा जल्पवितंडा संज्ञोक्ता ॥ तथाचाह

तत्वाध्यवसायसंरक्षणार्थं [2]जल्पवितण्डे बीजप्ररोहसंरक्षणार्थं कंटकशाखावरणवत् । गौ. सू. ४-२-५०. ॥

यथो[3]क्तोपपन्नश्छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानसाधनोपालम्भो जल्पः । गौ. सू. १-२-२. ॥

स प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहीनो वितण्डा । गौ. सू. १-२-३. ॥

वचनविघातोऽर्थविकल्पोपपत्त्या छलम् । गौ. सू. १-२-१० ॥

तत्त्रिविधम् वाक्छलं सामान्यछलमुपचारच्छलं चेति । गौ. सू. १-२-११ ॥

यथा

अविशेषाभिहितेऽर्थे वक्तुरभिप्राया[4]दर्थान्तरकल्पना वाक्छलम् । गौ. सू. १-२-१२ ॥

नवकम्बलोयं माणवक इत्युक्ते छलवाद्याह कुतो नवकंबला इति । तस्याऽप्रतिपत्तिलक्षणं निग्रहस्थानं वाच्यं । नवः कंबलो-

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1 प्रमाणातर्क° B. प्रमाणतर्क C. R;

2 B omits जल्पवितण्डे बीजप्ररोहसंरक्षणार्थं.

3 यथोपलक्षणोपपन्न° B.

4 °प्रायापरिज्ञानात् B. C.

ऽस्येति वक्तुरभिप्रायाऽपरिज्ञानाद्वा[1] विप्रतिपत्तेर्वा विपरीतज्ञानादिति ॥

संभवतोऽर्थस्यातिसामान्ययोगादसम्भूतार्थकल्पना सामान्यच्छलम् ॥ गौ. सू. १-२-१३ ॥

अहो नु[2] खल्वसौ ब्राह्मणश्चतुर्वेदाभिज्ञ इत्युक्ते केनचिन्न्यायवाद्याह किमत्राश्चर्यं संभवति हि ब्राह्मणे चतुर्वेदाभिज्ञत्वमित्यत्र च्छलवाद्याह न व्रात्येनानैकान्तिकत्वात् । तस्याऽपि पूर्ववन्निग्रहस्थानं वाच्यम् । कस्माद्धेतुत्वेना[3]ऽविवक्षितत्वात् । किं तर्हि । ब्राह्मणत्वे सति चतुर्वेदाभिज्ञत्वमाश्चर्यकारणं न भवति[4] सुक्षेत्रशालिसंपद्वत् ॥

उपचारप्रयोगे मुख्यार्थकल्पनया प्रतिषेध उपचारच्छलम् । यथा मञ्चाः क्रोशन्तीत्युक्ते च्छलवाद्याह पुरुषाः क्रोशन्ति न मञ्चास्तेषामचेतनत्वात् । इति तस्याऽपि निग्रहस्थानं वाच्यं पूर्ववत् । उभयथाऽपि लोके शास्त्रे च प्रयोगदर्शनादिति ॥

प्रयुक्ते हेतौ समीकरणाभिप्रायेण प्रसंगो जातिः ॥ पराजयनिमित्तं निग्रहस्थानमिति बहवश्चानयोः सूक्ष्मा भेदास्तेषां कियन्तो भेदा लक्षणोदाहरणाभ्यां प्रदर्श्यन्ते ॥

साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यामुपसंहारे तद्धर्मविपर्ययोपपत्ते[5]ः साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यसमौ । गौ. सू. ५-१-२. ॥

यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वाद्घटवदित्युक्ते जातिवाद्याह यद्यनित्यघटसाधर्म्यात्कृतकत्वादनित्यः शब्द इष्यते तर्हि नित्याकाशसाधर्म्यादमूर्तत्वान्नित्यः प्राप्नोति यदि च नित्याकाशवैधर्म्यात्कृतकत्वादनित्य इष्यते [6]तर्हि घटाद्यनित्यवैधर्म्यादमूर्तत्वा[7]-

1 वादिप्रतिपत्तिर्वा° B. वा विप्रतिपत्तेर्वा° C. D; वा विप्रतिपत्तिर्वा° R;
2 न° B. C; नु R. D;
3 हेतुत्वस्या° D; हेतुत्वेना° B. C.
4 °तीत्यभिप्राय° D;
5 त्तेः गौ. D; त्तिः B. C.
6 D. omits तर्हि.
7 मूर्तत्वं तर्हि° D.

न्नित्यः प्राप्नोति विशेषाभावात् । अनयोरुत्तरम् । अविनाभाविनः साधर्म्यस्य वैधर्म्यस्य च हेतुत्वाभ्युपगमादप्रसंगो धूमादिवत् ।

साध्यदृष्टान्तयोर्द्धर्मविकल्पादुभयसाध्यत्वाच्चोत्कर्षापकर्षवर्ण्यावर्ण्य[1]विकल्पसाध्यसमाः । गौ. सू. ५-१-४. ॥

साध्ये दृष्टान्ताद[2]निष्टधर्मप्रसंग उत्कर्षसमः ॥ इष्टधर्मनिर्वृत्तिरपकर्षसमः ॥ यदि कृतकत्वाद्धटवद[3]नित्यशब्द इष्यते तदा[4] घटवदेव सावयवोऽपि स्यात् । अथ[5] नैवमनित्योऽपि तर्हि न[6] स्यादविशेषादिति । अश्रावणश्च घटो दृष्टः शब्दोपि श्रावणो न स्यादविशेषादिति[7] । शब्दो यदि कृतकत्वाऽनुमानेनाऽनित्यो वर्ण्यते तदा घटोऽपि कृतकत्वाऽनुमानेनाऽनित्यो वर्ण्यः स्यात् । घटस्तेनैवानुमानेनाऽनित्यो वर्ण्यते ततः शब्दोप्यवर्ण्यः स्यादविशेषादिति वर्ण्यावर्ण्यसमौ ॥ कृतकत्वाऽविशेषेऽपि[8] यथामूर्तत्वाऽमूर्तत्वादिधर्मविकल्पस्तथा नित्यत्वाऽनित्यत्वविकल्पोऽपि स्यादविशेषादिति विकल्पसमः ॥ यदि कृतकत्वादुभयोरनित्यत्वं तर्हि साध्यत्व[9]मुभयोः स्यान्न वा कस्यचिदविशेषादिति साध्यसमः[10] ॥

एतेषामुत्तरं । किंचित्साधर्म्यादुपसंहारे सिद्धे[11] वैधर्म्यादप्रतिषेधः । गौ. सू. ५-१-५ ॥

किंचित्साधर्म्याद्धूमवत्त्वादिलक्षणात्साध्यदृष्टान्तयोर्धर्मविकल्पेऽपि व्यवस्था दृष्टा । तदपलापे लोकादिविरोधः सर्वाऽनुमानानामप्रामाण्यप्रसंगश्चेति ॥

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1 °पकर्षवर्ण्यावर्ण्यविकल्पसाध्यसमाः C. गौ. R. °पकर्षविकल्पसमाः B.

2 दि° B. द.° C. D.

3 दि° B. द.° C. D.

4 तथा B. तदा C. D.

5 अथानेक° B.

6 त° B.

7 This is the reading of R and D. C. omits, certainly by mistake, श्रावणो न स्यात् ···शब्दो.

8 षो° B. C. कृतकत्वादि° C.

9 साध्यत्वं तदा D.

10 C. omits साध्यसमः.

11 °द्धे वै° B.

प्राप्य साध्यमप्राप्य वा हेतोः प्राप्त्याऽविशिष्टत्वादप्राप्त्याऽसाधकत्वाच्च प्राप्त्यप्राप्तिसमौ । गौ. सू. ५-१-७ ॥

यद्ययं हेतुः प्राप्य साध्यं साधयेत्तदोभयोः प्राप्त्यविशिष्टत्वादंगुल्योरिव किं कस्य साध्यं साधनं चेति । अप्राप्यसाधको नास्ति काष्ठादग्निवदिति ॥ अनयोरुत्तरम्[1] ।

घटादि-निष्पत्ति-दर्शनात्पीडने चाभिचारादप्रतिषेधः । गौ. सू. ५-१-८ ॥

प्राप्त्यप्राप्त्यविशेषेऽपि प्रतिनियतार्थवृत्तय एवैते साध्यसाधनत्वादयो धर्मा दृष्टास्ते निराकर्तुमशक्याः सर्वप्रमाणविरोधादिति॥

प्रागुत्पत्तेः कारणाभावादनुत्पत्तिसमः । गौ. सू. ५-१-१२॥

यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः कार्यत्वादित्युक्ते प्रागुत्पत्तेरनित्यत्वे कारणं नास्तीति नित्यः प्रसक्तः । तस्योत्पत्तिरनुप[2]पन्नेति ॥ अस्योत्तरम् ।

तथाभावादुत्पन्नस्य कारणोपपत्तेर्न्न कारण[3]प्रतिषेधः । गौ. सू. ५-१-१३ ॥

अनुत्पन्नः शब्द एव नास्ति कस्य[4] नित्यत्वादिधर्माश्चिन्त्यन्ते ॥

त्रैकाल्याऽसिद्धेर्हेतोरहेतुसमः । गौ. सू. ५-१-१८ ॥

यदि पूर्वं साधनमसति साध्ये कस्य साधनम् । अथ[5] युगपत्तथापि किं कस्य साधनं साध्यं वा द्वयोस्तुल्यकालत्वादिति ॥ अस्योत्तरम् । न हेतुतः साध्यसिद्धे प्रवृत्त्यादिविरोध इति सूत्रार्थः । प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तेश्च त्रैकाल्यासिद्धिः । [6]स्वमतेनैव प्रतिषे[7]धासिद्धौ हेतुसिद्धिरिति सूत्रार्थः ॥

[8]ऐकधर्मोपपत्तेरविशेषे सर्वाऽविशेषप्रसंगात्सद्भावोपपत्तेरविशेषसमः । गौ. सू. ५-१-२३ ॥

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1 परिहारम्° C.

2 °दुत्पन्नस्य शब्दस्य C.

3 °त्तेर्न्न कारणप्रतिषेधः, गौ.; B.C. and D. omit न्न कारण°.

4 कुतस्तस्यपक्षता इति शेषः R.

5 पश्चादविद्यमानं कथं साधनमथ C.

6 स्ववचनेन C.

7 प्रतिषेधस्यासिद्धौ D.

8 B omits ए.

यथा[1] यदि घटशब्दयो[2]रेकैकस्य कार्यत्वस्योपपत्ते[3]रनित्यत्वेनाऽविशेष इष्यते सर्वभावानां तर्हि सद्भावोपपत्तेरविशेषः प्रसज्यत इति॥ [4]अत्रेदमुच्यते। सर्वथाऽविशेषे[5] प्रत्यक्षविरोधः। अनित्यत्वेनाऽविशेषे [6]त्वनुमानाग[7]मविरोधः। केनचिदविशेषे प्रमेयत्वादिना सिद्धसाधनमिति॥

निर्दिष्टकारणाभावेऽप्युपलंभादुपलब्धिसमः। गौ. सू. ५-१-२७

पृथिव्यादिषु कार्यत्वसिद्धये निर्दिष्टस्य सावयव[8]स्याऽभावेऽपि बुद्ध्यादौ कार्यत्वमुपलब्धमिति॥ अस्योत्तरम्। सपक्षैकदेशस्यापि धूमादेर्गमक[9]त्वदर्शनादप्रतिषेध इति॥ कथं तर्हि बुद्ध्या[10]दौ कार्यत्वसिद्धिर[11]त आह। कारणान्तरादपि तद्धर्मोपपत्तेरप्रतिषेधः। प्रमाणान्तरादपि कार्यत्व[12]सिद्धिरित्यर्थः॥ प्रमाणान्तरं वाऽनुपलब्धिकारणेष्वसत्सु प्रागूर्ध्वं वा[13]ऽनुपलंभात् घटवदिति॥

[14]तदनुपलब्धेरनुपलंभादभावसिद्धौ तद्वि[15]परीतोपपत्तेरनुपलब्धिसमः। गौ. सू. ५-१-२९॥

तस्य बुद्ध्यादिकार्यस्याऽनुपलब्धे[16]रनुपलंभादभावसिद्धावनुपलब्धिविपरीतोपलब्ध्युपपत्तेः प्रागूर्ध्वमपि बुद्ध्या[17]देः सद्भावः सेत्स्यतीत्यभिप्रायः॥ अस्योत्तरम्

अनुपलंभात्मकत्वादनुपल[18]ब्धेरहेतुः। गौ. सू. ५-१-३५॥

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1 B omits यदि. C omits यथा. D has यथा यदि.

2 °रेकस्य B. °रेकैकस्य C.

3 D omits one whole line from रनित्यत्वेन·········सद्भावोपपत्तेः

4 तत्रे° C.

5 विशेषेऽपि D.

6 °षेऽनुमाना° B. °षे त्वनुमाना° C.D.

7 C omits आगम.

8 सावयवत्वस्य° C.

9 गमत्व B.

10 °दे: D.

11 °द्धिरिति C.

12 कार्यत्वादि° D.

13 वा° B. C, चा° R.

14 C. omits this whole line.

15 विपरीतोपलब्ध्युपपत्तेः C.

16 C. omits° रनुपलंभा···लब्धि।

17 बुध्यादिसद्भावः C.

18 °दनुपलब्धेः गौ. D; लब्धिः C.

नास्तीति ज्ञानमनुपलब्धिः सा तत्स्वभावतया प्रत्यात्मसंवेद्या[1] [2]तत्सदनुपलब्धिरसिद्धेत्यभिप्रायः ॥

नित्यमनित्यभावादनित्ये नित्यत्वोपपत्ते[3]र्नित्यसमः । गौ. सू. ५-१-३५ ॥

अ[4]नित्यत्वधर्मस्य नित्यं सर्वदा [5]सद्भावे धर्मिणोऽपि शब्दस्य सर्वदा सद्भावः । अथाऽनित्यत्वं सर्वदा नास्ति तथाप्य[6]नित्यत्वाभावान्नाऽनित्यः शब्द इति ॥ अस्योत्तरम्[7] । अनित्यत्वस्य सर्वदाऽभ्युप[8]गमे नित्यत्वविरोधः । अनभ्युपगमे चाऽसिद्धो हेतुः । प्रध्वंसश्चानित्यत्वं तव तस्मिन्सति शब्दसद्भाव इति । एतेनान्यत्वस्यात्मनोऽनन्यत्वादन्यत्वं नास्तीत्यादीन्यसदुत्तराणि प्रत्युक्तानि । निमित्तान्तरात्संज्ञान्तरे योज्यमानेऽर्थे तथाभावस्य निराकर्तुमशक्यत्वात् ॥ आनन्त्यान्न सर्वाण्यपि जात्युत्तराण्युदाहर्तुं शक्यन्ते । सूत्राणामप्युदाहरणार्थत्वादित्युक्ता जातिभेदाः ॥

अथेदानीं निग्रहस्थानान्युच्यन्ते । तान्यपि [9]विप्रतिपत्त्य[10]प्रतिपत्त्यो विकल्पादसंख्या[11]नि । अतः संक्षेपतो व्युत्पाद्यन्ते ॥

प्रतिज्ञाहानिः प्रतिज्ञान्तरं प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासो हेत्वन्तरमर्थान्तरं निरर्थकमविज्ञातार्थमपार्थकमप्राप्तकालं न्यूनमधिकं[12] पुनरुक्तमननुभाषणमज्ञानमप्रतिभा विक्षेपो मतानुज्ञा पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणं निरनुयोज्यानुयोगोऽपसिद्धान्तो हेत्वाभासाश्च निग्रहस्थानानि ॥

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1 संवेद्या B. D. वेद्या. C.

2 तदनुपलब्धि° C. तत्सदनुपलब्धिः B.

3 त्ते°, (गौ.) त्ति.° C.

4 अनित्यधर्मस्य° B. अनित्यत्वधर्मस्य° C.

5 सद्भावे B. D; सद्भावात् C.

6 तथाप्यनित्यत्वान्नित्यः शब्द इति C.

7 D omits this.

8 °भ्युपगमे C °भ्युपगमात् B. D;

9 R & C. omit. विप्रति···विकल्पात्°.

10 त्त्यु° B.

11 असंख्यानि B. असंख्यातानि D.

12 अधिकः B. अधिकम् D. C. (गौ.)

तत्र साध्ये प्रतिदृष्टान्तधर्मानुज्ञा[1] प्रतिज्ञाहानिः ॥ यथा यदि कृतकत्वाद्[2] घटवदनित्यः शब्द इष्यते तर्ह्याकाशवद्[3]-मूर्तत्वान्नित्यः किन्नेष्यते । एवं प्रतिवादिनोक्तो[4] वाद्याह । भवतु किं नो बाधते[5] इति । तस्य नित्यत्वाऽभ्युपगमेनाऽनित्यत्वप्रतिज्ञा हीयत इत्यतः प्रतिज्ञाहानिनिग्रहस्थानं भवति[6] । १ ।

प्रतिज्ञातार्थस्य[7] प्रतिषेधे धर्मविकल्पात्तदर्थनिर्देशः प्रतिज्ञान्तरम् ॥ यथा सर्वमनित्यं सत्वादित्यत्र दृष्टान्ताऽभावेन प्रतिज्ञातार्थ-प्रतिषेधे[8] धर्मो[9] विवादास्पदीभूत[10]लक्षणस्तस्य विकल्पः प्रतिज्ञातार्थ[11]विशषणत्वेन योजनं । तदर्थ इति प्रतिषेधनिवृत्त्यर्थः । [12]निर्देशो [13]विशेषणाभिधानं विवादास्पदीभूतं सर्वमनित्यमित्येतत्प्रतिज्ञान्तरं निग्रहस्थानं हेत्वन्तरवत् ॥ २ ॥

प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोर्विरोधः प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः । गौ. सू. ५-२-४ ॥ यथा गुणव्यतिरिक्तं द्रव्यं भेदेनानुलंभाद्घटवत्[14] ॥ ३ ॥

पक्षप्रतिषेधे प्रतिज्ञातार्थाऽपनयनं प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासः । गौ. सू. ५-२-५ ॥ यथाऽनुष्णोऽग्निरित्येतस्य[15] पक्षविरोधित्वेन[16] प्रतिषेधे[17] वाद्याह । संपश्यध्वमहो मध्यस्था नाहमनुष्णमग्निं ब्रवीम्यनुक्तोपालंभोयमित्येत्प्रतिज्ञासन्न्यासलक्षणं निग्रहस्थानम्[18] ॥ ४ ॥

अविशेषोक्ते हेतौ प्रतिषिद्धे विशेषमिच्छतो हेत्वन्तरनिग्रह-

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1 धर्माभ्यनुज्ञा° (गौतम. better reading) धर्मानुज्ञा° R. B. D.

2 कार्यत्वात्° R.

3 न चाकाश° B. नन्वाकाश° D.

4 °क्ते B, D.

5 बोध्यतेति D.

6 भविष्यति C.

7 प्रतिज्ञातार्थप्रतिषेधे° (गौ,) D. प्रतिज्ञातार्थस्य प्रतिषेधे C, B.

8 प्रतिज्ञातार्थस्य C.

9 धर्मादित्वा° B.

10 भूतत्वाल्ल° C.

11 प्रतिज्ञातार्थ° B. प्रतिज्ञातेर्थ° D.

12 C & D insert यथामशकार्थो धूम इति before निर्देशो°.

13 C. omits विशेषणाभिधानम्.

14 C. omits घटवत्°.

15 अनुष्णोग्निः कृतकत्वात्°.

16 C. omits पक्षविरोधित्वेन°.

17 प्रतिषेध° B. प्रतिषेधे C. D.

18 B. omits निग्रहस्थानम्.

स्थानम् ॥ यथा नित्या वेदा अस्मर्यमाणकृतकत्वादित्येतस्य[1] जीर्णकूपा[2]ऽऽरामादिभिरनैकान्तिकत्वेन प्रतिषेधे[3] संप्रदायविच्छेदे सतीति विशेषणमिच्छतो[4] हेत्वन्तरं निग्रहस्थानम् । पूर्वस्याऽसाधकस्योपादानात् ॥ ५ ॥

प्रकृतादर्थादप्रतिसबन्धार्थमर्थान्तरम् । गौ. सू. ५-२-७ ॥ यथा नित्यः शब्दो[5]ऽस्पर्शवत्त्वादिति हेतुः । हेतुश्च हिनोते र्धातोः तुनि प्रत्यये सति कृदन्तं पदमित्या[6]दिप्रसक्तानुप्रसक्त्या प्रकृतार्थाऽनुपयोगिशास्त्रा[7]न्तरमुपदिशतोऽर्थान्तरं निग्रहस्थानम् ॥ ६ ॥

वर्णक्रमनिर्देशवन्निरर्थकम् । गौ. सू. ५-२-८ ॥ यथा नित्यः शब्दः कचतटपानां गजबडवत्वात् घझडढधभवत् ॥ ७ ॥

परिषत्प्रतिवादिभ्यां त्रिरभिहितमप्यतीत[8]मविज्ञातार्थं ॥ यथा यद्वाक्यं त्रिरभिहितमप्यप्रतीतप्रयोगा[9]ऽतिद्रुतोच्चारितादिना निमित्तेन परिषत्प्रतिवादिभ्यां न ज्ञायते तदज्ञानसंवरणायोक्तमविज्ञातार्थं निग्रहस्थानम् ॥ ८ ॥

पौर्वापर्याऽयोगादप्रतिसंबद्धार्थमपार्थकम् । गौ. सू. ५-२-१० ॥ यथा दशदाडिमानि षडपूपाः कुण्डमजाजिनमित्यादिः ॥ ९ ॥

अवयवविपर्यासवचनमप्राप्तकालम् । गौ. सू. ५-२-११ ॥ प्रतिज्ञादीनामर्थवशात्क्रमस्तेषां विपर्ययेणाभिधानं निग्रहस्थानम् ॥ १० ॥

हीनमन्य[10]तमेनाप्यवयवेन न्यूनम् । गौ. सू. ५-२-१२ ॥ [11]साधनाभावे साध्यसिद्धेरयोगात् ॥ ११ ॥

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1 °दित्यस्य D.

2 पो° B. कूपारामा° C. D. Raghav explains आरामादिभिरुपवनैः.

3 D. inserts हेतौ.

4 ता° B.

5 शब्दोस्पर्श° C.

6 पदं च नामाख्यातोपसर्गनिपातभेदाच्चतुर्विधमि° D.

7 शास्त्रान्तरम्. C. D. शास्त्रार्थं B.

8 अविज्ञातं (गौ.)

9 °गातितोच्चा° B.

10 हीनमप्यंतिमेनावयवेन C. हीनमन्यतमेनाप्यवयवेन B. D. गौ.

11 साधनाद्यसिद्धेरयोगादिति B. D. साधनाभावेसाध्यसिद्धेरयोगात्. C.

हेतूदाहरणा[1]भ्यामधिकम् ॥ एकेन [2]कृतत्वादितराऽऽनर्थक्यादिति ॥ १२ ॥

शब्दार्थयोः पुनर्वचनं पुनरुक्तमन्यत्रानुवादात् । गौ. सू. ५-२-१४॥ सार्थकं पुनरभिधानमनुवादस्तद्व्यतिरेकेण पुनर्वचनं पुनरुक्तम् । यथा नित्यः शब्दो नित्यः शब्द इति शब्दपुनरुक्तम्[3] ॥ अर्थादापन्नस्य स्वशब्देन पुनर्वचनं पुनरुक्तम् ॥ साधर्म्योदाहरणेऽभिहिते वैधर्म्योदाहरणाऽभिधानमिति । कथं तन्निग्रहस्थानम् । कथावसानविरोधित्वादेकेन [4]कृतार्थत्वादितरानर्थक्यात् ॥ १३ ॥

विज्ञातस्य परिषदा त्रिरभिहितस्याऽप्यप्रत्युच्चारणमननुभाषणं[5] प्रतिवादिनो निग्रहस्थानम् । अप्रत्युच्चारयन्किमाश्रयः परपक्षप्रतिषेधं ब्रूया[6]दिति ॥ १४ ॥

[7]अविज्ञातार्थं चाज्ञानम् ॥ यच्च वाक्यं त्रिरभिहितमपि परिषदाऽवगतार्थं प्रतिवादी प्रत्युच्चारयन्नार्थतः सम्यगधिगच्छति तदज्ञानं नाम निग्रहस्थानं भ[8]वति ॥ १५ ॥

कथामभ्युपगम्य तूष्णींभावोऽप्रतिभा वादिप्रतिवादिनोर्निग्रहस्थानम् ॥ १६ ॥

कार्यव्यासंगात्कथाविच्छेदो विक्षेपः । गौ. सू. ५-२-१६ ॥ कथामभ्युपगम्य सभ्येषु मिलितेषु ब्रवीत्यद्य मे महत्प्रयोजनमस्ति तस्मिन्नवसिते पश्चात्कथयिष्यामीति ॥ १७ ॥

स्वपक्ष[9]दोषाभ्युपगमात्परपक्ष[10]दोषो[11] मतानुज्ञा ॥ यः स्वपक्षे

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1 c. & गौ. omit भ्याम्.

2 कतकत्वात्°. B.

3 c and D add here नित्योध्वनिरविनाशीशब्द इति पुनरुक्तम्.

4 कृतार्थत्वात् D. कृतत्वात् B.

5 c. inserts here नाम.

6 ब्रूयात्° (वा०) c, कुर्यात्, B, D.

7 अविज्ञातार्थमज्ञानम्. B. ···चाज्ञानम्. c. D. अविज्ञातं चाज्ञानं (गौ.)

8 c and D omit भवति.

9 स्वपक्षे° c. स्वपक्ष° B. गौ.

10 परपक्षं° B. c. परपक्षे. (गौ.)

11 दोषो c. B. दोषप्रसंगो. (गौ.)

मनागपि दोषं न परिहरति केवलं परपक्षे दोषं[1] प्रसंजयति । भवांश्चोर इत्युक्ते त्वमपि चोर इति । तस्येदं निग्रहस्थानम् । स्वयं दोषाभ्युपगमात्[2]

[3]निग्रहप्राप्तस्याऽनिग्रहः पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणम् ॥ पर्यनुयोज्यो नाम निग्रहोपपत्त्या [4]चोदनीयस्तस्योपेक्षणं निग्रहप्राप्तौ सत्यामननुयोग इति । [5]एतदुभाभ्याम[6]नुक्तया परि[7]षदा वक्तव्यम् ॥१९॥

अनिग्रहस्थाने निग्रहस्थानाभियोगो निरनुयोज्याऽनुयोगः ॥ यथा सावयवत्वेन पृथिव्यादेः कार्यत्व[8]सिद्धौ [9]परो ब्रूयादप्रयोजकोयं हेत्वाभास इति । तस्येदं मिथ्याऽभियोग[10]लक्षणं निग्रहस्थानम् ॥२०॥

सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेत्याऽनियमात् कथाप्रसंगोऽपसिद्धान्तः ॥ यथा मीमांसामभ्युपगम्य कश्चिदग्निहोत्रं स्वर्गसाधनमित्याह । कथं पुनरग्निहोत्रक्रियाध्वस्ता सती स्वर्गस्य साधिका भवतीत्यनुयुक्तः प्राह । [11]अनया [12]क्रिययाऽऽराधितो[13] महेश्वरः फलं ददाति राजादिवत् । तस्येश्वरानभ्युपगमादपसिद्धान्तो निग्रहस्थानम् ॥ प्रतिज्ञातार्थविपर्ययस्तु प्रतिज्ञाहानिर्नापसिद्धान्तः ॥ २१ ॥

हेत्वाभासाश्च यथोक्ताः । हेत्वाभासलक्षणेनैव यथोक्तेन हेत्वाभासा निग्रहस्थानानि ॥ २२ ॥

एतेन दुर्वचनकपोलताडनवादित्रादीनां साधनानुपयोगित्वेन निग्रहस्थानत्वं वेदितव्यं । नियमकथायामपशब्दादीनामपि ॥

इति न्यायसारे द्वितीयः परिच्छेदः ॥

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1 दूषणम् C.

2 C. D. add here परेणानभ्युपगमात्.

3 निग्रहं B. निग्रहस्थानप्राप्तस्य° (गौ).

4 नोदनीयः B. C. D. चोदनीयः(वा).

5 C. omits this line.

6 अनुक्तया° R.D.अनुयुक्तया°B.C.(वा.)

7 °दो° B. °दा° R. D. (वा.)

8 °त्वासिद्धौ B.

9 पुरो C.

10 °योगोलक्षणम्. C.

11 तया C.

12 क्रियाया° B.

13 °तःपरमेश्वरः B. °तो महेश्वरः D.

[1]अथावसितमनुमानमागमस्येदानीं लक्षणमुच्यते ॥ समयबलेन सम्यक्परोक्षानुभवसाधनमागमः ॥ स द्विविधो दृष्टाऽदृष्टार्थभेदात् । तत्र [2]दृष्टार्थानां वाक्यानां प्रायेण प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यात्प्रामाण्यं [3]गम्यते । अदृष्टा[4]र्थानां पुनराप्तोक्तेनेति ॥ कथम् पुत्रकामो यजेते[5]त्यादि वाक्यानां प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यात्प्रामाण्यमनुमाय[6] तत्प्रणेतुरतीन्द्रियार्थदर्शित्वेन परमाप्तत्वमवधार्य तत्प्रणीतानां सर्ववाक्यानामप्रामाण्ये कारणाऽभावात्प्रामाण्यमनुमीयत इति ॥ न नित्यत्वेन वाक्यानां हि नित्यत्वे [7]प्रमाणाऽभावात् । अनित्यं पुनर्वाक्यत्वाद्यनेकमनुमानं । सर्वदोपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिप्रसंग[8]श्चेति विपर्ययो[9] नियामकाभावात् । तदनुपलब्धिरिति चेन्न [10]तदनिर्देशात् ॥ वायुसंयोगविभागाविति चेन्न सर्वशब्दानां युगपद्[11]ग्रहणप्रसंगात् । कथम् । श्रोत्रं तावत्समानेन्द्रियग्राह्यसमानदेशसमानधर्मापन्नानां[12] ग्रहणाय प्रतिनियत[13]संस्कारसंस्कार्यं न भवति इन्द्रियत्वाच्चक्षुर्वत् ॥

शब्दा वा प्रतिनियतसंस्कार[14]संस्कार्या न भवन्ति [15]समानेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वे सति युगपदिन्द्रियसंबद्ध[16]त्वात् घटादिवत् । उत्पत्तिपक्षेप्ययं समानो दोष इति चेन्न[17] मृत्पिंडप्रदीपदृष्टान्ताभ्यां कारकव्यंजकवैधर्म्यसिद्धेरित्यलमतिप्रसङ्गेनेति ॥

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1 अथवसितं B. अवसितं C.

2 दृष्टार्थानां D. दृष्टानां B.

3 गम्यते B. C. अवगम्यते. D.

4 अदृष्टानां B.

5 इत्यैवमादि° D.

6 मीयते तत्प्र° B.

7 प्रामाण्याभावात् C.

8 श्च° B.

9 विपर्ययें° D.

10 अभिव्यंजकाभावात्तदनु° C. D.

11 युगपदग्रहण° B. युगपत्ग्रहण° C. D.

12 °पन्नानामर्थानाम् C.

13 संस्कार्यं° B. संस्कारसंस्कार्यं. C. D.

14 संस्कार° B. संस्कारक° C. D.

15 समानेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वे B. समानेन्द्रियग्राह्यसमानदेशसमानधर्माऽपन्नत्वे C.

16 संबंधत्वात्. C. संबद्धत्वात्. B.

17 तम्° B. न मृ° C.

एवमेतानि त्रीण्येव प्रमाणानीति ॥ एष्वेवोपमानाऽर्थापत्तिसंभवाऽभावैतिह्यादीनामन्तर्भावः ॥ तत्र[1] यथा गौरेवं गवय इत्युपमानं शाब्दे[2]ऽन्तर्भूतम् । अनेन सदृशी मदीया गौरित्युपमानमिति चेन्न तस्य स्मृतित्वात्[3] ॥ पूर्वमेवहि[4] सादृश्यविशिष्ट [5]उपलब्धो गोपिण्डः । कस्मात् । उपलब्धियोग्यत्वात्[6] । अयोग्यत्वे वा न[7] कदाचिदुपलभ्येताऽदृष्टत्वात्[8] ॥ निर्विकल्पेन तु[9] प्रत्यक्षेण[10] पूर्वं सादृश्यमुपलब्धं तेन तदुपलब्ध्यभिमानो[11] न भवति । [12]निर्विकल्पकोपालंभे[13]ऽपि संस्कार[14]सहकारिसामर्थ्यादभावादिषु सविकल्पका स्मृतिर्दृष्टेति ॥

संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबंधप्रतिपत्तिरथाऽप्तवचनकार्या । तथा प्रश्नोत्तराभिधानादन्यप्रमाणाऽनिर्देशात् ॥ अस्य गवयशब्दः संज्ञेति प्रतिपत्तावुपमानसिद्धिस्तथाशब्दश्रवणादिति चेत् । एवं तर्हि गौरयमित्येवं संकेते कृते[15]ऽस्य गोशब्दः संज्ञेति प्रतिपत्तौ प्रमाणान्तरं वाच्यम् । समानन्यायत्वात् ॥ गोपिंडान्तरेऽपि संकेतग्रहणे प्रमाणान्तराभिधानप्रसंग इति ॥ तथाशब्दानभिधानेऽपि प्रतिपादकप्रतिपाद्ययो[16]रेवमेवाभिप्राय ईदृशस्य सर्वस्य गोशब्दः संज्ञेति सामर्थ्यादेवं[17] प्रतिपत्तिरिति चेन्न[18] । समानमेतदत्रापि गोसदृशो गवय इति शब्दादुभयोरेवा[19]भिप्रायो गोसदृशस्यार्थस्य गव-

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1 तत्र य° B. तद्य° D.
2 शाब्दे° B. C. शब्दे° D.
3 स्मृतित्वात् B. स्मृतत्वात् C.
4 °मेव B. °मेवहि D. C.
5 गौरुपलब्धः D उपलब्धो B. C.
6 °त्वात् B. °त्वात्सादृश्यस्य D.
7 D omits न.
8 अदृष्टवत् C. D. अदृष्टत्वात् B.
9 तु C. पुनः D. च B.
10 D. inserts here गवयदर्शनात्.
11 तदो° C. पदो° B. तदु° D.
12 D inserts प्रथमगोपिंडोपलंभकलिंगत्वोपलंभात् before निर्विकल्पक.
13 °पलंभ° C. B.
14 C. D. omit संस्कार.
15 C. D. omit कृते°.
16 प्रतिपत्रो° B. प्रतिपाद्ययो° C.
17 °देवं B. द्वैधं C.
18 चेत्° B. चेन्न D.
19 °रेवाभि° B. °रेवमभि° C. D.

यशब्दः संज्ञेति सामर्थ्यादेवं प्रतिपत्तिरिति ॥ न च प्रत्यक्ष एवाऽर्थे संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबंधप्रतिपत्तिरप्रत्यक्षेऽपि शक्रादौ संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबंधप्रतिपत्तिदर्शनात् ॥

सूत्रविरोध इति चेन्न प्रमाणनिग्रहस्थानाभ्यां दृष्टान्तहेत्वाभासादीनामिव प्रयोजनवशेन पृथगभिधानादिति। तर्हि[1] प्रयोजनं वाच्यमुच्यते। शब्दप्रामाण्यसमर्थनं प्रयोजनम्। कथम्। केचिदाहुः प्रत्यक्षानुमानविषयत्वे शब्दस्यानुवादकत्वमेव[2]। अनुवादकं[3] चाऽप्रमाणम्। तदविषयत्वे च संबंधाऽग्रहणादवाचकत्वम् पदार्थस्याप्रसिद्धत्वान्न[4] च पदेन संबंधग्रहणमितरेतराश्रयत्वात्[5]। वाक्यार्थस्तु प्रसिद्धार्थानां[6] पदार्थानामन्वयमात्रमिति[7] ॥ तन्निराकरणार्थमुपमानं निदर्शनार्थत्वेन पृथगुक्तम्। यथा गवयार्थिनाऽप्रसिद्धगवयस्य[8][9] प्रसिद्धगोसादृश्यमुपादायोपमानाख्येन वाक्येन संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबंधप्रतिपत्तिः क्रियते तथा किंचिन्निमित्तमुपादाय शक्रादि–पदपदार्थयोरपीति। तस्मादन्यार्थत्वान्न सूत्रविरोधः ॥

परीक्षा चार्थापत्तिवत्प्रमाणस्य सतः प्रमाणेष्वंतर्भावज्ञापनार्थम्। अंतर्भावस्तु यथाश्रुतोऽप्यनुमान एवास्य निराकृतो नाऽऽगम इति ॥

चतुष्ट्वाभिधानं सूत्रेषु[10] पंचत्वादिनिराकरणार्थं[11] न त्रित्वप्रतिषेधार्थं[12]। प्रमाणसिद्धत्वादंतर्भावस्य ॥ त्रित्वाऽनभिधानादयुक्तमिति

1 तर्हि B. एवं तर्हि° D.

2 °त्वमेव D °त्वात् B.

3 This phrase is found in D. B and C omit it.

4 अप्रसिद्धत्वात्° B. अवसिद्धत्वात्° D.

5 °श्रयत्वात् B. °श्रयत्वप्रसंगात् D.

6 प्रसिद्धानामु° B. प्रसिद्धार्थानामु° D.

7 B here inserts the phrase वाक्यं तु पदानामन्वयमात्रमिति.

8 गवयार्थिना° B. कार्यार्थिनो. C.

9 प्रसिद्ध° B अप्रसिद्ध° D.

10 D omits सूत्रेषु.

11 °त्वादिनिरा° B. °त्वनिरा° D.

12 C omits त्रित्व···र्थं.

चेन्नाऽस्य सूत्रकारस्यैवं स्वभावत्वात्[1] स्वसिद्धान्तमपि क्वचिन्नाधत्ते। यथा कृत्स्नै[2]कदेशविकल्पादिनाऽवयवि[3]निराकरणे विशिष्टानामूहादिशक्त्यतिशययुक्ता[4]नामेवात्राधिकारः । तस्मात्स्थितमुपमानं शब्देऽन्तर्भूतम् ॥

अर्थापत्तेरप्यनुमानेऽन्तर्भावोऽविनाभावबले[5]नार्थप्रतिपत्तिसाधनत्वात् । अन्यथा नोपपद्यत इत्युक्ते सत्येवोपपद्यत इति लभ्य[6]तेऽयमेवाऽविनाभावः ॥ यत्र सामान्याऽऽकारेणाऽन्वयग्रहणं नास्ति यथा मुख्यकारणत्वाऽप्रतिबद्धशक्त्योस्तत्रार्थापत्तिः पृथक्प्रमाणमिति चेन्न । तत्रापि केवलव्यतिरेक्यनुमाना[7]ऽव्यतिरेकात् । केवलव्यतिरेक्यर्थापत्तिरिति संज्ञाभेदमात्रम् ॥ अन्वयाऽभावान्नैतदनुमानमिति चेन्न केवलान्वयिनो व्यतिरेकाऽभावे [8]प्रमाणान्तरत्वप्रसंगात् । अपि वा[9] प्रत्यक्षादिभेदानां केनचिद्वैधर्म्येण भेदात्प्रमाणान्तरत्वप्रसंगः। तस्मादविनाभावबलेनैवार्थप्रतिपादकत्वादर्थापत्तिरनुमानमिति ॥

बहु[10]संख्याविषयत्वे सत्यल्पसंख्याविषयत्व[11]स्य सर्वत्रोपलब्धत्वान्नानुमानात्संभवो भिद्यत इति ॥

अभावस्य तु त्रिष्वपि यथासंभवेनान्तर्भावः । तथाहि । कौर[12]वाद्यभावप्रतिपत्तिरागमात् । आत्मादिषु रूपाद्यभावप्रतिपत्ति-

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1 B adds here यत्.

2 प्रश्नै° B. कृत्स्नै° C. D.

3 अवयवि° C. D. अवयव° B.

4 युक्तानामेवात्राधिकारः C. युक्ताधिकारंज्ञापनार्थम्. B.

5 बलेन B. C. बलेनैव D.

6 लभ्यते C. D. लक्ष्यते B.

7 °मानाऽव्य° C. मानादव्य° B.

8 प्रमाणान्तरत्वप्रसंगात् D. °न प्रमाणान्तरं स्यात्° B. C.

9 च C. D. वा B.

10 बहुत्वसंख्या° C. D. बहुसंख्या° B.

11 विषयस्य C. D. विषयत्व° B.

12 कौरवाद्य° D. कैरेवाद्य° B; C. omits this whole phrase.

रनुमानात् । भूतलादिषु घटाद्यभावप्रतिपत्तिः प्रत्यक्षात्[1] । इन्द्रियव्यापारभावभावित्वादिति ॥ अन्यत्र तद्भावभावित्वं पर्यवसितमिति चेन्न रूपादिष्विव बाधकाऽभावात् ॥ संबंधाभावो बाधक इति चेन्न स्वपरपक्षयोरसिद्धत्वात् स्वपक्षे तावद्रूपादिष्विवापरोक्षानुभवकार्यानुमेयो योग्यताख्यः संबन्धः[2] । परपक्षेऽपि संयुक्तविशेषणभावादिः ॥ संयोगसमवायरहितस्य विशेषणविशेष्यभावानुपपत्तिरिति चेन्न विशिष्टप्रत्ययवशेन तत्सिद्धि[3]रिति ॥

अनिर्दिष्टप्रवक्तृकं प्रवादपारंपर्यमैतिह्यमागमेऽन्तर्भूतम् ॥ यथेह वटे यक्षः प्रतिवसति ।

प्रयत्न[4]जनिता शरीरतदवयवक्रिया चेष्टा सा[5] नाट्यशास्त्रादिप्रसिद्धा समयबलेन पुरुषाभिप्राय[6]मर्थविशेषं च गमयंती[7] नाऽऽगमाद्भिद्यते । लिप्यक्षरादर्थप्रतिपत्तिवदिति ॥ तदेवं व्यवस्थितमेतानि[8] त्रीण्येव प्रमाणानीति[9] ॥

किं पुनरेभिः प्रमाणैः प्रमातव्यमित्युच्यते[10] । प्रमेयम् । किं लक्षणम् । यद्विषय[11]ज्ञानमन्यज्ञानाना[12]मुपयोगित्वेनैव निःश्रेयस[13]साधनं भवति तत्प्रमेयम् । तदेव तत्वतो ज्ञातव्यम् सर्वदा भावयि-

1 प्रत्यक्षात् B. प्रत्यक्षत्वात् D.

2 D omits संबन्धः.

3 °द्धेः B °द्धिः C. D.

4 °जनिता C. D. °जन्या B.

5 सा नाट्य° C. D; अनादि° B. अनाद्यशास्त्रादिसमयबलेन C.

6 पुरुषाभिप्रायविशेषम्° B. पुरुषाभिप्रायविशेषमर्थविशिषम्° C. पुरुषाभिप्रायमर्थविशेषम्° D.

7 गमयंती B. गमयती D.

8 एतानि त्रीण्येव B. एतत्रीण्येघ C.

9 D here inserts इति तृती-योऽयमागमपरिच्छेदः

10 °तव्यं । उच्यते C. B. °तव्यमित्युच्यते D.

11 विषयं ज्ञानम् C. D. विषयज्ञानम् B

12 ज्ञानामु° B. ज्ञानानुप° C. D.

13 निःश्रेयसांगं C. निःश्रेयससाधनं B.

तव्यं च । न कीटसंख्यादिवत् ज्ञानस्यानुपयोऽगित्वात्[1] ॥

[2]तच्चतुर्विधम् । हेयं तस्य [3]निर्वर्तकम् [4]हानं तस्योपाय इति ॥ तत्र हेयं दुःखमनागतमेकविंशतिप्रकारकम्[5] । शरीरं षडिन्द्रियाणि षड्विषयाः षड्बुद्धयः सुखं दुःखं चेति ॥ तत्र शरीरं दुःखायतनत्वाद्दुःखम् । इन्द्रियाणि विषया बुद्धयश्च [6]तत्साधनभावात् । सुखं[7] दुःखानुषंगाद्दुःखम् । दुःखं च[8] बाधना पीडा संतापात्मकं मुख्यमेवेति ॥

तस्य निर्वर्तकमसाधारणं कारणमविद्यातृष्णे धर्माधर्माविति । सम्यगध्यात्मविद्भिः प्रदर्शितार्थविपरीतज्ञानमविद्या ॥ सहसंस्कारेण पुनर्भवप्रार्थना[9] तृष्णा ॥ सुखदुःखयोरसाधारणौ हेतू धर्माधर्माविति ॥

हानं दुःखविच्छेदः । आत्यन्तिकमिति न कदाचित्कथंचिद्दुःखसंबंधः ॥

तस्योपायस्तत्त्वज्ञानमात्मविषयम् ॥ तथा चोक्तम् । आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यश्चेति । श्रोतव्यः श्रुतिवाक्येभ्यो मन्तव्यश्चोपपत्तिभिः । ज्ञात्वा च सततं ध्येयः एते दर्शनहेतवः । तरति शोकमात्मविदिति ॥

स द्विविधः । परश्चापरश्च । तथा चोक्तम् । [10]द्वे ब्रह्मणी वेदितव्ये परं चापरं चेत्यादिः ॥ तत्रैश्वर्यविशिष्टः संसारधर्मैरीषदप्यसंस्पृष्टः[11] परो भगवान्महेश्वरः[12] सर्वज्ञः सकलजगद्विधाता ।

1 °नुपयोगात् C. °नुपयोगित्वात् B D.

2 तत् प्रमेयम् C.

3 विनिवर्तकम् B. निर्वत्रिकम् C. निर्वर्तकम्. D. (जयसिंह).

4 हीनं B. हानम् C.

5 प्रकारकम् B. प्रकारम् C. D.

6 तत्साधने भावाद्दुःखम् D. तत्साधनभावात्° B.

7 सुखम् B. C. सुखमपि D.

8 च B. तु C. D.

9 प्रार्थना B. प्रार्थनम् C.

10 D has तथा चोक्तम्. B omits it.

11 °संस्पृष्टः B. D. °स्पृष्टः C.

12 D inserts after महेश्वरः, and before सर्वज्ञः, परमैश्वर्यविशिष्टः संसारधर्मैं रागद्वेषमोहदुःखादिभिरीषदप्यस्पृष्टोऽनादिः.

स कथं ज्ञातव्यः । अनुमानादागमाच्च ॥ तथाहि विवादाध्यासितमुपलब्धिमत्कारणकमभूत्वाभावित्वाद्वस्त्रादिवदिति । सामान्यव्याप्तेरनवद्यत्वेन निराकर्तुमशक्यत्वात् । ततः सामान्यसिद्धौ पारिशेषात्कार्यविशेषाच्च कर्तृविशेषसिद्धिः चित्रादिकार्यविशेषात्कर्तृविशेषसिद्धिवत् ॥

एको हि रुद्रो न द्वितीयाय तस्थुर्य इमान्लोकानीशित ईशिनीभिरित्यागमाच्चेति ॥

संसार[1]भोक्ताऽनन्तोऽपरः । स खलु बुद्ध्यादिकार्याणामाश्रयभूतोऽनुमातव्यः । न हि कार्यमनाधारं किंचिदुपलब्धम् । न चेन्द्रियाणामाश्रयत्वमुक्तमुपहतेन्द्रियस्य विषयस्मरणाऽयोगात् । अन्यानुभूतेर्थेऽन्यस्य [2]स्मरणाऽदर्शनात् । अत एव शरीरस्यापि बाल्यकौमारादिभेदभिन्नत्वादस्मरणम् । एते[3]न पूर्वबुद्ध्यनुभूतेर्थे उत्तरबुद्धेः कार्यकारणभावात्स्मरणमपास्तमन्यत्वा[4]ऽविशेषात् ॥ [5]कर्पासे रक्ततावदिति चेन्न साधनदूष[6]णाऽसंभवात् । अन्वयाद्यभावान्न साधनमसिद्धत्वाद्यनुद्भावना[7]न्न दूषणमिति । न च कर्पासेऽपि निरन्वयविनाशोत्पादे रक्ततोत्पद्यते कर्पासान्तरवत् । एतेनैव क्षणिकत्वमपास्[8]तम् ॥ प्रत्यभिज्ञाख्येन च प्रत्यक्षेण स्फटिकादिष्वक्षणिकत्वं गृह्यते । प्रदी[9]पादिष्विव भ्रान्तमिति चेन्नैकत्रबाध्यत्वेन भ्रान्तत्वं सर्वत्र तत्कल्पनायामतिप्रसंगात् । अनभ्युपगमाच्च सादृश्यस्य क्षणिकत्वे भ्रान्तिबीजाभाव इति ॥

[10]तत्सिद्धमेतच्छरीरादिव्यतिरिक्त आत्मा व्यापको नित्य इति ।

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1 संसारभोक्ता B. संसारफलोपभोक्ता C. D.

2 अन्यस्म° B. अन्यस्य स्म° D.

3 °न B. तु D.

4 अन्यत्वावि° B. अन्यत्ववचनात् C. अन्यत्वात् D.

5 कर्पासे° C. D. कार्पसे B.

6 दूषणाऽभावात् B.

7 °नान्न B. °नाच्चन D.

8 अपास्तम् B. निरस्तं ज्ञेयम् C.

9 प्रदीपा° B. प्रतीप° C. D.

10 तदेतत्सिद्धम् C. तत्सिद्धमेतत् B.

नित्यत्वं कुत इति चेदनादित्वात् । तदेव कथम् । जातमात्रे[1] जन्मान्तरानुभवसूचकस्मरणलिंगस्य हर्षभयशोकमोह[2]शून्याभिलाषादेरुपलंभात् ॥

धर्मादेराश्रयसंयोगा[3]ऽपेक्षस्य गुरुत्वादिवदाश्रयांतरे वाँ[4]द्यादौ क्रियाकर्तृत्वा[5]दणिमाद्युपेतस्य [6]युगपदसंख्यातशरीराधिष्ठातृत्वाच्च व्यापकत्व[7]सिद्धिः ॥ तथा चोक्तं पुराणादिषु—

आत्मनो वै शरीराणि बहूनि मनुजेश्वराः । प्राप्य योग्यं[8] बलं कुर्यात् तैश्च सर्वां महीं चरेत् ॥ भुंजीत विषयान्कैश्चित् कैश्चिदुग्रं तपश्चरेत् । संहरेच्च पुनस्तानि सूर्यस्तेजोगुणानिव ॥

तदेवमपरात्मतत्वज्ञानं परलोकसद्भावेन [9]परलोकप्रत्युप[10]योगित्वादधर्मक्षयहेतुत्वाच्च निश्रेयसांगमिति ॥

परमात्मज्ञानं च[11] तदुपासनांगत्वेनापवर्गसाधनम् ॥

स चोपासनाविधिः क्लेश[12]क्षयसमाधिलाभार्थमनुष्ठानम् । तथा चोक्तम् । तपःस्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानात्मिकाक्रियायोगः क्लेशतनूकरणार्थसमाधिलाभार्थश्चेति ॥

तत्रोन्मादकामादिव्यपोहार्थमाध्यात्मिकादिदुःखसहिष्णुत्वं तपः ॥ प्रशान्तमन्त्रस्येश्वरवाचिनोऽभ्यासः स्वाध्यायः ॥ परमे[13]श्वरतत्वस्य प्रबन्धेनानुचिंतन[14]मीश्वरप्रणिधानम् ॥ समासतो रागद्वेषमोहाः क्लेशाः समाधिप्रत्यनीकाः संसारापत्तिद्वारेण क्लेशहेतुत्वात् ॥

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1 जातमात्रे° B. मात्रस्य जन्तोः D. जातमात्रे प्राणिनि C.

2 C and D omit मोह.

3 °गा° C. D °गो° B.

4 चा° C. D वा° B.

5 कर्तृत्वात् B. कर्तृत्वदर्शनात् C D.

6 युगपद° C. गुणवद° B.

7 व्यापकत्वसिद्धिः C. व्यापकासिद्धिः B

8 योगं B. योग्यं D.

9 परलोकं D परलोके B.

10 प्रभ्यु° D. प्रवृत्त्यु° B.

11 चोपासना B च तदुपासना D.

12 क्लेशक्षय° B. क्लेशकर्मक्षय° D.

13 परमेश्वरतत्वस्य B. परमेश्वरस्यतत्वस्य D

14 अनुचिंतनम् B. अनुचिंतनपर्यालोचनम् D.

यमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणाध्यानसमाधयोऽष्टावंगानि[1] ॥ तत्र देशकालावस्थाभिरनियताः पुरुषस्य शुद्धिहेतवो यमाः । अहिंसाब्रह्मचर्यास्तेयादय[2] इति ॥ देशकालावस्थाद्यपेक्षिणः पुण्यहेतवः क्रियाविशेषा नियमाः । देवताप्रदक्षिणसंध्योपासनजपादयः ॥ योगकर्मविरोधिक्लेशजयार्थः करणबंध आसनम् । पद्मकस्वस्तिकादीनि ॥ कोष्ठ्यस्य वायोर्गतिविच्छेदः प्राणायामः । कुंभकपूरकरेचकप्रकारकः[3] । स[4] शनैः शनैर्जेतव्यो वनगजेन्द्रवत् ॥ समाधिप्रत्यनीकार्थेभ्यः समंताच्चेतसो व्यावर्त्तनं प्रत्याहारः ॥ चित्तस्य देशबंधो[5] धारणा ॥ तत्र प्रत्ययैकतानता[6] ध्यानम् ॥ तदेवार्थमात्रनिर्भासं[7] स्वरूपशून्यमिव समाधिः । ध्यानोत्कर्षान्निवाताचलप्रदीपावस्थानमिवैकत्रैव[8] चेतसावस्थानं[9] समाधिरभिधीयते ॥ एवमेतानि योगांगानि मुमुक्षुणा[10] सर्वेषु ब्रह्मादिस्थानेष्वनेकप्रकारदुःखभावनयाऽनभिरतिसंज्ञितं परं वैराग्यं महेश्वरे च परां भक्तिमाश्रित्यात्यंताभियोगेन सेवितव्यानि ॥ ततोऽचिरेणैव[11] कालेन भगवंतमनुपमस्वभावं शिवमवितथं प्रत्यक्षतः[12] पश्यति । तं दृष्ट्वा निरतिशयं श्रेयः प्राप्नोति । तथा चोक्तम्

यदा चर्मवदाकाशं वेष्टयिष्यन्ति मानवाः । तदा शिवमविज्ञाय
दुःखस्यान्तो भविष्यति ॥ तमेव विदित्वाऽतिमृत्युमेति ॥
नान्यः[13] पंथा विद्यतेऽयनाय ॥ तस्माच्छिवदर्शनादेव मोक्ष इति ॥

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1 D adds योगस्य.

2 D omits अस्तेय.

3 Different copies mention is different order.

4 स च शनै° C. D. स शनैः B.

5 देशबंधः B. D. देशसंबंध. C.

6 प्रत्ययैकतानता. B.C. प्रत्ययैकाग्रता D.

7 अर्थनिर्भासमात्रकम् D. मात्रम् C. अर्थमात्रनिर्यासकम्° B.

8 D omits एव.

9 चेतसा° B. चेतसो° C. D.

10 C omits मुमुक्षुणा here but inserts after अभियोगेन.

11 D omits एव.

12 प्रत्यक्षतः B. C प्रत्यक्षेण D.

13 C and D omit the last line of the verse.

कः पुनरयं मोक्षः । एके तावद्वर्णयन्ति समस्तविशेषगुणोच्छेदे संहारावस्थायामाकाशवदात्मनो[1]ऽत्यंतावस्थानं मोक्षः ॥ कस्मात् । सुखदुःखयोरविनाभावित्वेन विवेकहानानुपपत्तिः । कंटकादिजनितदुःखपरिहारार्थत्वेनाऽपि प्रवृत्तेरुपलंभादिति । मोहावस्थात्वान्मूर्च्छाद्यवस्थावदत्र विवेकिनां प्रवृत्तिर्न युक्तेत्याहुरन्ये । दुःखे सति सुखोपभोगस्याऽसंभवात्कंटकादिपरिहारोऽपि सुखोपभोगार्थमेवेत्यसमो दृष्टान्तः ॥

कुतो मुक्तस्य सुखोपसिद्धिरिति चेदागमात् ।

उक्तं हि ॥

सुखमात्यन्तिकं यत्र बुद्धिग्राह्यमतीन्द्रियम् ।
तं वै मोक्षं विजानीयाद्दुष्प्रापमकृतात्मनि ॥

तथा —

आनंदं ब्रह्मणोरूपं तच्च मोक्षेऽभिव्यज्यते ।
विज्ञानमानंदं ब्रह्मेति च ॥

मुख्यार्थे बाधकाभावान्नोपचारकल्पना ॥ सुखसंवेदनयोर्नित्यत्वान्मुक्त[2]संसारबद्धयोरविशेषप्रसंग इति चेन्न । चक्षुर्घटयोः कुड्यादेरिव सुखसंवेदनयोर्वि[3]षयविषयिभावसंबंधप्रत्यनीकस्य दुः[4]खादेः संसारावस्थायां स[5]द्भावात् । तन्नाशे च मुक्तावस्थायां भ[6]वति सुखसंवेदनयोः संबंध इत्यतो नाविशेषः ॥

तस्य संबंधस्य कृतकत्वेन क[7]चिन्नाशप्रसंग इति चेन्न प्रध्वंसेना[8]नैकान्तिकत्वात् ॥

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1 °त्यंभव° D °त्यंताव° B.

2 संसारबद्धयो.° B. संसारिणोः C.G.D.

3 विषयिविषयसंबंधप्रत्यनीकस्य° C. विषयविषयीभावसंबंधप्रत्यनीकस्य° B.

4 धर्मदुःखादेः B. अधर्मदुःखादेः D.

5 संभवात् C. सद्भावात् B.

6 D omits भवति.

7 क्वचित् B. कदाचित् C. D.

8 अनैकान्तिकत्वात्° D. अनैकान्तिकत्वभावात्° B. अनैकान्तात् C.

वस्तुत्वे सतीति चेन्न द्रव्यादिष्वनन्तर्भावेन तदसिद्धत्वादन्तर्भावे वा समवायादिभिः[1] सह तत्संवेदनस्य संबंधो न स्यात् ॥

अदृष्टादिवशात्कर्मकारणं विषयतज्जनितं ज्ञानं विषयीति चेन्न । ईश्वरज्ञानस्य नित्यस्यार्थैः सह संबंधाभावप्रसंगात् । तस्मात्कृतकत्वेऽपि नित्यसुखसंवेदनसंबंधस्य विनाशकारणाभावान्नित्यत्वं स्थितम् ॥ तत्सिद्धमेतन्नित्यसंवेद्यमानेनं सुखेन विशिष्टाऽऽत्यंतिकी दुःखनिवृत्तिः पुरुषस्य मोक्षः ॥

इति परमाचार्यतार्किकसार्वभौमश्रीभासर्वज्ञप्रणीते न्यायसारप्रकरणे तृतीय आगमपरिच्छेदः समाप्तः ॥

समाप्तं चेदं न्यायसाराख्यं प्रकरणम् ॥

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1 समवायादिभिः B. D. समवायाभावादिभिः C.

NOTES.

P. 1. L. 2 **शम्भुम्**—The author is a devotee of *Shiva*. As will be seen in the last part of this work, the author, though he discusses several definitions of *Moksha*, is neither a follower of *Shaṇkarácharya* school nor of any other of the wellknown six schools.

P. 1. L. 5 **प्रमाणतद्भेदतदन्यलक्षणम्**—*Gautama* and his commentators base their theory of *Nyáya* on twenty-four *Padârthas*, the existence of which they take for granted. *Bhâsarvajna* strikes a new path, holding that there is one *Padârtha* only and that one is *Pramána*. All the other *Padârthas*, discussed by *Gautama* and his followers, are according to our author, different divisions and subdivisions of the one *Padârtha*, *Prama'ṇa*. *Jayasinha*, the Jain commentator of our author, says that this taking of one *Padârtha* only as the object of discussion is a reply to the theory of *Sadguru-s'ishya*.

P. 1. L. 6 **सम्यगनुभवसाधनम्**—*Pramâṇa* is the cause of correct experience. *Râghava* in this connection annotates on the definition of *Pramáṇa* by उदयनाचार्य and his followers. According to them, a thing incidental to *Pramâ* or knowledge is प्रमाणम्. In that way, says *Râghava*, even ईश्वरः will be a *Pramâṇam*. तत् (प्रमाणम्) हि प्रमाणसंबंधित्वमित्युदयनादयः। एवं जनकत्वेनेंद्रियादाविवाश्रयत्वेनेश्वरस्यापि प्रमासंबंधित्वमस्तीति सोऽपि प्रमाणमिति तन्मते तात्पर्यं तन्निषेधार्थं प्रमाकरणं प्रमाणमिति प्रमाणपदादेवाऽऽगतं प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणमाह ॥ राघवः ॥

P. 1. L. 6 **सम्यग्ग्रहणं**—*Rághava* discusses also the significance of the word सम्यक्. *Prabhákara Bhatta* and his followers, according to *Rághava*, think that there is nothing like असम्यक् or मिथ्याऽनुभवः or incorrect knowledge. The word सम्यक् therefore in the definition of प्रमाणम् is unnecessary. *Rághava* says that *Bhásarvajna* differs from this view and thinks that सम्यक् is necessary to exclude संशयः and विपर्ययः from true knowledge.

P. 1. L. 7 **अनवधारणम्**—निश्चयात्यन्ताभावविशिष्टज्ञानम् (राघवः).

,, ,, **स च समानधर्मा**—As *Rághava* remarks, this classification of संशयः is according to *Vátsyáyana*. The sutra of *Gautama* mentions only three cases of संशयः and *Rághava* sticks to that opinion.

P. 1 L. 11 **विप्रतिपत्तिरेके**—परस्परविरुद्धार्थवाक्ये विप्रतिपत्तिरित्यर्थः राघवः *Râghava* says that by the word एके the author means the Naiyayikas, but he does not say who are meant by the word अन्ये. According to *Jayasinha* the word अन्ये is used for the followers of Sânkhya philosophy and in support of his view he quotes the तत्वकौमुदी. This संशयः is आगमिकः as it is based on the different आगम of the two schools.

P. 1. L. 12. **उपलब्धेः किं**—The question is whether the *sanshayas* based on *Upalabdhi* and *Unupalabdhi* are not included in the *samâna-dharma sanshaya*. *Râghava*, though he discusses these two sources of *sanshaya*, is decidedly of opinion that they are not independent sources of *sanshaya*. *Jayasinha* holds a different view and explains it thus समानधर्मान्नानयोर्भेद इति चेन्न समानधर्मस्य ज्ञेयस्थत्वादनयोश्च ज्ञातृस्थत्वान्महान्भेदः । In support of this view *Jayasinha* quotes भूषणकारः whose explanation runs thus—य उपलब्धिमात्रेण शब्दे स्थायित्वमनुपलब्धिमात्रेण स्वर्गेश्वरादीनामसत्वं चेच्छंन्ति तन्मतप्रतिक्षेपार्थमुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्योः पृथक्पृथक्संशयहेतुत्वम् ।

P. 1. L. 14. **अनवधारणत्वात्**—अत्र संशयादर्थान्तर्भावः पार्थक्यं न भवतीत्यन्वयः अनवधारणं नामानिश्चितज्ञानत्वं तेनाविशेषस्तौल्यं तस्मात् । (जयसिंहः). ननु सम्यग्ग्रहणं संशयविपर्ययापोहार्थमिति न वक्तव्यं किन्तु संशयोहानध्यवसायविपर्ययापोहार्थमिति (राघवः). *Râghava* always tries to be very concise. But here he does so at the sacrifice of clearness. *Bhâsarvajna* takes ऊहः and अनध्यवसायः as not different from संशयः.

P. 1. L. 15. **वाह्यालीप्रदेशे**—यत्र वाहा वाह्यन्ते तत्क्षेत्रं वाह्यालीत्युच्यते (जयसिंहः). This is an instance of ऊहः which is the same as तर्कः. तत्र (वाह्यालीप्रदेशे) तु प्रायेण स्थाण्वादेरसंभवात्कमप्यूर्द्धं दविष्ठं दृष्ट्वा दृष्टा-इति ऊहते मन्येऽहमत्रानेन केनाप्यूर्द्धतमेन पुरुषेण भवितव्यम्. As to ऊहः see the sutra of *Gautama*. अविज्ञाततत्वेऽर्थे कारणोपपत्तितस्तत्वज्ञानार्थमूहस्तर्कः । १-१-४० । This sutra gives a distinction between a तर्कः and an ऊहः A question raised to ascertain an object which is not till then known or ascertained is ऊहः. A तर्कः which may be an ऊहः is a question raised in a case when the object is either unascertained or already ascertained. This very author in his भूषणम् says वादादिप्रवृत्तिविशेषार्थं तर्कः पृथगुक्तः ॥

P. 1. L. 16. **मिथ्याऽध्यवसायो विपर्ययः ।** विपर्ययः is incorrect knowledge. *Râghava* and also *Jayasinha* say that, as illustrated in the text, this is incorrect knowledge. Quoting a similar passage from *Bhâsarvajna's Bhushana*, *Râghava* says यत्तु स्मरणज्ञानेति पाठान्तरं तिष्ठति तत्पंडितंमन्यपाठकदोषादित्युपेक्ष्यम् । भूषणे तु भासर्वज्ञैरज्ञानस्य योगादेरिति व्याकुर्वद्भिरीदृश एव पाठः कंठतोऽपि प्रतिष्ठित इति.

P. 2. L. 2. **फलाच्छेदज्ञापनार्थम्**—सम्यगनुभव एव प्रमाणफलमिति प्रमाणफलयोरैक्यं प्रयोज्येत तथा तत्परिहार एव प्रयोजनमित्याह (जयसिंहः). The knowledge is the result but प्रमाणम् is the source of that knowledge. The word साधनम् was also necessary in the definition to show the distinction between the cause and the effect.

P. 2. L. 3. **प्रमाश्रयः प्रमाता**—प्रमाया आश्रयः समवायीकारणं प्रमाता भवतीत्यर्थः (जयसिंहः).

P. 2. L 4. **तत्रिविधम्**—Both the commententors agree in saying that प्रमाणम् is only one and not three or four as suggested by the author of the *Sutras* and other writers. This author's view is that प्रमाणम् is only one but owing to three different operations employed, it is of three kinds. *Bhâsarvjna* thus admits the unity of knowledge.

P. 2. L. 5. **सम्यगपरोक्षानुभवसाधनं प्रत्यक्षम्**:—This definition of प्रत्यक्षम् is peculiar to *Bhâsarajna*. *Râghava* in his commentary discusses the definition of प्रत्यक्षम् given by *Gautama* which is इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम् १-१-४. If we adopt this it gives the knowledge (ज्ञानम्) aquired in a particular way as the definition of प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम्. But, as has already been discussed, a प्रमाणम् is not the result but the cause of that result *viz.* knowledge. The प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम् is the instrumental cause (साधनम् or करणम्) of the direct or immediate and right cognition. If we adopt the definition of *Gautama*, says the commentator, we exclude from प्रत्यक्षज्ञानम् the direct cognition acquired by the योगिनः which is undoubtedly a प्रत्यक्षज्ञानम् and yet it is not produced by the connection of the object and the senses (इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नम्). The word अपरोक्षम् in the definition is explained by *Râghava* by शब्दलिंगाऽजन्यं ज्ञानम्—the knowledge which is not produced either by शब्दः or लिंगम् which are instruments of knowledge in शाब्दज्ञानम् and अनुमितिः respectively. *Râghava* would thus divide ज्ञानम् into परोक्षम् and अपरोक्षम् (mediate and immediate). The latter is acquired by the प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम्. The परोक्षज्ञानम् is acquired by one of the two methods. Firstly it may be acquired by the help of a लिंगम् which means literally a characteristic and stands in the position of what we call a middle term in the western logic. In this case the cause of cognition is the अनुमानप्रमाणम्. The other method is that of शब्दप्रमाणम्, wherein शब्दः is the cause of knowledge.

P. 2. L. 6. **प्रकाशदेशकालधर्माद्यनुग्रहात्**—It is doubtful if *Râghava* had this phrase in his copy. In his commentary he explains only the words स्थूलार्थग्राहकम् in the definition of अयोगिप्रत्यक्षम्. Even *Jayasiṃha*

although he explains this phrase, distinctly says that स्थूलार्थग्राहकम् is the principal part of the definition of अयोगिप्रत्यक्षम्. प्रकाशः, देशः, कालः, धर्मः and others are taken as common causes (साधारणानि कारणानि) of the result. The author of मुक्तावली, and authors who are of his view, mention several common causes, but प्रकाशः does not appear in those works as one of them. *Râghava* does not mention the phrase and has not therefore any explanation to give. *Jayasiṇha* explains it as प्रकाशो दीपाद्यालोकः (a lamp or other light). This seems to be a very gross meaning to be attached to the word. Do we not acquire knowledge even in dark? This reminds one of the dialogue of *Janaka* and *Yâjnavalkya* in the *Upanishad* where the prince *Janaka* asked the sage *Yajnavalkya*. 'What is that light by which all this is known?' The sage began with the apparent source of light, the sun, and on that being doubted, says the lamp light in the absence of the sun. The sound in the absence of both and pure intelligence in the absence of all of them. I think *Bhâsarvajna* by प्रकाशः, meant intelligence as one of the common causes with space, time, duty and others.

P. 2. L. 7. **इन्द्रियार्थसंबंधविशेषेण**—By later writers the प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम् is defined as इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्यं ज्ञानम्. Thus they do not seem to make distinction between the योगिप्रत्यक्षम् and अयोगिप्रत्यक्षम् unless they take मनः as one of the organs of senses. There are various kinds of connections (संबंधाः) as mentioned here. *viz.* योगः or संयोगः संयुक्तसमवायः, संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः, समवायः, समवेतसमवायः and विशेष्यविशेषणभावः.

The instruments of direct cognition are the senses which are recognised to be five viz. the eye, the nose, the ear, the skin and the tongue. The knowledge acquired through the ear is not considered to be by a very immediate process and the knowledge acquired by the nose, the skin and the tongue comes under one class of the sense of touching. *Bhâsarvajna* therefore says that an object (e. g. a pot) is known either by the eye or the touch. These are the two instruments to acquire knowledge of a corporeal object.

P. 2. L. 8. **संयुक्तसमवायात्ताभ्यां घटत्वादिसंख्यापरिमाणादिज्ञानम्**—To understand properly the phrase, one has to know the various nameables given by *Kaṇad* in his *Vaisheshika Sutras*. He enumerates them as substance (द्रव्यम्), quality (गुणः), action (कर्म), Genus (सामान्यम्), differentia (विशेषः), and concomittance (समवायः). Nonentity (अभावः) is an additional nameable given by the later writers of the school. After explaining how the immediate cognition of substance is arrived at, the author, from this phrase down-

words discusses how the knowledge of quality and other nameables is arrived at. This knowledge is also acquired by the eye and the touch, but not directly i.e. not by the one process of connection (संयोगः) but by the twofold process of connection (संयोग) and concommittance (समवायः). For an explanation of concommittance (समवायः) see तर्कसंग्रहः. The समवायः is an eternal connection between an object and its inherent qualities without which the object can not exist. Thus, in the language of the Naiyayikas, a pot (घटः) can not exist without the agregate qualities which go to make a pot (घटत्वम्). It is a matter of controversy what this समवायः is. Is it a quality ? It is very difficult to say. Some authors try to show that it is a quality, but it is not so according to *Kaṇâda.* He puts it in the nameables as one distinct from the quality (गुणः). We cannot call it a connection; because in that case it would become one of the qualities. Vide the enumeration of qualities (गुणाः) in *Kaṇâda's Vaisheshika Sutras.* In this place the word is used for a sort of connection which is different from संयोगः (connection which is enumerated as one of the qualities). When we want to know the genus of an object (*e. g.* घटत्वम्) we do so by a twofold process. The eyes or any other sense which is in operation to know our object, comes in direct contact with the object, and by our intuitive knowledge that the genus (घटत्वम्) resides in the object, we know the genus. Similarly we come to know the qualities of the object under operation. *Jayasiṇha* in this connection enumerates the twenty four gunas mentioned in the *Vaisheshika Sutras.*

P. 2. L. 9. परिमाणादि—*Jayasiṇha* explains this phrase by अणुमहदादयः. All this time we have been discussing the cognition of objects either by the sight or by one of the senses of touch. But there are these objects which though recognised by one of the five senses has the necessity of this second kind of operation.

P. 2. L. 9. चक्षुषैव—The colour, he says, is known only by the eye, touch only by the skin, taste only by the tongue, smell by the nose and pleasure &c. by the mind. To know colour one has to know the object in which it is inherent, that is, one knows the colour of an object by first knowing the object. The same process takes place in acquiring the knowledge of the smell. It is understood that smell never exists by itself, but exists always with an object. That object, in which a smell resides, is not known by the sense of smelling but by either the eye or the touch. It may here be doubted, if the knowledge of the object is at all necessary for the knowledge of the

smell. Often we do seem to experience smell without the knowledge of the object from which it emanates. Here again we have to go by the theory of the *Naiyayikas*, which presupposes an object for the smell to reside in, and hold therefore that knowledge of the object is essential for the right understanding of the smell. Then follows the discussion of knowledge of the taste by the tongue and that of the pleasure or pain by the mind. In almost all the schools of philosophy in India, mind is taken as an organ of knowledge. It is never taken as one and the same with the soul.

P. 2. P. 11. **मनसैव सुखादिज्ञानम्.** We mark here one distinction between different illustrations of संयुक्तसमवेतप्रत्यक्षम्. In the case of the cognition of qualities, the four senses of the sight, the nose, the tongue and the skin receive qualities which reside in external objects, but the mind receives qualities which are inherent in the soul (आत्मा). One more point should be noted here which *Jayasiṇha* discusses. As has been already said, according to Indian Philosophers, the mind is not one and the same as the soul. The reason is plain enough. The soul (आत्मा) is always accepted as all-pervading and consequently must be all-knowing which it does not appear to be. The difficulty is solved by accepting the mind as an organ which is necessary for a particular or specific knowledge. We come across here, several qualities and the processes of knowing them.

P. 2 L. 11 **एतेषु संख्यादिषु**—This is a further development of immediate cognition (प्रत्यक्षम्). The *Vaisheshikas* recognise a nameable known as सामान्यम् which is aptly translated into English by the word *genus*. This nameable is accepted to be residing both in the substance (द्रव्यम्) and in the qualities (गुणाः). The genus residing in the (द्रव्याणि) substances is known by the operation known as संयुक्तसमवायप्रत्यक्षम् but not so the genus residing in the qualities (गुणाः). The qualities (गुणाः) themselves are known by संयुक्तसमवायप्रत्यक्षम् and we have therefore to go a step further to know the genus of the qualities. This further process is that of संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः. Take for example the process by which संख्यात्वम् is known. संख्या is a quality residing in a substance and cannot therefore be known unless the substance is known. The substance is known by संयोगः of the eye or the sense of touch with the object and the संख्या of this substance, being a quality thereof and residing therein by समवायसंबंधः, is known by संयुक्तसमवायप्रत्यक्षम्. संख्यात्वम् is in समवायसंबंध with संख्या and the operation to know this genus is that of संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायप्रत्यक्षम्.

P. 2. L. 14. **तदेतत्पंचविधः**—*Jayasinha* thus explains this line: पूर्वोक्ताः । संयोगः संयुक्तसमवायः संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः समवायः समवेतसमवायश्चेति पंचसंबधास्तैः संबद्धा ये अर्थास्तैः सहाऽभावस्य समवायस्य च यो विशेषणविशेष्यभाव इतरसंबंधवैधर्म्येण सन्निधिविशेषोऽन्यथा तस्य प्रतिनियताश्रयवर्तित्वेन द्वित्वरूपानुपपत्तिस्तस्मादभावसमवाययोर्ज्ञानम् । It is to be remarked here that *Bhâsarvjna*, who never mentions the seven nameables of *Kaṇâda*, and according to his commentors limits himself to the discussion of the nameables mentioned by *Gautama* in his Sutras, mentions several things which are not alluded to in those sutras. This passage again refers to the knowledge of समवायः and अभावः both of which find no place in the *Padârthas* of *Gautama*. One more point to be marked is, that although *Bhâsarvajna* seems to be aware of the seven nameables of *Kaṇâd* he discusses the mode of knowing five of them only, leaving out the *action* (कर्म) and the *differentia* (विशेषः). Differentia (विशेषः) as understood by *Kaṇad*, resides in the atoms only and they being out of the province of प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम्, differentia may well be omitted from the consideration of प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम्. It is the opinion of several Naiyayikas that the action (कर्म) is known only by inference. This explains the absence of these two nameables from their discussion in this chapter. The explanation of विशेषणविशेष्यभावः is very important. *Abhâva* of a substance, that is non-existence is cognised by the senses. When there is no book on the table we can know the absence of the book on the table. But there are many things which are not on the table, and how do we mark this one particular absence of the book and not of other things. Here comes in the importance of विशेषणविशेष्यभावः If there is this knowledge of the qualified and the qualifier in the table and the book, we can know the absence of the book from on the table. This प्रत्यक्षम् can be arrived at only by this method and no other.

P. 2. L. 17. **तथाहि तंतवः... पटसमवाय इतिः**—There is a difference in the reading of *Râghava* and the three other MSS. *Râghava* reads as it is put in this text before इत्येवं सर्वाशः । This reading is more correct than the other, as without it the paragraph is certainly incomplete in as much as that will omit the consideration of समवायः । This विशेषणविशेष्यभावः is applicable in five different ways as shown by *Râghava* who says ननु किं संयोगविशिष्ट एव विशेषणविशेष्यभावादभावसमवाययोर्ज्ञानम् । नेत्याह । सर्वत्रेत्येव विशिष्टसंबंधविशिष्टेष्वित्यर्थः । तथाहि रूपं रसत्वशून्यं रूपे रसत्वं नास्ति । तथा रूपरूपत्वसमवायवद्रूपे रूपत्वसमवाय इति । अथसंयुक्तसमवेतसमवेते । तथाहि &c.

P. 3. L. 1. **समवायस्य तु क्वचिदेव ग्रहणम्**—The meaning of the word क्वचित् in this phrase is very doubtful. One explanation given by *Râghava* is that the cognition of समवायः by प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम् is not accepted by all the schools of philosophy but only by the *Naiyâyikas.* The particle तु however suggests that this mode of cognition of समवायः is not taken in all the five different connections as in the case in अभावः.

P. 3. L. 5. **योगिप्रत्यक्षं तु**—Having so far discussed the अयोगिप्रत्यक्षम् the author now comes to योगिप्रत्यक्षम् by which the *Yogi* acquires knowledge of objects without any regard to space, time or nature. One natural question which arises here is that to a Yogi, by his powers, every thing is known and consequently further discussion as to any mode of acquisition of knowledge is useless. *Râghava* explains it away by quoting :—

लौकिकी प्रतिभा यद्वत्प्रत्यक्षाद्यनपेक्षिणी ।
न निश्चयाय पर्याप्ता तथा स्याद्योगिनामपि ।


This योगिप्रत्यक्षम् is again of two kinds, one, when the person is in युक्तावस्था and the other when, he is not so.

P. 3. L. 3. **तत्र युक्तावस्थायां**—This is clearly the case when the Yogi is in युक्तावस्था, that is in समाधिः, *i. e.* when his अन्तःकरणम् is incessantly connected with his soul, which is the result of his धर्मः or religious practices. In that state he is supposed to be able to know anything and everything.

P. 3. L. 5. **वियुक्तावस्थायां**—When the Yogi is not in *samadhi,* the knowledge is acquired by not only the connection of the sense and the object. It is either by fourfold, threefold, twofold or single connection as the case may be. The fourfold connection is, first the connection of soul with the mind, then of the mind with the organ of sense and lastly of that with the object. By this he acquires the knowledge of any outward object. The object comes in connection with the eye, the eye with the mind and the mind with the soul who receives the impression of the object. For the instance of threefold connection we take the sound, which being in समवायः with the ear, is taken identical with the ear which comes in contact with the mind and the mind does so with the soul. Feelings such as pleasure and pain which are merely functions of the mind are known by the soul by his connection with the mind.

P. 3. L. 7. **अत्रैवार्षमन्तर्भूतम्**—Some writers suppose that आर्षज्ञानम् is a third process of प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम्. *Arsha* knowledge is the same as revelation which, *Bhâsarvajna* says, is included in योगिप्रत्यक्षम् and it is the result of a higher *Dharma.*


P. 3. L. 8. **तच्च द्विविधम्**:—*Bhâsarvajna* mentions a classification of प्रत्यक्षम् on another principle which has been laterly adopted by *Vishvanâth Panchânana* and his followers. It is into सविकल्पम् and निर्विकल्पम्. For explanations of these terms I had better refer the reader to the elaborate notes on them by Mr. Athlye* in Tarka Sangraha. The following table shows how *Bhâsarvajna* divides प्रत्यक्षम्.



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* *Tarka Sangraha* annotated by Mr. Athlye and Mr. M. R. Bodas, Bombay Sanskrit Series pp. 216–221.

P. 4. L. 1. **सम्यगविनाभावेन परोक्षानुभवसाधनमनुमानम्**—The construction of this sentence with which the author begins his discussion on the second kind of प्रमाणम् *viz.* inference, is a matter of controversy between the commentators. *Râghava* says that the word सम्यक् should be construed with the phrase परोक्षानुभवसाधनम् and not with अविनाभावेन as some authors do. *Râghava* mentions and adversely criticises one *Râmbhatta*, an author not much known. *Jayasiṇha*, who follows an old writer, says that सम्यक् should be construed with अविनाभावेन. To understand the construction clearly let us compare the four definitions given by *Bhâsarvajna* where this word is used. प्रमाणम् is defined as सम्यगनुभवसाधनम्. प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम् as सम्यगपरोक्षानुभवसाधनम्. अनुमानम् is defined as सम्यगविनाभावेन परोक्षानुभवसाधनम्, and the definition of आगमप्रमाणम् is समयबलेन सम्यक्परोक्षानुभवसाधनम्. In all the definitions except that of the अनुमानम् the word सम्यक् qualifies, without doubt, अनुभवसाधनम्. प्रमाणम्, for example, is an instrument of correct (सम्यक्) knowledge. This correct knowledge in the case of प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम् is (अपरोक्षम्) immediate, but in the case, either of the अनुमानप्रमाणम् or आगमप्रमाणम् it is mediate or परोक्षम्. I think therefore that *Râghava* is correct in construing सम्यक् with परोक्षानुभवः in this definition, and not with अविनाभावेन as *Jayasiṇha* does. अविनाभावः is a qualification which distinguishes अनुमानप्रमाणम् from आगमप्रमाणम् which is also a source of सम्यग्परोक्षानुभवः, but is to be arrived at by समयबलम् which means पुरुषकृतसंकेतः or conventional signs adopted by people. The distinction becomes very clear. In the first place an instrument of knowledge (प्रमाणम्) is defined as the source of correct knowledge (सम्यगनुभवसाधनम्). The knowledge is either immediate or mediate (अपरोक्षम् or परोक्षम्). The mediate knowledge is either by constant concomitance (अविनाभावः) or by the help of signs of human convention (पुरुषकृतसंकेतः).



In this way, it is अपरोक्षत्वम् which distinguishes the प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम्

from the अनुमानम् and आगमः both of which have the element of परोक्षत्वम् in them. सम्यक्त्वम् which permeates in the definition of all the three *Pramáṇas* is a part only of the definition of प्रमाणम्. (अविनाभावः) Constant concomitance, distinguishes अनुमानम् from आगमः which latter, though it is सम्यक्परोक्षानुभवसाधनम्, is not so by constant concomitance, but by the force of human convention. *Jayasiṇha* and other authors whom he follows, hold the different view and say that सम्यक् qualifies अविनाभावः by which they would render the definition of अनुमानम् as the instrument of mediate knowledge by (the help of) good concomitance. *Jayasiṇha* defends his interpretation by explaining that if the word सम्यक् is not construed with अविनाभावः any sort of concomitance should be able to give knowledge. But, as he thinks, that is not so. The concomitance, to give knowledge, must be of the correct order. This stretching of the meaning is certainly unnecessary and incorrect, when we see the explanation given of अविनाभावः in the following line of the text. अविनाभावः does not mean, as *Jayasiṇha* thinks, the concomitance of any two objects, but necessarily and naturally that of the साध्यम् and the साधनम्.

Jayasiṇha notices the view of *Bhâsarvajna* in his न्यायभूषणम्, that सम्यक् is introduced in the definition to avoid भ्रान्तिः–delusion–being mixed up with प्रमा. How this supports *Jayasiṇha's* interpretation of the definition of अनुमानम्, I fail to see. *Bhâsarvajna* is correct in putting सम्यक् with the object as explained by *Jayasiṇha*. The very definition of प्रमा given by *Bhâsarvajna* in this work (See P. 2. L. 2.) is very clear on the point, but there even सम्यक् goes with अनुभवः. *Râghava* laughs at these authors and says that their interpretation does not bear out the construction of the sentence. Both the commentators agree to say that the definition is aimed at the views of the *Chârvâkas* who recognise no other प्रमाणम् but the प्रत्यक्षम्.

P. 4. L. 2. **स्वभावतः साध्येन साध्यस्य व्याप्तिरविनाभावः**—A साध्यम् is the thing to be proved and corresponds with the major term of the western system of logic. साधनम् is the लिंगम् or हेतुः or the middle term. The literal meaning of अविनाभावः is ' being together.' विना means without, and विनाभावः means the state of being without. अविनाभावः is the state of ' not being without,' or the state of being together. The technical meaning given to this awkwardly formed word is ' the state of being together of the major and the middle terms by their nature.' Such a state would occur between the cause

and the effect, such as the clay and a pot, the smoke and fire &c. Both the commentators, while discussing the word स्वभावत:, bring in the discussion of उपाधि: which means an accident. What they want to say is, that this concomitance between the major and the middle term is very often the result of an accidental circumstance, in which case the connection is not अविनाभाव:.

This concomitance of the major and the middle terms (साध्यम् and साधनम्) is expressed in two ways. One way is by an affirmative general proposition and the other by the negative general proposition. In the first, the generality of the middle term is asserted as concomitant with the generality of the major term. Take for example the typical syllogism of the *Naiyâyikas* पर्वतो वन्हिमान्धूमात् which when expressed in strict syllogistic form would be:

प्रतिज्ञा — पर्वतो वन्हिमान्
हेतुः — धूमात्
उदाहरणम् — यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र वन्हिर्यथा महानसे
उपनयः —वन्हिव्याप्यधूमवानयं पर्वतः
निगमनम् — तस्मात्पर्वतो वन्हिमान्

Here the third member of the syllogism gives the affirmative general proposition known as अन्वयव्याप्तिः. The proposition affirms that all cases of smoke are cases of fire. The same proposition when converted gives an instance of व्यतिरेकी–अविनाभावः *e. g.* यत्र यत्र वन्ह्याभावस्तत्र तत्र धूमाभावः *i. e.* all the cases of the absence of fire are the cases of the absence of smoke. One has to bear in mind that Sanskrit logicians always manage to put their propositions into universal affirmative although in meaning they may be either negative or even particular. The elasticity of the language makes it easy to do so. This explains the definition of व्यतिरेकः which is the concomitance of the absence of the generality of the middle term with the absence of the generality of the major term.

The middle term is the sign (लिंगम्–हेतुः) by which we arrive at the conclusion. This middle term is again of two kinds being either दृष्टम् as सामान्यतो दृष्टम्.

Râghava says that अविनाभावः is the same as व्याप्तिः. The latter term is the most common one used by later writers, while अविनाभावः is mostly found in the old works.

P. 4. L. 5. **साधनं लिंगम्**—The साधनम् is the sign which leads to the

conclusion. This sign is of two kinds दृष्टम् and सामान्यतो दृष्टम्. By the दृष्टं साधनम् is meant the middle term, which perceptibly co-existing with the साध्यम् brings the knowledge of the same. One has to clearly mark the two senses in which the word साधनम् is used in this paragraph. The word साधनम् in the definition of अनुमानम् (P. 4. L. 1.) is identical with अनुमानम्, but in the phrase under note and in the two following lines it means the 'middle term' *i. e.* लिंगम्. It may be remarked here that the word कारणम्, so very commonly used by later writers, has not become prominent in the time of *Bhâsarvajna.* Nor do we find *Bhâsarvajna* enlarging on the theory of causation which led later writers to distinguish between terms like कारणम् करणम्, and व्यापारः.

P. 4. L. 5. **तच्च द्विविधम्.** The commentators, in the explanation of this phrase, and in the one following in the next paragraph viz. तत्पुनर्द्विविधम् hopelessly mix up things, so distinctly kept apart by *Bhâsarvajna.* The word तत् in this expression refers to साधनम् or लिंगम् the middle term and not to अनुमानम् as *Râghava* thinks. तत् in the second phrase refers to अनुमानम् and not to लिंगम् as *Jayasiṇha* explains it. As has already been said the middle term is of two kinds the दृष्टम् *i. e.* the apparent one, and सामान्यतोदृष्टम् *i. e.* seen commonly. The first one is not difficult to understand but the second requires explanation. रूपादिज्ञानं चक्षुरादेरनुमापकं सामान्यतोदृष्टं लिंगम्. The knowledge of colour, is a sign by which one can infer that he has the sense of seeing.

P. 4. L. 5. **तत्र प्रत्यक्षयोग्यार्थानुमापकं दृष्टं यथा धूमोऽग्नेः**—*Râghava* in annotation on this line gives the interpretation put upon it by those whom he calls प्राचीनाः *i. e.* the ancient writers. The interpretation given by them is अस्मदादीन्द्रियग्राह्यग्राहकम् *i. e.* receiver of what could be received by the senses of people of our type. This is too narrow an interpretation. The test is not based on the capacity of the cognizor, but on the fact whether the thing to be known is fit to be known by means of प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम्. The author means to say that if there was a prior concomitance established by प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम् *i. e.* if the व्याप्तिः or अविनाभावः of the साध्यम् and the साधनम् was established by प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम्, any future perception of the साधनम् gives a knowledge of the साध्यम् by inference. On the same line the author goes on to explain the definition of सामान्यतो दृष्टम्, which is not what the ancients called अस्मदादीन्द्रियाऽग्राह्यग्राहकम् *i. e.* a साधनम् which enables one to infer a thing, which can not be known by a person by his own senses, but it is a साधनम् which is reputed to be in a constant

concomitance with the generality of साध्यम्. *Râghava* very boldly says इत्यचतुरमेव प्राचीनाचार्यमतमिति मन्तव्यम्. The commentator in support of his view cites the view of one *Vâdindra*, a fellow student of his who says कर्पूररूपकार्यसाक्षात्कारः कर्पूररसस्य साक्षात्कारजनकद्रव्यजन्यः कार्यत्वे सति रूपसाक्षात्कारत्वात् । प्रदीपसाक्षात्कारवत् ॥ *Râghava* is not very happy in the elaborate quotation from his fellow student in the explanation of a very simple phrase of *Bhâsarvajna.*

P. 4. L. 8. **तत्पुनर्द्विविधम्**—The two inferences given here are only two different processes of the inference. It is in fact one process, but in two forms. They are स्वार्थमनुमानम् and परार्थमनुमानम्. The first, स्वार्थमनुमानम्, is a process of reasoning which one goes through for his own conviction. No one says what that process is, but one can understand that it can not be any other than that of the syllogism either of five or of three members. The process is so very swift that sometimes it is reduced even to two members, giving only the conclusion and the ground for it *e. g.* पर्वतो वन्हिमान्धूमात्. This mode of expressing syllogisms is often adopted by *Shankarâchârya.* The स्वार्थम् and परार्थम् modes of inferences are not the same as the *discovery* and *instruction* given by Jevons in his work on logic. Discovery as explained by him is a process of induction, which, though not differently treated by the Indian logician, forms a necessary part of their syllogism viz. the third member of the syllogism which is commonly known as उदाहरणम् but which involves व्याप्तिः or अविनाभावः. The third member is in fact a conclusion arrived at by induction. It gives expression to generalization arrived at by the knowledge of particulars.

अनुमानम् as explained here is a converse method. There we arrive at a particular conclusion by the application of a general proposition. Thus both the स्वार्थम् and परार्थमनुमानम् are deductive syllogisms, the only difference being, that in the latter we go regularly step by step through all the five members, while we do not necessarily do so in the former. परार्थमनुमानम्, being परोपदेशापेक्षम् may be the method of instruction mentioned by Jevons.

The स्वार्थमनुमानम् being only a shorter form of the परार्थम् no further discussion is given thereof by the author, who now begins to discuss the five members of परार्थमनुमानम् which are necessary for the proper instruction of the person to whom an argument is addressed.

P. 4. L. 10. **प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनान्यवयवाः**— This enumeration of the five members of a syllogism is bodily taken from *Gautama* (see गौ. सू. १-१-३२). It is interesting to know that the number of these

different members of a syllogism was not originally fixed to five. Even *Gautama* does not expressly say that these members are five and five only, although he does not mention more than five. The *Mimaṇsakas* admitted only three and the *Vedantins* made use, very often, only of two. The later *Naiyayikas* stick to five members but the logicians, who flourished before *Gautama*, had as many as ten. The five others, besides those mentioned in this Sutra, are given both by *Vâtsyayan* in his *Bhâshya* and by *Udyotkara* in his *Nyâya-Vartika*. They are जिज्ञासा, संशयः, शक्यप्राप्तिः, प्रयोजनं and संशयव्युदासः. Very plausible explanation is given by *Udyotkara* in his *Nyâya-Vartika* as to why the latter five were not included in the *Avayavas* by *Gautama* and his followers. According to him, a complete argument forms one whole sentence, and the different members of an argument are component parts of the sentence uttered by one person and one only. संशयः and other members, dropped by the later *Naiyayikas* can not form parts of one and the same sentence because all of them taken together are to be spoken by more persons than one. It may be said that taken as a whole all these ten members, mentioned by the early logicians, form part of a controversy, which begins with a desire to know (जिज्ञासा) on the part of one, who wishes to be instructed and ends with the removal of his doubt (संशयव्युदासः). The other three *viz.* संशयः, शक्यप्राप्तिः and प्रयोजनम् are intermediate steps to discuss the assertion of doubt, possibility of coming to right conclusion and the object of the controversy. These are certainly parts of a debate and need not have a place in a single argument. *Gautama*, who in this part of his *Sutras* deals with logic proper, and nothing else, tries not to enter into questions of a debate and its rules, but sticks to the consideration of strict rules of reasoning. Further on in the last portion of his work, *Gautama* does deal with the question of fallacies and tricks used in debates by debators, but that portion stands in a separate chapter altogether. The five members of a syllogism, adopted by *Gautama* and copied from him by our author are प्रतिज्ञा, हेतुः, उदाहरणम्, उपनयः and निगमनम्. When in-a terpreted in English they would be an assertion, the ground, (for it) the illustration (or the instance), the application and the conclusion.

P. 4. L. 11. **तत्र प्रतिपिपादयिषया पक्षवचनं प्रतिज्ञा**—This is the definition of the first member of the syllogism. It is a statement of the major term (पक्षः) with the desire of asserting (something) of it. The example given is **शब्दोऽनित्यः**– the sound is uneternal. In this

case, 'the sound' is the major term of which 'uneternity' is to be established. This should not be confounded with निगमनम्, the conclusion. Although in both the propositions, the statement is the same, the first proposition (प्रतिज्ञा) sounds of a question while the other is the conclusion. The sense of questioning is borne out by the word प्रतिपिपादयिषया in the definition of प्रतिज्ञा. The definition given by *Gautama* of प्रतिज्ञा is very short. साध्यनिर्देशः—a statement of that which is to be established, which is very obscure unless we supply the phrase पक्षे प्रतिपिपादयिषया as our author does, or the words पक्षे सिसाधिषया as is done by the later writers on the subject.

P. 4. L. 12. **साधनत्वख्यापकं लिंगवचनं हेतुः**—The second member of the syllogism is the expression of the ground which leads us to the conclusion to be arrived at. Translated into literal English the phrase means a statement of a *sign* which expresses the nature of the reason. *Bhâsarvajna* becomes more methodical than *Gautama*, who gives two *Sutras* to explain a *hetu* but our author gives one phrase explaining the general nature of the *hetu*, and then gives its three classifications and discusses them in detail. There is some obscurity about this phrase explaining the *hetu*. The *Hetu* in the first place is a statement of the *sign*. One has always to bear in mind that a regular syllogism is expressed in the form of a sentence, and a *hetu*, is, like others, a clause in that sentence. *Hetu* then may be expressed either in the instrumental or ablative case, mostly in the latter. **साधनत्वख्यापकम्**, as it stands in the phrase, would in the ordinary grammatical construction, qualify the words **लिंगवचनम्** but the construction would not be proper. The proper interpretation is that the *hetu* is a statement (वचनम्) of the *sign* (लिंगम्) which expresses (ख्यापकम्) the cause-the instrument (साधनम्).

Of all the five members of a syllogism, the *hetu* is the most important and difficult to be understood and treated. It is of three kinds, or to say more correctly, can be expressed in three different ways. It may be an affirmative, or a negative or it may be a *hetu* which can be expressed both affirmatively and negatively. In this connection *Râghava* explains the two senses in which the word *Sâdhana* is used. The reader will find the word used firstly in L. 5 P. 4, and secondly in this phrase. In the former sentence it is used as meaning an instrument and identical with *hetu* but of two kinds. In the latter also it is identical with the

hetu but is expressed to be of three kinds. *Jayasinha* is silent about it but *Râghava* explains it thus :— यद्यपि साधनं लिंगमित्यस्यानंतरमेव साधु त्रैविध्याभिधानं तथापि तत्रावान्तरविप्रतिपत्त्यपाकरणायापरथा द्वैविध्यमेव दर्शितम्। The phrase is not very happily worded. What he means to say is, I think, that although the author in the very first instance, should have said that साधनम् is of three kinds, to avoid a side misunderstanding, he mentioned there, of two kinds. He wanted there to show, that the *linga* which leads to conclusion is of two kinds. I think the justification given by *Râghava* was not necessary. The ideas expressed by *Bhâsarvajna* in the two phrases under discussion, are quite clear. In the first *i. e.* साधनं लिंगम्, the author explains, what a *linga* is, and how it is classified. In the second phrase साधनत्वख्यापकं लिंगवचनं हेतु:—the author explains the *hetu*, and not the *linga*. The *hetu* as distinguished from the *linga* is a statement–an expression of the *linga*, and is not the same as the *linga*. This expression of *linga*, the author says, is of three kinds.

P. 4. L. 13 **तत्र पंचरूपोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकी**—This *hetu* has five requisites. पंचरूप: does not mean 'of five kinds.' The word रूप: is misleading and should be properly interpreted and understood. The five requisites are enumerated and discussed hereafter.

P. 4. L. 16 **तत्र साध्यधर्मविशिष्ट: पक्ष:**—To understand very clearly the five requisites of a *hetu*, it is necessary to understand the *Vyapti*– concomitance as understood by the eastern logicians. Take the most typical and oft-quoted syllogism, पर्वतो वन्हिमान्धूमात्. In this argument पर्वत:–is the पक्ष:–the subject, of which वन्हिमत्त्वम्–firyness is predicated. पर्वत:–in the logical phraseology of the West is the *minor term* and वन्हिमत्त्वम् is the *major term*. The *hetu* is धूमात्—*because there is smoke.* Smoke is the लिंगम् or the middle term. पक्षधर्मत्वम् is the quality of concomitance of the *hetu* and the minor term. I may mention here that very often the word *hetu* is used for the *linga*. The distinction between the two is already explained, but they are used indiscriminately. The one word पक्षधर्मता or पक्षधर्मत्वम् is a prelude to the explanation of the theory of *Vyapti* which, in short, is the explanation of everything we mean by induction in the Western system of logic. पक्ष: is defined here as an object which has the quality (धर्म:) of the major term (साध्यम्). The explanation thus given of पक्ष: looks like anticipating the conclusion. As far as we are treating the process of reasoning, it is neither

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unimportant nor anticipating. In fact a minor term (पक्षः) cannot be a minor term unless there is the corresponding major term. It is interesting to note, in this connection, the definition given of the minor term by *Annambhatta* in his *Tarkasangraha.* He says संदिग्धसाध्यवान्पक्षः. He seems to have felt the same difficulty of anticipating the conclusion and puts therefore the definition in a different form altogether. Inspite of the great elasticity of Sanskrit phraseology, to give a very correct and appropriate definition of a term of logic is a difficult task.

P. 4. L. 17. **साध्यसमानधर्मा धर्मी सपक्षः**—In detecting a formal fallacy it is important often to know a *Sapaksha*-a term similar to the minor term. It means an object in which, the proposed major term is known to exist. In the syllogism पर्वतो वह्निमान् धूमात्, a महानसः—a kitchen–is the सपक्षः of पर्वतः, which is the पक्षः. *Annambhatta* defines सपक्षः as निश्चितसाध्यवान्. A सपक्षः is one on which the major term is ascertained. In the case of a kitchen the predicate 'fire' is an ascertained thing. The second requisite of a good *hetu* is that it should exist in a सपक्षः (सपक्षे सत्वम्). It may happen that the common quality may appear in the whole or only a part of the सपक्षः. The reading printed in the text as adopted by *Jayasinha* is also to be found in the Deccan college Ms. *Râghava* has सर्वस्मिन् only. I see no reason why the reading of *Jayasinha* should be rejected and yet I feel that *Râghava's* was the reading in the text. It is uncertain how the reading was changed and who did it.

P. 4. L. 18. **साध्यव्यावृत्तधर्मा धर्मी सपक्षः**—A विपक्षः is an object which has a quality, not to be found in the major term. If an object is not seen in concomitance with another, the latter is said to be *Vyvritta* of the first. In the case of fire and smoke, the smoke cannot be in concomitance with that which is devoid of the major term. In the case of the syllogism of smoke and fire, the smoke, which can not be in concomitance with a pond of water, is said to be *Vyavritta* of the pond of water. The third requisite therefore is the absence of the *hetu* from *Vipaxa.* In this case *hetu* must be absent from the whole of the *Vipaxa*, and not only from a part of it.

P. 4. L. 19. **प्रमाणाविरोधिनि** &c.—This reading, as found in C, and G, seems to be better and more correct reading than that in B which may be a mistake by the copyist. *Râghava* explains the last two words of the definition only and we therefore can not make out

what reading he had before him. When the *hetu* resides in an object without contradiction from authority it is अबाधितविषयत्वम् which is the fourth requisite of a proper अन्वयव्यतिरेकी inference.

P. 5. L. 1. **साध्यतद्विपरीतयोः** &c.—This is the fifth requisite for a good अन्वयव्यतिरेकी हेतुः. The *hetu* must not fulfil the first three conditions in the major term to be established and also in some other term. This requisite is called असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम्. In short the same *hetu* should not prove the contrary of the conclusion.

P. 5. L. 3. **स द्विविधः**—Having explained the five requisites for a good अन्वयव्यतिरेकी हेतुः the author gives the two kinds of this sort of *hetu*. The principle of division adopted is the nature of the *hetu* found in a सपक्षः. The *hetu* may be good of the whole of the सपक्षः or only of a part of it. As an instance of the first he examines the syllogism—शब्दोऽनित्यः। कार्यत्वात्. When expanded it becomes:—

प्रतिज्ञा—शब्दोऽनित्यः.

हेतुः—कार्यत्वात्.

उपनयः—यत्र कार्यत्वं तत्राऽनित्यत्वं यथा घटे.

उदाहरणम्—अनित्यत्वव्याप्यकार्यत्ववानयं शब्दः.

निगमनम्—तस्मात् शब्दोऽनित्यः.

In this argument घटः is the सपक्षः and कार्यत्वम् is true of the whole of the matter known as घटः. As an instance of the second kind he takes the same syllogism with the same conclusion but with a different *hetu* which when expanded becomes :—

प्रतिज्ञा—शब्दोऽनित्यः

हेतुः—सामान्ये सत्यस्मदादिबाह्येंद्रियग्राह्यत्वात्.

उदाहरणम्—यत्र सामान्ये सत्यस्मदादिबाह्येंद्रियग्राह्यत्वं तत्राऽनित्यत्वम्। यथा घटः.

उपनयः—अनित्यत्वव्याप्यसामान्यत्वे सति..........................ग्राह्यत्ववानयं शब्दः

निगमनम्—तस्मात् शब्दोऽनित्यः.

In this syllogism the expression of the middle term is worth understanding. शब्दः is the पक्षः and घटः is taken as the सपक्षः. The phrase used as the *hetu*–a long sentence as it were of five different phrases is one from which, even for brevity's sake we cannot omit a single syllable. The process is thus explained. We have to prove the अनित्यत्वम् or non-eternity of 'Words'. अनित्यत्वम् or noneternity is a term which includes, according to some schools of philosophy,

every created object or say every effect of a cause. There is no difficulty therefore, in finding a सपक्षः for शब्दः for any object, which can be shown to be an effect and which will suit the middle term, will serve the purpose. This is an instance of a व्यतिरेकी हेतुः. To explain the distinction between these two *hetus* it is necessary to know what is अन्वयः and what is व्यतिरेकः, and in connection with these, what is व्याप्तिः. Vyapti is shortly concomitance. To put in simple clear and short phrase it is यत्सत्वे सत्वम्. When a thing exists on the existence of another there is व्याप्तिः between the two. This is however अन्वयव्याप्तिः. The व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः being the non-existence of the one on the non-existence of another. In the common व्याप्तिः of धूमः and अग्निः अन्वयव्याप्तिः is यत्र धूमस्तत्र वन्हिः and this is a true proposition. But the व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः is not true if the terms are used in the same order. It is false to say यत्र धूमाभावः तत्र वन्ह्याभावः । *e. g.* in the hot iron, there is the absence of smoke but there is not the corresponding absence of fire. But the conversion of this is true. It is quite true to say यत्र वन्ह्याभावस्तत्र धूमाभावः । This is true universally, understanding of course in the belief of the ancients that smoke is the concommitant effect of fire and fire only. This shows that in a व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः when it is true, the *hetu* or middle term resides in a part only of the सपक्षः which is any thing having fire. It is seen in one thing having fire by a kitchen and yet not seen in a red hot iron, although it is one of the सपक्षाः. It is therefore now seen that in an अन्वयव्यतिरेकी हेतुः, the हेतुः may reside in the whole of the सपक्षः or only in a part of it. The अन्वयव्यतिरेकी हेतुः is one which can enable us to arrive at the conclusion by two ways. It may be either by giving an अन्वयी उदाहरणम् or by a व्यतिरेकी उदाहरणम्. अन्वयः is always a general affirmative proposition. The व्यतिरेकः is a particular proposition. None of them seem to be negative propositions. The *hetu* used here is not true of all the सपक्षाः *i. e.* all the non-eternal objects ; but of a part only. The commentators analyse this *hetu* thus. It is necessary to give this lengthy phrase, as it will not do to say इन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात्; for even God is ग्राह्य by inference through mind, an इन्द्रिय, but He is not अनित्य. This result is avoided by prefixing बाह्यम्. This even will not do, as, according to eastern philosophers, the योगी can see even atoms by their physical organs, and atoms according to Naiyayikas are eternal. To avoid this second result, the word अस्मदादिः is inserted, which avoids the physical organs of the *yogis* by limiting the result to the organs of common people like us. But even the physical organs of common people are able to cognise the eternal सामान्यानि (genuses.). शब्दः

has a सामान्यम् yet being itself not eternal, the genus to which it belongs is not taken to be eternal. To avoid the eternal *Samanyas* the phrase introduced is सामान्यत्वे सति, which means 'although there is सामान्यम्.'

P. 5 L. 6. **पक्षव्यापकः सपक्षवृत्तिः**—A *Kevala'nvayi hetu* is that which is concomitant with पक्षः (minor term) and resides in the *Sapaxa*, and has no *Vipaxa*. This again is of two kinds as shown before. The author says that, as shown in the previous note, सपक्षवृत्तिः may mean either that the hetu resides in the whole or only a part of the सपक्षः and consequently the two syllogisms.

P. 5 L. 7. **विवादास्पदीभूतानि**—This is an instance of the first kind of केवलान्वयी which when put in syllogistic form becomes :—

प्रतिज्ञा—अदृष्टादीनि कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षाणि.

हेतुः—प्रमेयत्वात्.

उदाहरणम्—यत्र प्रमेयत्वं तत्र कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षत्वम् यथा करतलम्.

उपनयः—प्रत्यक्षत्वव्याप्यप्रमेयत्ववदिदमदृष्टम्.

निगमनम्—अदृष्टं कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षम्.

In the first place this is only an अन्वयी हेतुः for if we convert the व्याप्तिः of the उदाहरणम् it will be found that the व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः is not correct. यत्र न प्रत्यक्षत्वम् तत्र न प्रमेयत्वम् is not true because even where there is not प्रत्यक्षत्वम्, प्रमेयत्वम् is seen to exist.

In this case the *hatu* प्रमेयत्वं resides in the whole of सपक्षम् *viz.* करतलम्.

P. 5. L. 7. **सैव प्रतिज्ञा**—Let us now take the same assertion and the conclusion proving it with a different *hetu* which in syllogistic form stands thus.

प्रतिज्ञा–अदृष्टादीनि कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षाणि.

हेतुः–मीमांसकानामप्रत्यक्षत्वात्.

उदाहरणम्–यत्र मीमांसकानामप्रत्यक्षत्वं तत्र कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षम् यथा अस्मत्सुखादिः.

उपनयः—कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षत्वव्याप्यमीमांसकानामप्रत्यक्षत्ववन्ति अदृष्टादीनि.

निगमनम्—तस्मात् अदृष्टादीनि कस्यचित्प्रत्यक्षाणि.

As it is, this is a very queer argument and at first sight looks a faulty one. It is intended to prove that अदृष्टम् or the unseen (future) is visible (directly) to some people (the yogis). The reason given constitutes the queerness. It is so, he says, because they are directly

noncognizible to the Mimansakas. Here we have to take for granted that the yogis know several things by direct mode of cognition, (प्रत्यक्षम्) which the Mimansakas (who are not yogis) do not know. Here the सपक्षः is अस्मत्सुखादिः which according to the argument should be अप्रत्यक्षः to the *Mimansakas.* The reasoning is this. The अदृष्टानि are *pratyaxa* to some because they are *apratyaxa* to the *Mimaṇsakas* as is the case with अस्मत्सुखादिः which though *pratyaxa* to us are *apratyaxa* to the *Mimansakas.* Let us examine this argument first by the definition of केवलान्वयी हेतुः. The *hetu* मीमांसकानामप्रत्यक्षत्वात् must be पक्षव्यापक *i. e.* it must reside in the पक्षः which in this case is अदृष्टादिः. This is true according to the theory of the *Mimansakas.* The हेतुः then must be found in the सपक्षः which is अस्मत्सुखादिः which is also true according to their theory. The third condition is, that there should not be a विपक्षः Now under this assertion *viz.* the future is cognized directly by some; the predicate is such that there can not be any thing which is not cognized by some directly *i. e.* even by the yogis; and therefore there cannot be a विपक्षः. But even the सपक्षः, अस्मत्सुखादिः is a part of it because all the human happinesses are not *pratyaxa.*

P. 5. L. 10. **केवलव्यतिरेकी यथा**—A *kevalavyatireki hetu* is that which is व्यापकः in the minor term, which has no सपक्षः, and which is distinct from विपक्षः. This is again of two kinds which the author names by अप्रसंगोन्नेयी and प्रसंगोन्नेयी. As an instance of the first kind he gives an argument which can be thus put in syllogistic form.

प्र०—सर्वं कार्यं सर्ववित्कर्तृपूर्वकम्.

हेतुः—कादाचित्कत्वात्.

उदाहरणम्—यत्र यत्र सर्ववित्कर्तृपूर्वकत्वाभावः तत्र कादाचित्कत्वाभावः यथाआकाशे.

उपनयः—सर्ववित्कर्तृपूर्वकत्वाऽऽभावव्याप्यकादाचित्कत्वाऽऽभावव्यापकं इदं न.

निगमनम्—तस्मात् सर्वं कार्यं न सर्ववित्कर्तृपूर्वकाभाववत्. This reasoning is absent from many later works but the next is the one often found there. I do not see the necessity nor understand the utility of dividing केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतुः into two parts. Both the arguments cited here are interesting so far as the first is aimed at the thiest and the second against the latter's doctrine, that a body has no soul.

P. 5. L. 14. **एतेन हेत्वाभासानामहेतुत्वं भवति.**—The author now proceeds to discuss the *Hetvabhâsas* or fallacies which, according to him, have merely, the appearance of the *hetu.* The line following this

phrase, which gives the definition of a *hetvabhâsa* merely explains the term. This definition of *hetvabhâsa* is taken from the Bhashya of *Vatsyâyana* on *Gautama's Sutras.* According to *Gautama,* there are five *hetvabhasas.* They are सव्यभिचारः, विरुद्धः, प्रकरणसमः, साध्यसमः and कालातीतः. According to our author, they are six, namely असिद्धः, विरुद्धः, अनैकान्तिकः, अनध्यवसितः, कालात्ययापदिष्टः and प्रकरणसमः. We can mark that three of these are in meaning the same as those given by *Gautama.* The असिद्धः in our work stands for साध्यसमः of *Gautama,* अनैकान्तिकः for सव्यभिचारः, and कालात्ययापदिष्टः for कालातीतः, विरुद्धः, and प्रकरणसमः are common to both. Our author gives one more अनध्यवसितः which is not to be found in *Gautama.* According to the *Vaisheshikhas,* there are only three *hetvabhasas, e. g.* विरुद्धः, असिद्धः, and संदिग्धः. संदिग्धः corresponds to अनैकान्तिकः of our author. The other two are common. According *Shankermishra,* अनध्यवसितः is the same as अनुपसंहारि-अनैकान्तिकः mentioned by the later writers. Buddhist author of the न्यायबिन्दु follows *Kanâda* in classification of *hetvabhasas.*

The commentator *Jayasinha* is silent as to the exact number of the *hetvabhasas* ; *Raghava Bhatta,* however says that really speaking there are only five but *Bhasarvajna* splits one of them into two. He is not very clear as to the one which has been so split up.

A very pertinent question occurs to a student of Nyaya Shastra, which is, how far the *hetvabhasas* correspond with the fallacies of the Western Logic. Aristotle and his followers would divide fallacies into formal, and material and would say that a material fallacy can hardly have place in formal logic. The distinction is not clear even in *Gautama's* logic, but taking his syllogism to be purely formal, the *hetvabhasas* are also of that type.

P. 6. L. 3. **तत्राऽनिश्चितपक्षवृत्तिरसिद्धः**—In understanding a fallacy, one has to keep in his mind that the *hetu* to be a correct one, must fulfil the five conditions already explained. A breach of any one of these conditions gives rise to a fallacy. The first of these conditions is that the *hetu* must co-exist with the पक्षः or the minor term. Let us examine the argument given by our author to illustrate this fallacy. शब्दोऽनित्यः चाक्षुषत्वात्.

A word is non-eternal

∵ A word refers to the eye.

Here the very first requisite is not complied with. The debator forgets that there can be no connection between the eye and the word. *Raghava Bhatta* in his commentary gives this explanation of असिद्धः,

but at the same time, he supports the view of *Vatsyayana*, and the author of न्यायवार्तिकम् that असिद्धः is identical with **साध्यसमः**.

P. 6 L. 3 **पक्षविपक्षयोरेव वर्तमानो विरुद्धः**. When a *hetu* is to be found in the पक्षः and विपक्षः only and not in सपक्षः we get the *hetvâbhasa* विरुद्धः. To remind the reader, the first three requisites of a good *hetu* are (1) that it must be found in the पक्षः (2) it must be found in the सपक्षः and (3) that it must not be found in a a विपक्षः. The argument cited in illustration is शब्दोनित्यः कार्यत्वात्. In this syllogism शब्दः is the पक्षः, the सपक्षः of शब्दः as it is to be नित्यः we take to be ईश्वरः. The विपक्षः of शब्दः which must be अनित्यः may be घटः. Here the reader will understand that कार्यत्वात् (because it is an effect) is to be found in शब्दः *i. e.* पक्षः, but is not to be found in सपक्षः *i. e.* ईश्वरः and it resides in a घटः *i. e.* विपक्षः which it should never do. Here the *hetu*, if properly worked out will give us a conclusion contrary to our प्रतिज्ञा. Putting the syllogism in its proper form it runs thus :—

प्रतिज्ञा—शब्दोनित्यः.

हेतुः—कार्यत्वात्.

उदाहरणम्—यत्र यत्र कार्यत्वम् तत्र तत्र नित्यत्वम्.

This is a false व्याप्तिः because we cannot find an illustration to support it.

Let us take the व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः which will run as follows :—

प्रतिज्ञा—यत्र यत्र अनित्यत्वम् तत्र तत्र कार्याभावत्वम्.

This व्याप्ति is also unsupported by any illustration.

The correct व्याप्तिः would be

यत्र यत्र कार्यत्वम् तत्र तत्राऽनित्यत्वम्.

This is supported by the illustration यथाघटः. The regular conclusion (निगमनम्) drawn from this will be शब्दोऽनित्यः which is a contradiction of the प्रतिज्ञा.

When we put this syllogism in English form it becomes

All cases of eternity are cases of effect.

Sound is a case of effect

∴ Sound is eternal.

This is clearly a fallacy of undistributed middle term.

P. 6. L.4. **पक्षसपक्षविपक्षवृत्तिरनैकान्तिकः**—When a *hetu* is found in all the three *viz.* पक्षः, सपक्षः and विपक्षः, the *hetvabhasa* committed is अनैकान्तिकः. It violates the rule that the *hetu* shall not be found in the विपक्षः. The argument cited in the illustration is अनित्यः शब्दः प्रमेयत्वात्. In this case शब्दः in the पक्षः, अनित्यत्वम् is the साध्यम्, पटः may be taken as the सपक्षः and ईश्वरः being eternal may be taken as the विपक्षः. प्रमेयत्वम् (the quality of being known) is the *hetu*. All

the *shastrâs* aim at knowing ईश्वरः. प्रमेयत्वम् therefore, resides in ईश्वरः, which is contrary to the rule of five requisites to be found in a good syllogism. When put in regular form, the argument becomes:

प्रतिज्ञा—शब्दोऽनित्यः
हेतुः—प्रमेयत्वात्,
उदाहरणम्—यत्र यत्र प्रमेयत्वम् तत्र तत्र अनित्यत्वम् (This is false).
उपनयः—अनित्यत्वव्याप्यप्रमेयत्ववदयं शब्दः (false)
निगमनम्—शब्दोऽनित्यः (false)

In English it would be,

All objects of knowledge are non-eternal
Sound is an object of knowledge.
∴ Sound is non-eternal.

In this case the major premise is false, and it is a case of undistributed major term.

P. 6. L. 4. **साध्याऽसाधकः** &c.—A *hetu* which does not establish the साध्यम् (major term,) but is found only in the पक्षः (minor term) is a fallacy called अनध्यवसितम्. This हेत्वाभासः is not mentioned by the *Sutras* nor by any other schools of philosophy. The aggregate of the definition is that it is not proved by the *hetu* *i. e.* both the conditions (1) being in the सपक्षः and (2) absent from विपक्षः are not complied with. Quite independent of the existence of सपक्षः and विपक्षः the *hetu* is found only in the पक्षः. This is mentioned by शंकरः.* The instance given of this is सर्वमनित्यंसत्वात्. Here सर्वं being the पक्षः there can neither be a सपक्षः nor a विपक्षः. There is nothing therefore to test the व्याप्तिः which can not be mentioned. The *hetu* is therefore unable to prove the साध्यम् of the पक्षः though सर्वं is residing in the पक्षः, सर्वं, which it does according to Vedant theory.

P. 6. L. 5. **प्रमाणबाधिते** &c. The *hetu* which exists in a पक्षः but which is disproved by another प्रमाणम् is कालात्ययापदिष्टः. The very prominent instance is अनुष्णोऽग्निः कृतकत्वात्. Here the very प्रतिज्ञा is false because, we know by perception (प्रत्यक्षम्) that fire is not cold. The *hetu* though it may be found in the पक्षः is false and proves nothing.

P. 6. L. 6. **स्वपरपक्षसिद्धावपि** &c. A *hetu* which fulfils the three conditions in the पक्षः in hand and also in another पक्षः is called प्रकरणसमः. This is a case of a dilemma and is called in later works सत्प्रतिपक्षः.

P. 6. L. 7. **यद्यपि चैषां** &c. These **हेत्वाभासाः** thus classified into six

* vide p. 30 note p. 8-4-8.

broad divisions, can be further divided innumerably: but in the following pages the author gives a few of them only: He begins with twelve *Assiddhas* many of which are quite easy to understand. We will discuss one or two leaving the others to be dealt with by the reader.

P. 6. L. 9. **स्वरूपासिद्धः** ॥ शब्दः अनित्यः चाक्षुषत्वात्.

Keeping in mind that the *hetu* must fulfil the five conditions, and examining the *hetu* we found that चाक्षुषत्वम् has nothing common with शब्दः. It is not appertaining to a चक्षुः nor is it received by a चक्षुः

असिद्धः though not mentioned by name in the *Sutras* is the same as साध्यसमः mentioned and defined by *Gautama* in Sutra 1-2-8. साध्याविशिष्टः साध्यत्वात्साध्यसमः. The explanation is that the *hetu* itself being not true of the साध्यम्, it requires to be proved. The author of न्यायवार्तिकम् says that this is the same as असिद्धः and divides it into three classes. सोयमसिद्धस्त्रेधाभवति । प्रज्ञापनीयधर्मसमान आश्रयासिद्धोऽन्यथासिद्धश्चेति । (न्यायवार्तिकम्.) The illustration given by *Vatsyâyana* of this fallacy is द्रव्यं छाया गतिमत्त्वात्. Here छाया is पक्षः, द्रव्यं is साध्यं and गतिमत्वम् is the *hetu*. It is not certain that गतिमत्त्वम् is concomitant with छाया. Thus we see that *Vat'sya'yana* who flourished in the fifth century A. D. is satisfied with keeping on the name of साध्यसमः explaining it by the word असिद्धः. *Udyotkara*, the author of वार्तिकम् who lived about the eighth century A. D. mentions three divisions of असिद्धः stating that it is the same as साध्यसमः. Our author mentions about 16 different instances of असिद्धः giving different names to each, but without strictly classifying them; the strict classification begun by उद्योत्करः and followed by most of the later writers is not to be found in our author. He may have lived before उद्योत्करः or so very near his time as not have been informed of this writer.

(1) **स्वरूपासिद्धः.**

शब्दोऽनित्यश्चाक्षुषत्वात्. शब्दः. is पक्षः, सपक्षः is घटः and विपक्षः is ईश्वरः. The **हेतुः** चाक्षुषत्वम् breaks three conditions *viz.* पक्षधर्मत्वम्, सपक्षे सत्वम्, and विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तिः.

(2) **व्यधिकरणासिद्धः.**

शब्दोऽनित्यः पटस्य कृतकृत्वात्. This also violates the first three conditions.

(3) **विशेष्यासिद्धः.**

शब्दोऽनित्यः सामान्यवत्त्वे सति चाक्षुषत्वात् is equally faulty.

(4) **विशेषणासिद्धः.**

शब्दोऽनित्यश्चाक्षुषत्वे सति सामान्यवत्त्वात् is again faulty. These first four instances are mere different shades of one and the same fallacy called स्वरूपासिद्धः and all of them necessarily violate the first condition required for a valid syllogism.

(5) **विभागासिद्धः** is one in which हेतुः does not exist in a part of the पक्षः. The distinction between this and the first four is, that in the latter the hetu does not exist in the whole पक्षः, while in the former it is not found in a part only of the पक्षः. *Jayasinha* goes into the theory of the production of शब्दः held by the नैयायिकाः or more correctly by the वैशेषिकाः which is thus explained. भागे पक्षैकदेशेऽसिद्धः भागासिद्धः । प्रयत्नः शब्दजनको व्यापारः । तत्प्रयत्नानंतरं भवः प्रयत्नांतरीयः । There he goes on to explain, the further प्रयत्नम् which he thinks does not exist, but on which depends the further production of sound. According to him प्रयत्नम् is the cause of the first wave of sound, which प्रयत्नम् is absent in the second wave and therefore there is an absence of हेतुः in the whole of the शब्दः. This would come under स्वरूपासिद्धः and therefore in fact, we have five illustrations of स्वरूपासिद्धः.

(6) **आश्रयासिद्धः** यथाऽस्ति प्रधानम् विश्वपरिणामित्वात्. Here the *hetu* stands in the position of आश्रितः and आश्रयः with the पक्षः. पक्षः is प्रधानम् and अस्तित्वम् is साध्यम् the हेतुः being विश्वपरिणामित्वम् (because it has the characteristic of resulting into विश्वम्)- Here the author makes a thrust at the Sankhya philosophers who hold that विश्वम् is the result of प्रधानम्. But the नैयायिकाः say that it is a fallacy because it is not true that there is that relation between प्रधानम् and विश्वम्, and the hetu therefore fails to prove the existence of प्रधानम्. This is a very good and yet peculiar illustration of this fallacy. Later authors give us very common instances as for example गगनारविन्दं सुरभि-अरविन्दत्वात्. Here the पक्षः is qualified by an adjective which makes the very पक्षः non-existent and much less therefore fregrant. In the illustration of our author one thing is attempted to be proved by another which itself is not known to be affirmed of the other. The *hetu* is as uncertain as the साध्यम्. This illustration gives a clear explanation of the name साध्यसमः given to this fallacy by *Gautama.*

(7) आश्रयैकदेशासिद्धः is explained in a similar way.

(8-9) The next two व्यर्थविशेष्यासिद्धः and व्यर्थविशेषणासिद्धः are quite unnecessary divisions. *Râghava* says that these are instances of व्याप्यत्वासिद्धः which according to later writers involves a case of उपाधिः but in the instance cited here there is no case of उपाधि. Perhaps *Râghava's* illustrations were different as appears from one found in the MS. with me. It seems to me that the illustration noted is not the illustration given by *Bhásarvajna* and it may be that the copy used by *Ra'ghava* was one tempered with by a subsequent copyist. It is worth noting that *Râghava,* gives five classes of असिद्धः which he calls स्वरूपासिद्धः, पक्षधर्मत्वासिद्धः, आश्रयासिद्धः, व्याप्यत्वासिद्धः and अप्रसिद्धसाध्यः. He further goes on grouping the twelve in these five and suggests several more of his own. The copy in this part of it, as also in several other parts is badly written and although the letters are clear, it becomes very difficult to gather the author's meaning. He jumbles up together, the views of *Gautama,* his commentator and himself and also perhaps of some one of his immediate predecessor.

(10-11-12) संदिग्धासिद्धः is an important fallacy. If some one without ascertaining whether the phenomenon in sight is smoke or mist says, अयं प्रदेशः अग्निमान् धूमवत्त्वात् he commits this fallacy. If we look to the definition of असिद्धः it says that in that there is the uncertainty of the *hetu* existing with the *Paxa.* This is not a purely formal fallacy violating one of the conditions of a true syllogism. The fault lies in the wrong observation, which leads to that violation. The fault has its origin in the doubt. In the two following fallacies the doubt exists in the qualified हेतुः or the qualifier. These three may be classed in one group of संदिग्धासिद्धः.

P. 7. L. 4. विरुद्धभेदास्तु &c. Eight fallacies known by the name of विरुद्धः are given by *Bhasarvajna.* Four of these occur when there is a सपक्षः and four more when there is not a सपक्षः. In a विरुद्धः the *hetu* resides in the पक्षः and विपक्षः only and not in सपक्षः. This shows that if the *hetu* resides in the विपक्षः and not in सपक्षः the conclusion must be contrary to the प्रतिज्ञा. This is very well borne out in the definition given by *Gautama* viz. सिद्धान्तमप्युपेत्य तद्विरोधी विरुद्धः । G.S.1.2. 6. A still simpler definition is given by *Lougaxi Bháskar* in his तर्ककौमुदी

where he says साध्याभावव्याप्तो हेतुर्विरुद्धः The four illustrations given by our author are the modification of one and the same, शब्दो नित्यः कार्यत्वात्. Here सपक्षः should be ईश्वरः in which *hetu* कार्यत्वात् can not reside. विपक्षः is घटः in which it does reside, which is contrary to the rule. Thus it violates the condition विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तिः. To make it clear let us expand the syllogism.

प्रतिज्ञा—शब्दः नित्यः

हेतुः—कार्यत्वात्.

व्याप्तिः— यत्र कार्यत्वं तत्र नित्यत्वं. This is false as there is no illustration or यत्र नित्यत्वाभावः. (अनित्यत्वं) तत्र कार्यत्वाभावः This may be false as in घटः or true as in अज्ञानम्.

उपनयः—कार्यत्वाभावव्याप्य अनित्यत्ववानयं शब्दः.

निगमनम् —शब्दः अनित्यः. In this way all the other instances given by the author could be worked out.

P. 7. L. 16. **ननु चत्वार एव** &c. A question arises that there are not more than four विरुद्धाः, as those in which the हेतुः resides in पक्षैकदेशः are already mentioned in the असिद्धः. The author says, it does not matter as they can very well be included in both.

P. 7. L. 19. **अनैकान्तिकभेदास्तु** &c. *Gautama* defines this as **सव्यभिचारोऽनैकान्तिकः**. *Bhâsarvajna's* definition is पक्षसपक्षविपक्षवृत्तिरनैकान्तिकः. Thus we see that the fault lies in the *hetu* being concomitant with विपक्षः. This vitiates the third condition of a valid syllogism. *Bhâsarvjna* proceeds in a very systematic way and naturally by considering the position of *hetu* as to *Paxa*, Sa*paxa*, or Vi*paxa* makes as many divisions of the fallacy as could be made mathematically. In a previous portion he has shown tendency to split up consideration of पक्षः into that of the whole and of the part of it. If the *hetu* is to be found or not found in a पक्षः it may either be not found in the whole or in a part of it. The same may be said equally of सपक्षः and विपक्षः. He thus enumerates eight different classes of this हेत्वाभासः which are—

1 पक्षत्रयव्यापकः
2 पक्षव्यापकः सपक्षविपक्षैकदेशव्यापकः
3 पक्षसपक्षव्यापकः विपक्षैकदेशव्यापकः
4 पक्षविपक्षव्यापकः सपक्षैकदेशव्यापकः
5 पक्षत्रयैकदेशव्यापकः

6 पक्षसपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिर्विपक्षव्यापकः
7 पक्षविपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः सपक्षव्यापकः
8 सपक्षविपक्षव्यापकः पक्षैकदेशव्यापकः

Let us now examine one of the instances.

प्रतिज्ञा शब्दोऽनित्यः
हेतुः प्रमेयत्वात्. } शब्दः is पक्षः अनित्यत्वम् is साध्यं

उदाहरणम्—यत्र प्रमेयत्वम् तत्र अनित्यत्वम् This is correct as in घटः
प्रमेयत्वम् is हेतुः or

यत्र अनित्याभावः (नित्यत्वम्) तत्र प्रमेयत्वाभावः. This is false as in आत्मा.
घटः is सपक्षः आत्मा is विपक्षः.

उपनयः will be false with विपक्षः.

निगमनम् must therefore be false.

Let us put it in Aristotalian form.

Wherever there is an object of knowledge, there is non-eternity.

i. e. All objects of knowledge are non-eternal.

Sound is an object of knowledge.

∴ Sound is non-eternal.

This is an instance of the illicit process of the major term.

It may be noted that *Raghava's* eight names of **अनैकान्तिकः** are somewhat different. The whole of this part in his commentary seems to have been very badly copied and is full of mistakes. It may be that the copist made an unpardonable mistake in mixing up lines from other pages.

P. 8. L. 8. **अनध्यवसितभेदास्तु** &c. As already remarked this हेत्वाभासः is mentioned by *Bhâsarvajna* alone, except by *Shankarmishra* who, about the 17th century, says that it is the same as अनुपसंहारी-अनैकान्तिकः which latter did not take its name and form in the time of *Bhâsarvajna.* This is not found even in *Gautama* or the *Bhashya* on his *Sutras.* Unless we find out that some other authors mentioned it before *Bhâsarvajna* we must say that he was the first to suggest it. As it is, it is not a very important addition in the हेत्वाभासाः He defines it as साध्याऽसाधकः पक्ष एव वर्तमानोऽनध्यवसितः. In classifying this, again he follows the same method of going on very systematically. Although the *hetu* in this case resides in the पक्षः only, पक्षः may either have or not the सपक्षः or विपक्षः.

That then makes two broad divisions of having or not having सपक्षः and विपक्षः. Next division is by the *hetu* being found in the whole पक्षः or in a part only. This brings it to four. Then he gives a further division where there is no विपक्षः but there is सपक्षः. This

adds four more to the number. The breach of condition is, in not finding हेतुः in the सपक्षः. Mere पक्षधर्मता is not sufficient because that does not prove anything. The conditions violated are सपक्षे सत्त्वम् and विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तिः । Let us examine one example:

प्रतिज्ञा—सर्वमनित्यं (सर्वम् being पक्षः there is neither सपक्षः nor विपक्षः.)
हेतुः—सत्त्वात्,
व्याप्तिः—यत्र सत्त्वं तत्र नित्यत्वम्

There is an absence of उदाहरणम् because there is neither सपक्षः nor विपक्षः

In Aristotalian form it would be

All real things are non-eternal.

All things are real things.

∴ All things are non-eternal.

This is illicit process of the major term.

Râghava raises here a very good question. It may be shown that there cannot be a व्याप्तिः in अनध्यवसितः and in that case this fallacy is only a case of व्याप्यत्वासिद्धः and need not be separately mentioned. But, says *Râghava*, this is a different feature of the fallacy and may be separately treated.

P. 8 L. 17 **कालात्ययापदिष्टभेदास्तु** &c. The definition already given is प्रमाणबाधिते पक्षे वर्तमानो हेतुः कालात्ययापदिष्टः. This fallacy is known in later works as बाधितः. It is interesting to note that the word used as definition by *Gautama* in the Sutra (1. 2. 9) is used here as a name of the fallacy. According to later writers कालातीतः is the name of the fallacy. *Jayasinha* thus explains कालात्ययापदिष्टः. प्रमाणानुपहतपक्षोपन्यासाऽनंतरं हेतूपन्यासस्य समयः कालः तदत्ययेऽतिक्रमे सत्यपदिष्टः कालात्ययापदिष्टः. *Râghava* explains it, thus. कालात्ययापदिष्टः कालातीतः इति कालात्यये कालाभावे ऽपदिष्टः कथित एकदेशो यस्य हेतोः स तथा । तथाच यस्य कस्याप्यर्थः किंचित्कालसंबंधी यस्य पुनरर्थौ न कस्मिंश्चित्कालेऽस्ति स कालात्ययापदिष्टो बाधाभिधान इति सूत्रतात्पर्यार्थः It is clear that this is the fallacy known in later works as बाधितः. The instance given by *Vâtsya'yana* is very interesting though not so easy as that given by *Bhâsarvajna.* He says नित्यः शब्दः संयोगव्यंग्यत्वात् रूपवत्. Here, the *hetu* is concomitant with रूपम् which is seen in an object by its connection with light. A शब्दः in which संयोगः ought to exist, is not so seen. The sound is the result of the connection of a drum and a stick, but the connection (संयोगः) is not concomitant with the sound. By the time we hear the शब्दः the संयोगः has disappeared *i. e.* संयोगः has passed (अत्ययः) at the time when it should have been a

हेतुः. I fail to see how this is the same as बाधितः or बाधः of the later writers. I am even much more perplexed to see, that *Bhásarvajna* gives instances of बाधितः under the heading of कालात्ययापदिष्टः. Mr. Athlye in his annotations on तर्कसंग्रहः says that कालातीतः or कालात्ययापदिष्टः is the same as बाधितः. There is another reason why this can not be the same as बाधितः. *Vátsyáyana* who does not even mention either बाधः or बाधितः, says that the fault in कालातीतः occurs in non-similarity of the illustration as shown in the syllogism given by him. It may become interesting to find who first thought that कालातीतः or कालात्ययापदिष्टः is the same as बाधितः. It is not done by वात्स्यायनः. It is not also in न्यायवार्तिकः as seen from the passage quoted in the Benares edition of वात्स्यायनः nor in the तात्पर्यटीका of वाचस्पतिः.

The very first instance given by *Bhásarvajna* clears his meaning of the fallacy, though it does not appear how he gets it and why he drops *Gautama's* meaning. अनुष्णोऽग्निः कृतकत्वात्. Here by प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम् fire is known to be hot. This accordingly violates the fifth condition of अबाधितविषयत्वम्. Here the *hetu* कृतकत्वम् does not reside in the प्रतिज्ञातार्थः which is coldness of fire, because that coldness is not प्रमाणाविरोधी but it is विरोधी of प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम्. A question is rightly raised viz whether this is a हेत्वाभासः. The fault does not reside in the हेतुः but rather in the पक्षः. *Jayasinha* answers this difficulty by suggesting that it is हेत्वाभासः because when the recepient is faulty you may accept the fault even in the object received. The argument is not very sound. This much can be said, that this does not seem strictly to be a formal fallacy, except that it violates the fourth condition. This fallacy can occur even when a साध्याभावः is proved of the पक्षः by another हेतुः by अनुमानम्. If it is the same हेतुः it becomes a case of प्रकरणसमः.

P. 9. L. 1. **प्रकरणसमः**— This cannot be the same as सत्प्रतिपक्षः because in this case the साध्यः is proved by the same *hetu* and not by another which is the case in सत्प्रतिपक्षः

P. 9. L. 3. The author mentions विरुद्धाव्यभिचारी. This may be the same as अनुमानकालात्ययापदिष्टः.

P. 9. L. 8. **उदाहरणम्.** Having treated the first two members of the syllogism *viz.* प्रतिज्ञा and हेतुः we now come to the important third member उदाहरणम् which is the most essential member in the argument. It is worth remarking here that the word व्याप्तिः which plays so important and necessary a part in an उदाहरणम् and on the importance of which later writers dwell at very great length-

had not acquired that importance at the time when *Bhásarvajna* wrote. Even the definition given by *Bhàsarvajna* of उदाहरणम् is not logically correct. It gives only a synonymous term. अन्नंभट्टः the wellknown manual writer does not define it in his text of तर्कसंग्रहः but in his gloss over it, he defines it as व्याप्तिप्रतिपादकं उदाहरणम्. So also does *Laugákshi Bháskar* in his तर्ककौमुदी, where he says व्याप्तिप्रतिपादकं वचनमुदाहरणम्, Mr. Athlye, however, points out that *Laugákshi Bhàskar* in his न्यायसिद्धान्तमंजरीप्रकाशः has the courage to say that the employment of the instance is purely conventional and not necessary. We saw that neither *Gautama* nor *Vátsyáyana* mentions व्याप्तिः. Mr. Athlye says that even न्यायबिंदुः the wellknown Bauddha work on logic is silent on this point. It is thus very conspicuously absent from earlier works. *Rághava* explains it as सम्यक्त्वं व्याप्तिपुरःसरम्. The prominence of व्याप्तिः is already felt by राघवः in the 12th century. *Bhâsarvajna* does not mention the word व्याप्तिः but he has the necessary form of व्याप्तिः in his उदाहरणम्. This may throw some light on the date of our author. He does not belong to that class of authors, who are very early in date, and who do not admit, recognise or even mention the व्याप्तिः, and whose third member is a naked उदाहरणम्. Nor does he belong to the later writers who recognise the importance of, and insert व्याप्तिः, as a necessary member of a good syllogism, and make the mention of उदाहरणम् as a part of the व्याप्तिः. As long as there is no व्याप्तिः the inference is necessarily from particular to particular; and in the *Sutra* we do not see any attempt at generalization which becomes a prominent feature in the later works. The very words अन्वयः and व्यतिरेकः on which hangs the idea of व्याप्तिः are not to be found either in the *Sutras* or in the *Bhâshya.* उदाहरणम् is of two kinds being either by similarity or dissimilarity. We however see in this work that although in this connection the author does not mention the word व्याप्तिः, he gives the form of the sentence which is adopted by subsequent writers as व्याप्तिः.

P. 9. L. 14. **एतेनोदाहरणाभासानाम्**—The author as well as the commentators think that by mention of उदाहरणम् the उदाहरणाभासाः are excluded or discarded. Why such an interpretation should be put upon the text I cannot understand. In this way we should also expect उपनयाभासाः and निगमनाभासाः which do not, and if हेतुः be correct cannot exist. This feature of उदाहरणाभासाः is a novel one and does

not exist either in the *Sutras* or the *Bháshya*, and not even in subsequent writers.

These are again of various kinds, only eight of which are mentioned here in connection with one syllogism which is

मनः अनित्यम्.

मूर्तत्वात्. Here यथा परमाणुः is the उदाहरणाभासः.

The उदाहरणाभासः marks a state of transition in the development of logical science. The old process of reasoning appears to be from the particular premises to a particular conclusion. Later on comes the idea of generalization with व्याप्तिः as the instrument. The same process is visible in the western system of logic. Even Aristotle began with infering a particular from a particular proposition. The idea of व्याप्तिः which aims at generalization is not to be seen in the *Sutras* nor even the *Bháshya*. In their view व्याप्तिः would only mean concomitance which may be of two particular objects only. To be clear. यत्र धूमस्तत्र वन्हिः according to earlier writers would mean, 'Here there is smoke and with it fire' and महानसः be the place where the concomitance is seen. According to later writers it is यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र वन्हिः meaning wherever there is smoke there is fire: a general or universal proposition, महानसः being one of such universal cases.

Thus the idea of उदाहरणाभासः signifies that by this time the idea of generalization was coming into prominence but was not so thoroughly complete and the writers were feeling the awkwardness of finding correct generalization, as they often met with false illustrations which did not suit the व्याप्तिः. But if the generalization is complete or correct the illustration must tally with it. In plain words, if the उदाहरणम् is incorrect, it can never tally with the व्याप्तिः, as it is only one of the individual instances which go to form the general rule.

P. 10. L. 1. Taking घटः as दृष्टान्तः we get this syllogism.

प्र. मनः—अनित्यम्

हे. मूर्तत्वात् घटवत्

This is an instance of अव्याप्त्यभिधानदोषः which is an उदाहरणाभासः I do not see why this should be a दोषः. *Rághava* says यन्मूर्तं तदनित्यमिति व्याप्तिमनभिधाय यद्धटवदिति दृष्टान्ताभिधानं सोयं व्याप्त्यनभिधानं नाम साक्षा-

दृष्टान्तवचनदोषः तत्र साधनविकलत्वादेरनुपजीव्यत्वात् । *Jayasinha* has the following: न व्याप्तेरभिधानमव्याप्त्यभिधानं नाम दोषो भवति । यन्मूर्तं तदनित्यं दृष्टमिति व्याप्तिमविरचय्यैव घटदृष्टान्तोपादानात् । This does not say that व्याप्तिः cannot be expressed, and if it can be expressed why should it be a दोषः only becanse it is not expressed. The next दोषः is also equally unintellegible. There *Râghava* says यदनित्यमिति । दृष्टमित्यत्र यथा घट इति पूरणीयम् । अन्यथा तेनैव दुष्टत्वं स्यात् । यद्यप्यत्राऽव्याप्त्यभिधानवत्वसंपूर्णत्वान्न दोषः साध्यसाधनवत्तया दृष्टान्तस्याभिधानात्तथापि व्याप्तिमत्साधनतया दृष्टान्तस्यानभिधानाद-संपूर्णमेवेति द्रष्टव्यम् ॥ नहि यदनित्यं तन्मूर्तमित्यत्र मूर्तत्वं व्याप्त्याधारतया निर्धार्येत इत्यलं वाचालतया ॥ Now these two the fifth and the sixth faults are only वचनदोषौ *i. e.* committed by the speaker by slip of tongue or by haste in speaking omitting one phrase which should have been spoken, or it may be by speaking it in an irregular way. The first six of these faults are by साधर्म्यम्. The remaining six are by व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः and therefore by वैधर्म्यम्. The other six उदाहरणाभासाः by वैधर्म्यम् can be easily understood after one has understood the previous six. Even in these latter six the last two are वचनदोषौ and cannot really be called faults.

P. 10. L. 9. **अन्ये तु**—Some other writers suggest eight more उदाहरणाभासाः. *Râghava Bhatta* says that अन्ये means त्रिलोचनाचार्यः and his followers. It may or may not be that this त्रिलोचनः lived before भासर्वज्ञः. But he did live before राघवभट्टः. These eight उदाहरणाभासाः are by the instrumentality of doubt, which may be either in the साध्यम् or the साधनम् or in both.

Let us take the first instance,

प्रतिज्ञा—अयं महाराज्यं करिष्यति,

हेतुः—सोमवंशोद्भूतत्वात्.

व्याप्तिः and उदाहरणम्—यत्र सोमवंशोद्भूतत्वं तत्र महाराज्यकरणत्वं विवक्षितराजपुरुषवत् ॥

Here again we have a व्याप्तिदोषः. All the persons of सोमवंशः may not be महाराज्यकारकाः. Had the idea of व्याप्तिः been completely and correctly understood this fault should not have happened. There is no सामानाधिकरण्यम् in सोमवंशोद्भूतत्वम् and महाराज्यकरणत्वम्. This and the following seven *i.e.* in all eight उदाहरणभासाः are based on doubt existing (as to the concomitance) between the दृष्टान्तः and the other members of the syllogism: namely the साध्यम् and the साधनम् or both of them, firstly by आश्रयः or by way of साधर्म्यम् and then by way of वैधर्म्यम्.

P. 11. L. 3. **दृष्टान्ते** &c. The उपनयः is the sentence expressing concomit-

ance of the साधनम्, which is known to have concomitance in the illustration, with the पक्ष: by way of a metaphor of the illustration. This is again of two kinds, being either by साधर्म्यम् or by वैधर्म्यम्.This in later works would be according as the व्याप्तिः is by अन्वयः or by व्यतिरेकः. Here again we see that the later and the very clear form of उपनयः 'तथाचायं-वन्हिव्याप्यधूमवानयं,' has not come into existence. राघवभट्टः in his commentary does not discuss this definition at all; but he rather discusses the definition given in *Gautamâ's* Sutra *viz.* उदाहरणापेक्षस्तथेत्युपसंहारो न तथेति वा साध्यस्योपनयः उपनयः. It is the expression of the minor term either by अन्वयः or व्यतिरेकः dependant on the illustration. It is the same definition as that of न्यायसारः put in a very concise form.

P. 11. L. 7. **उपनयानंतरम्** &c. Now we come to the last member of the syllogism *viz* निगमनम् which comes after उपनयः and is the expressions of the प्रतिज्ञा coupled with the हेतुः. Its form is तस्मादनित्य एवेति. *Gautama* defines it as हेत्वपदेशात्प्रतिज्ञायाः पुनर्वचनं निगमनम्॥ १–१३–९.

It is quite natural that the usefulness of this may be questioned and consequently the author says that it is not useless. The reason is that it suggests that there is authority for proving the absence of the contrary of the साध्यम्. When we begin to argue the first question which suggests to us is that there may be proof for the contrary. When we go through the process we come to the conclusion that there is the absence of the contrary. This latter step is not complete unless the निगमनम् is put in a clear expression. *Râghava* says that the expression साध्यविरुद्धाभाव ... (L. 8.) shows the कार्यम् of निगमनम् and नचतदंतरेण ... (L. 9) shows the प्रयोजनम् of निगमनम्. In तदंतरेण, तद् means the कार्यम् expressed in the previous sentence. It cannot be said that in making an inference another contrary or contradictory inference is not suggested; because such a suggestion is essential to the moving of the inference in hand. This is so *Sutra* held even by *Gautama* whose 1-1-41 says that निर्णयः (conclusion) is arrived at after considering the arguments for and against.

P. 11. L. 13. **निगमनाभिधानं** &c. It may be said that the expression of निगमनम् is not a part of साधनम् or हेतुः and is therefore unnecessary. If we admit this, we shall have to admit that there is a बाधकप्रमाणम् which gives rise to a निग्रहस्थानम्. The latter is defined as विप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिपत्तिश्च निग्रहस्थानम्॥ १-२-१०. which in short means that when there is either contrary proof or no proof there occurs a निग्रहस्थानम् because then the बाधकः becomes the निगमनम् or the निगमनम् has the form of a बाधकप्रमाणम्.

P. 11. L. 15. **निगमनार्थविप्रतिपत्तौ**—In case we dispute the निगमनम् that will be the proper place to state the बाधकप्रमाणम् as the contrary inference. In the same way if one doubts the हेतु: he has to state the साधकप्रमाणम्.

P. 11. L. 16. **सोयं परमो न्यायो** ... This is the best mode of arguing; because it convinces the person who has doubt, and also because it leads to a disputation. Mark the meaning of the word **कथा** peculiar to the science of logic. This is not mentioned in any of the known dictionaries.

P. 11. L. 18. **कथा**. Taking in (or receiving) of the thesis of the disputant and adducing argument in answer thereof by the opponent is called कथा. This is again of two kinds *viz.* वीतरागकथा and विजिगीषुकथा.

P. 12. L. 1. The first वीतरागकथा is known as वाद: discussion. This takes place between two persons who do not have any worldly expectation but only have a desire to find out the truth. For that purpose one person makes an assertion and the other objects or finds fault with it. The सूत्रकार: defines वाद: as comprehending the thesis and expressing it by a syllogism of five members not opposed to the truth but beset with reasons and objections based on inference and doubt. This may again be with no desire to prove the opposite view, as is in the case of a pupil and a teacher by way of question by the pupil and reply by the teacher to instruct the former.

P. 12. L. 7. **यत्र विजिगीषुर्विजिगीषुणा सह**&c. When a person having a desire to win meets another who has a similar desire or has the desire of some gain, पूजा—worship or reverence, or fame, that disputation is called विजिगीषुकथा. *Râghava* says that it may be said that the सूत्रकार: did not mention वीतरागकथा but it is not so. Our author says that he has mentioned it by the word वाद:. Again this विजिगीषुकथा may be held even by a वीतराग: to convince others and to keep up the seed of knowledge. This is fourfold, being started either by a वादी (debator) by a प्रतिवादी, disputant, or opened by the leader in a meeting or by a neutral or independent thinker or what we may call, a man with open mind. This विजिगीषुकथा may be either जल्प: or वितंडा.

P. 12. L. 11. **तथा चाह**.—The author quotes *Gautama's* definition of जल्प: and वितंडा as given in his *Sutra* 4-2-50 which by a metaphor explains the objects of जल्प: and वितण्डा. जल्प: and वितण्डा are for the protection of the unchanging truth, just as a fence of

thorns is for the protection of the budding seed. A जल्पः is mere talk which is of the same form as वादः (discussion) but then there is support and opposition by छलम्, जातिः and निग्रहस्थानम्. The same sort of discussion but with no intention of establishing the opposite view is वितण्डा. (fallacious controversy).

P. 12. L. 17. **वचनविघातो** &c. This brings us to the discussion of छलम्, जातिः and निग्रहस्थानम्. It is छलम्, when there is विघातः—destruction of the statement in discussion by use of ambiguities of meaning. It is of three kinds *viz.* वाक्छलम्, सामान्यच्छलम् and उपचारच्छलम्. छलम् can be rendered by the word trick. It is a fallacy but it is better to render it by *trick* and thereby avoid confusion of meaning. The trick may be by expression or by implication.

P. 12. L. 21. **अविशेषाभिहिते** &c. A trick in an expresion occurs when there is attaching of a meaning different from one intended by the speaker, by the use of a word with two meanings. **नवकम्बलो माणवकः.** This may mean either that Mâṇavaka has a new blanket or that he has nine blankets. Here the fallacy (निग्रहस्थानम्) is of the nature of want of comprehension. This results from the nonappreciation of the object of the speaker who wants to say that this man has a new blanket. The trick is the result of the speaker's not knowing the reply or his miscomprehension of his false knowledge.

P. 13. L. 3. **संभवतोर्थस्य**—The common trick happens when there is an application of a wrong meaning on account of the very commonness of a possible meaning. 'Oh this is a Brahmin knowing four Vedas.' When some one said this, the न्यायवादी says, 'What wonder there is. It is possible that one who knows four Vedas is a Brahmin.' Then the disputant says, 'Not so; because then we commit the अनैकांतिकः fault and include a व्रात्यः (a Brahmin deprived of संस्काराधिकारः). Here even there is fallacy as before.

P. 13. L. 11. **उपचारप्रयोगे** &c. To apply to a sentence the primary meaning when the speaker has used in a secondary meaning is उपचारच्छलम्. When a person says 'Beds cry' the disputant (छलवादी) says it is the men (on the beds) who cry out and not the beds. They cannot do so as they are inanimate objects. Here even you must understand the fallacy as before; because this sort of expression is common to the people and also to *shâstras.*

P. 13. L. 15. **प्रयुक्ते हेतौ** &c. This is the definition of जातिः taken from वात्स्यायनः who says प्रयुक्ते हि हेतौ यः प्रसंगो जायते स जातिः which, literally translated, means, an argument, based on the same ground

as put forth by the first speaker *Bhâsarvajna* improves upon वात्स्यायनः and adds the words समीकरणाभिप्रायेण. *Gautama's* definition is shorter even than *Vatsyayana's* but is clear. साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानं जातिः ॥ गौतमः ॥ प्रयुक्ते हि हेतौ यः प्रसंगो जायते स जातिः । स च प्रसंगः साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानमुपालम्भः प्रतिषेध इति ॥ वात्स्यायनः ॥ प्रयुक्ते हेतौ समीकरणाभिप्रायेण प्रसंगो जातिः। भासर्वज्ञः ॥

Bhâsarvajna's definition means to say that when one ground is put forth in an argument by a speaker, and when the disputant (जातिवादी) tries to argue that his argument is similar to that of the first speaker, the case is of जातिः.

P. 13. L. 15. **पराजयनिमित्तम्**—The cause of defeat is the निग्रहस्थानम्. *Râghava* says समीकरणाभिप्रायेणेत्यनेन जल्पवितण्डयोः सदुत्तराऽपरिस्फूर्तौ साम्यापादनाय जातिरपि प्रयोक्तव्येति प्रतिपादितं । एकान्तपराजयाद्वरं संदेह इति न्यायात् ॥ If in an argument a disputant cannot find a proper reply, he, instead of courting complete defeat, may give a partial one by जात्युत्तरः–by showing the futility of the opponents argument–by showing the similarity of his argument with the other's equally fallacious.

This author does not give the proper definition of निग्रहस्थानम् which is defined by गौतमः as विप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिपत्तिश्च । It is either misaprehension or non-apprehension. Now these *Jatis* and *Nigrahasthanas* are innumerable but the author mentions, as *Jayasinha* says, twenty four *Jatis* and twenty *Nigrahasthanas.* These are mentioned by *Gautama* as साधर्म्यवैधर्म्योत्कर्षाऽपकर्षवर्ण्यावर्ण्यविकल्पसाध्यप्राप्त्यप्राप्तिप्रसंगप्रतिदृष्टान्ताऽनुत्पत्तिसंशयप्रकरणहेत्वर्थापत्त्यविशेषो ऽपपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिनित्यानित्यकार्यसमाः ॥ गौ. सू. ५-१-१ ॥

The twenty two *Nigrasthanas* are enumerated as प्रतिज्ञाहानिः प्रतिज्ञान्तरं प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः प्रतिज्ञासन्यासो हेत्वन्तरमर्थान्तरं निरर्थकमविज्ञातार्थमपार्थमप्राप्तकालं न्यूनमधिकं पुनरुक्तमननुभाषणमज्ञानमप्रतिभा विक्षेपो मतानुज्ञा पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणं निरनुयोज्यानुयोगोऽपसिद्धान्तो हेत्वाभासाः (गौ. सू. ५. २–१)

The last two sections of the last chapter of *Gautama's Sutras* deal with the *Jatis* and *Nigrahsthanas.*

P. 13. L. 18. **साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यामुपसंहारे**—When with the object of proving a proposition, we fix upon the similarity of things and have at the same time the apprehension of the contrary being proved, the *Jati* is साधर्म्यसमः. Similarly when with the object of proving a

proposition we fix upon the dissimilarity of things and have at the same time the apprehension of the contrary being proved, the *Jati* is वैधर्म्यसमः. The instance cited by the author is as follows :—

The mover says : शब्दोऽनित्यः कृतकत्वात् घटवत्.

The disputant replies शब्दो नित्योऽमूर्तत्वादाकाशवत्.

Both these syllogisms are dealt with by साध्यर्म्यम् or by अन्वयव्याप्तिः.

In the same way we can have two syllogisms proving opposite conclusions by वैधर्म्यम् that is by व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः.

Jayasinha says that this is not प्रतिपक्षः. cf. नायं प्रतिपक्षो व्याप्तिरूपांगविकलत्वेनाऽतुल्यबलत्वादित्यर्थः । अमूर्तत्वस्य नित्यत्वेनाविनाभावाऽभावात् ।

P. 14. L. 3. **साध्यदृष्टान्तयोः** This is Sutra 5-1-4 of *Gautama* giving six more futile arguments (जातिः). They are उत्कर्षसमः, अपकर्षसमः, वर्ण्यसमः, अवर्ण्यसमः, विकल्पसमः and साध्यसमः and *Gautama* gives one definition for all of them. When there are several धर्माः in the दृष्टान्तः and when we apply these different धर्माः to the साध्यम् we get any one of these six false reasonings. Let us take them in order:—

When there is an occasion of an unintended धर्मः of the दृष्टान्तः being applied to the साध्यम्ः, there is उत्कर्षसमः. If शब्दः is अनित्यः because of कृतकत्वम् as in घटः there is also सावयवत्वम् in घटः which will prove that शब्दः is सावयवः. If it is not सावयवः then it will not be even अनित्यः because of the similarity.

Again when an intended धर्मः disappears from the साध्यम् by the above process it becomes a case of अपकर्षसमः. If शब्दः is अनित्यः because it is an effect, like घटः then like घटः it would also be non-audible which is not true; because in these two cases the result goes contrary to प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम्.

Similarly when कृतकत्वम् is the common ground there may be either मूर्तत्वम् or अमूर्तत्वम् and in that case, there may be either नित्यत्वम् or अनित्यत्वम्. This is called विकल्पसमः जातिः.

Again if both साध्यम् and दृष्टान्तः that is अनित्यत्वम् and घटः are अनित्याः because there is कृतकत्वम् then both of them would become साध्यम् and thus it becomes साध्यसमः. Now all these are answered by *Sutra* 5-1-5. When the thing to be proved is proved by taking some similarity, there is no disproving it by a dissimilarity.

P. 15. L. 1. **प्राप्य साध्यम्**—Either the हेतुः reaches the साध्यम् or it does not. If it does reach, then there is distinction between हेतुः and साध्यम्. This is the case of प्राप्तिसमः. If it does

not reach then there is no relation like साध्यम् and हेतुः and there is no साधकम्. This is the case of अप्राप्तिसमजातिः. In the explanation, *Bhâsarvajnya* gives the illustration 'अंगुल्योरिव.' Just as of two fingers, when brought together, neither of them can be said to be the supporter of the other so the साध्यम् and साधकम् cannot be so said, by their mere jextaposition, if they do not support or are not supported by one another. If they do not reach each other then like the fuel and the fire, there cannot be साधकत्वम्. Sutra 5-1-8 is a reply to this. In the case of घटः, when there is the प्राप्तिः of instruments the result घटः appears. Here the jextaposition of the घटः and the wet clay is clearly seen. But it requires पीडनम् (pressing) which is not visible to the eyes (*i. e.* there is अप्राप्तिः of it) yet the result is seen. The author says that without any distinction as to प्राप्तिः and अप्राप्तिः, all these धर्माः of साध्यम् and साधनम् are known to be constant and we cannot avoid them, because, if we do, all the modes of knowledge will be obstructed.

P. 15. L. 10. **प्रागुत्पत्तेः कारणाभावात्** &c. Where there is no cause for a quality of an object before it is produced there is the fallacy of उत्पत्तिसमः. The illustration of this is the *sound* which is said to be non-eternal because it is an effect. The other side argues that before the very production of पक्षः *viz.* sound, there was no ground for non-eternity, and the sound therefore is eternal. If it is eternal then the very idea of production cannot be maintained. The next sutra of *Gautama* is a reply to this. He says तथाभावात् *i. e.* if the शब्दः is उत्पन्नः (a production) the produced शब्दः should have a cause and therefore there cannot be an objection to the cause. In fact there is no sound which can be said to be not-produced and we cannot therefore apply नित्यत्वम् to any sound.

P. 15. L. 16. **त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेः** &c. It is अहेतुसमः when the हेतुः cannot be shown to exist at any time (past, present or future). The argument is thus explained. The question is whether the हेतुः exists before the साध्यम् or after it or at the same time with the साध्यम्. It cannot exist before, because if it does, there is no साध्यम् whose साधनम् it can be. If it coexists with the साध्यम् one cannot say which is the साध्यम् and which the साधनम्. The third case is not mentioned by *Bhâsarvajna*; but the **भाष्यकारः** notes it thus. अथ पश्चादसति साधने कस्येदं साध्यम्. When there is not the साधनम् whose साध्यम् can it be. A reply to all these is given by the Sutra 5.1-19. न हेतुतः साध्यसिद्धेस्त्रैकाल्याऽसिद्धिः which means that there is no त्रैकाल्यासिद्धिः

because the very existence of साध्यम् presupposes हेतुः. By *Sutra* 5 1-20 *Gautama* gives another reason which coupled with one in 5-1-19 form two answers of त्रैकाल्यासिद्धिः.

At this point it may be mentioned that three copies out of the four collated by me do not mention अर्थापत्तिसमः. *Jayasiṇha* does not mention it in his commentary. It may be that he followd a copy which dropped it. *Râghava* mentions it; but he, while professing to comment on भासर्वज्ञः really discusses the sutras of *Gautama.* It cannot therefore be clear whether the copy he had, did or did not mention अर्थापत्तिसमः. At the same time we cannot say that भासर्वज्ञः purposely omitted it as he mentions all the other समाः and in the very order in which they are mentioned in the sutras. It may be that the copy, which *Râghava* used, had this Jati mentioned there in but subsequently by mistake of the scribe the whole paragraph was dropped. अर्थापत्तिसमः is a *Jati* where the contrary of the साध्यम् is proved by अर्थापत्तिप्रमाणम्. It is possible that as *Gautama* refused to recognise अर्थापत्तिः as an independent प्रमाणम् Bhasarvajna ommitted this *Jati* based or that प्रमाणम्.

P. 16. L. 6. **निर्दिष्टकारणाऽभावे** &c., This जातिः occurs when there is cognition of the result even when there is no cognition of the cause. When proving कार्यत्वम् (effect) of पृथिवी (earth), even though the cause सावयवत्वम् is absent, the कार्यत्वम् is understood. The author says that this is not a दोषः. The cause may be apparent in a part of the सपक्षः and then the cause is there apparent for the effect. Here the author raises a question; "How is it then that the effect (कार्यम्) is understood. He answers (अत आह) by the Sutra 5-1-28 that this is no difficulty. The same result can be obtained by other causes also. This he explains by saying that the result is known by some other प्रमाणम्. *Jayasinha* illustrates it thus यथांऽगारावस्थायां धूमाभावेऽपि प्रमाणान्तराद्वन्हिसिद्धिः. The author of न्यायसारः puts in here a new inference and further says that there may be another source of the same inference even though there is no cause which should obstruct cognition of the effect and the cause is not so easily discernible.

P. 16. L. 13. **अनुपलब्धिसमः** The definition of this Jati is bodily taken from *Gautama's sutra* 5-1-29, and is construed thus by the भाष्यकारः. तोषामावरणादीनामनुपलब्धिनोपलभ्यते अनुपलम्भान्नास्तीति अभावः अस्याः सिद्धयति. अभावसिद्धौ हेत्वभावात् तद्विपरीतमस्तित्वमावरणादीनामवधार्यते &c. *Bhâsarvajna's* explanation differs from this. By the first syllable तद् he means

कार्यबुद्धिः. The meaning seems to be this. When there is the effect which is not known and when, because it is not known, it is held to be nonexistent, and when although it is so held to be non-existent, it happens to be cognizable, the दोषः is अनुपलब्धिः. This fault is explained by अनुपलम्भात्मकत्वात् &c. 5-1-30. अनुपलब्धिः means that their is a knowledge of non-existance. This very अनुपलब्धिः is cognizable which fact makes the existance of अनुपलब्धिः improper.

P. 17. L. 3. **नित्यसमः** This *Jati* may be interpreted by the word *riddle.* It is explained thus:—Suppose the thing to be proved is "Sound is non-eternal (अनित्यः)." The question arises whether non-eternity is present in sound for ever or for a short time only. It cannot be for a short time because in that case when non-eternity disappears sound will be shown to be eternal, which disproves the proposition. Suppose that this non-eternity is ever existent in sound *i. e.* this non-eternity is eternal in sound. The qualifier (धर्मः) being eternal the qualified (धर्मि-शब्दः) must also be eternal. This is a fallacy.—The objector makes the mistake of believing that a qualifier (धर्मः) exists in the qualified (धर्मि) in such a way as to change the (धर्मि). This is not necessarily true. A quality may be of wider or longer existence than the object. In a red pot, the pot may come in existence at one time and disappear at the other. The redness is ever existent but is exhibited in the pot only during the existence of the pot.

This completes the list of *Jatis* mentioned by *Bhâsarvjna* but *Gautama* mentions and so does *Vâtsyâyana* many more. Those not mentioned by *Bhâsarvjna* are वर्ण्यः, अवर्ण्यः, प्रसंगः, प्रतिदृष्टान्तः, संशयः, प्रकरणम्, अर्थापत्तिः, अनित्यः and कार्यः. All these are fully discussed in chapter 5-1 of *Vâtsyâyana* and need not be gone into in detail here. *Bhâsarvjna* does not omit any of the निग्रहस्थानानि which are given by *Gautama* and they are mentioned in the same order.

We have already explained the description of the fallacy known by this name. But now we give and discuss the definition as given by *Gautama* which is विप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिपत्तिश्च. *It is either false apprehension or non-apprehention.* Both *Gautama* and *Bhâsarvajna* give twenty instances mentioned by so many different names.

P. 18. L. 1. The definition given by *Bhâsarvajna* of प्रतिज्ञाहानिः is साध्यप्रतिदृष्टान्तधर्मानुज्ञा. *Gautama* says प्रतिदृष्टान्तधर्माभ्यनुज्ञा स्वदृष्टान्ते which is as obscure as the definition given by *Bhâsarvjna.* If अभ्यनुज्ञा according to Vaidya's dictionary means admission in argument

प्रतिदृष्टान्तः is a दृष्टान्तः which agrees with a contrary dharma as qualification. Thus when a statement is going to be proved by an illustration and an opponent puts in another illustration which has a qualification which disproves the original statement, and the proposer admits the new qualification (धर्मः) he commits this fallacy as he virtually gives up his original statement. This is the syllogistic form of the illustration given in the text.

प्रतिज्ञा. शब्दोऽनित्यः.

हेतुः कृतकत्वात्.

उदाहरणं. घटवत्.

उपनयः. कृतकत्वव्याप्याऽनित्यत्ववानयं शब्दः.

निगमनम्. तस्माच्छब्दोऽनित्यः.

प्रति-वादिना उच्यते ननु.

शब्दो नित्यः.

अमूर्तत्वात्.

आकाशवत्.

वादिनोच्यते भवतु. Here by this admission the original argument and therefore the conclusion falls to the ground. *Bhâsarvajna* has expressed this in a very general way without fixing the fault to any one particular member of the syllogism. *Vâtsyâyana* is clearer in the illustration. ऐन्द्रियकत्वादनित्यः शब्दो घटवदिति कृतेऽपर आह । दृष्टमैन्द्रियकत्वं सामान्ये नित्ये कस्मान्न तथा शब्द इति प्रत्यवस्थिते तमिदमाह यद्यैन्द्रियकं सामान्यं नित्यं कामं घटो नित्योस्त्विति । स खल्वयं साधकस्य दृष्टान्तस्य नित्यत्वं प्रसज्जयन्निगमान्तमेव पक्षं जहाति पक्षं जहत्प्रतिज्ञां जहातीत्युच्यते प्रतिज्ञाश्रयत्वात्पक्षस्येति. This shows that the fault exists in the धर्मः of the दृष्टान्तः and not in the हेतुः. In this connection *Râghava* mentions several kinds of प्रतिज्ञाहानिः which are also mentioned by Udayanâchârya.

P. 18. L. 6. **प्रतिज्ञान्तरम्.** This is the second निग्रहस्थानम् defined both by *Gautama* and *Bhâsarvajna* by the same words. When a proposition is objected to by the opponent, on the strength of a different दृष्टान्तः or on the ground of absence of दृष्टान्तः the proposer by referring to a qualification apparent in the पक्षः commits this fault. When one party makes an assertion *e. g.* सर्वमनित्यम्, he makes it so very broad that he has no illustration to give and has to take another instance which may have an illustration either suitable or not. But the point is that the पक्षः is too general not to be covered by the साध्यम्. The objector therefore instantly objects and the proposer

immediately changes ground by making the same पक्षः qualified by an adjective as in the instance given in the text. In this way he changes the original प्रतिज्ञा where the पक्षः was an unqualified all. This kind of trick is very common among debators. *Râghaga* thinks that this is the same as हेत्वन्तरः. *Jayasinha* however tries to show that this is not the same as विरुद्धहेत्वाभासः which we have already discussed.

P. 18. L. 12. **प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोः** &c. The third निग्रहस्थानम् is प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः where the हेतुः (the middle term) is inconsistent with the प्रतिज्ञा.

P. 18. L. 14. प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासः is that a निग्रहस्थानं in which an assertion is made by the proposer, which is obviously false and when the opponent points it out the proposer withdraws his argument saying that he never made that assertion. When a man says that अग्निः (fire) is अनुष्णः (not warm) the opponent says that it is contrary to experience (प्रत्यक्षम्) whereupon the former says, that he never made the assertion and thus withdraws. *Jayasinha* says that in प्रतिज्ञाहानिः the प्रतिज्ञा is abandoned by admitting a धर्म mentioned by the opponent. In प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासः the proposer gives up the argument altogether when the other objects to it.

P. 18. L. 18. **अविशेषोक्ते हेतौ**. When an unqualified ground given by the proposer is objected to and he takes up another qualified ground (हेतुः) the निग्रहस्थानम् is called हेत्वन्तरम्.

P. 19. L. 5. **अर्थान्तरम्.** This is a निग्रहस्थानम् where the person while arguing one thing enters into the discussion of a subject which has nothing whatever to do with the subjects under discussion. When the proposer arguing that नित्यः शब्दोऽस्पर्शत्वात् इति हेतोः enters into a long discussion as to the grammatical formation of the word हेतुः the fallacy is अर्थान्तरम्.

P. 19. L. 9. **निरर्थकम्** is a mere childish way of arguing.

P. 19. L. 11. **अविज्ञातार्थः** is a निग्रहस्थानम् where, the meaning of the argument of the proposer is so obscure, that even though he repeats it *three times* neither the opponent nor the assembly, understand him. It may be, that there is nothing in the argument and to conceal the ignorance of the proposer, it is put in a very obscure language.

P. 19. L. 15. **अपार्थकम्** occurs where mere substantives are used without a prdicate.

P. 19. L. 17. **अप्राप्तकालम्** is a name given to an argument where the different members of syllogicism are used in improper order. Why should this be a fatal fault? It is an irregularity which may prove only a temporary obstacle in rightly undurstanding the conclusion.

P. 19. L. 19. **न्यूनम्** occurs when any one of the members of the syllogicism is absent from the argument. When converse is the process that is when more than necessary members are interposed there occurs a fault called अधिकम्.

P. 20. L. 3. **पुनरुक्तम्**. This fallacy occurs when the words in an argument are unnecessarily repeated. But it is no fault if it is अनुवादः which is described by *Bhâsarvajna* as सार्थकं पुनरभिधानम् ॥ *i. e.* repeating with some purpose. This is a very common explanation. *Gautama's* explanation of अनुवादः is विधिविहितस्यानुवचनमनुवादः (२-१-६५). It means repetition of words or of sense but of course with an object. Thus repetition without its being अनुवादः is a fault. The same is the fault when one and the same sense, is repeated although with different words. The reason why this is fault is that it brings no end to the discussion and also that when one ground is sufficient the other becomes redundant.

P. 20. L. 9. **अनुभाषणम्** The word means 'no following in speech.' When the proposer has thrice spoken out his subject and the opponent does not take up the argument it is a fault of the opponent. Distinct from this is the next fault अज्ञानम् where the opponent, though told thrice does not understand the thing and therefore does not argue.

P. 20. L. 15. **अप्रतिभा**. Dullness or want of ready wit. This may be the cause of the two preceding *viz.* अननुभाषणम् and अज्ञानम्. This fault is possible to both of the parties. Cf. *Gautama's* definition: उत्तरस्याप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिभा. (५-२-१८.)

P. 20. L. 17. It is विक्षेपः when the discussion is dropped on account of some other engagement. One cannot say that this is a fault unless it is purposely created by one of the parties to avoid the discussion.

P. 20. L. 20. **स्वपक्षदोषाः**—When a person while attributing a fault to the other side admits his own, the fault in the argument is called मतानुज्ञा. When a person says to another 'you are a thief' and the other in reply says that 'you are also a thief' virtually the

first speaker admits that he himself is a thief although the other may also be one.

P. 21. L. 4. **निग्रहं-प्राप्तस्य** &c. पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणम् means abandoning on censure. When one is censured for his argument he is made to abandon his position. The abandoning is pressed by the assembly who discriminate between the two.

The reading अनुयुक्तया परिषदा means, by the assembly who is questioned or appealed to. *Vâtsyâyana* says that the party himself, one or the other, would not admit his fault. It is therefore the assembly who has to decide.

Râghava seems to have for his reading अनुक्तया as he explains it by अनुक्तया परिषदा.

P. 21. L. 7. **अनिग्रहस्थाने** &c. When there is no ground for निग्रहः and yet a party attaches निग्रहः to the other it is निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः.

P 21. L. 10. **सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेत्य** &c. When, once a discussion is started on a basis to give up that basis and wander about without any rule, results in the fault of अपसिद्धान्तः. When a मीमांसकः who does not admit the existence of ईश्वरः argues that अग्निहोत्रः-fire sacrifice-is the means of attaining heaven and the opponent objects on the ground that a sacrifice which only burns things cannot give heaven the मीमांसकः turns round and says that the sacrifice pleases ईश्वरः who gives heaven. By this argument the मीमांसकः commits this fault. The sacrifice, which only burns things cannot be the cause of heaven.

The first replies that by the sacrifice the god is pleased and gives the fruit as does the king.

Now this is contrary to the principle of the मीमांसकाः. The author says that this is different from प्रतिज्ञाहानिः whenre the प्रतिज्ञा is changed.

P. 21. L. 16. Thus he says all the हेत्वाभासाः are निग्रहस्थानानि and he further says that even undesirable words used by way of arguments are also निग्रहस्थानानि.

P. 22. L. 1. **अथावसितम्** The third Prama'ṇa, discussed by *Bha'sarvjna*, is आगमः. Writers differ in giving a name to this प्रमाणम्, some calling it शब्दः and the others आगमः. cf: आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः (गौ. सू. १-१-७) and *Vâtsyâyana's Bhâshya* on the same, आप्तवाक्यं शब्दः (त. सं.) विज्ञाताच्छब्दात्पदार्थाभिधानद्वारेण यद्वाक्यार्थविज्ञानम् तच्छाब्दं नाम प्रमाणम्. (शा. दीपिका P. 276. Benares Ed.)

These writers, it seems, consider the words शब्दः and आगमः as interchangeable. Later writers of *Purâṇas* have used the word आगमः in a very technical sense meaning the *Vedas.* Comparing the definitions of शब्दः by *Gautama* on the one hand, and of आगमः by *Bhâsarvjna* on the other, we find that the two words as used by these two authors bear different meanings. Firstly आगमः as used by the writers of *Puranâs* would be the same thing as ऐतिह्यम् or tradition which is one of the *Pramâṇas* mentioned but at the same time discarded by *Gautama.* The literal meaning of the word आगमः would be the same. The word is derived from the root गम् with आ meaning to come. The *Vedas* which are taken as having no human source, may very aptly be called आगमः. *Gautama,* decidedly disregards any such knowledge.

The word आगमः perhaps did not acquire this meaning in his time which it did in the time of *Bhâsarvjna.* Even if the word did acquire the meaning in which it is used by the *Paurânas* in the time of *Gautama* the later authors on न्यायः may have rejected this word on that very account.

Bhâsarvjna's definition is " समयबलेन सम्यक्परोक्षानुभवसाधनमागमः. This definition is quite independent of *Gautama* who defines शब्दः is आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः *covering* a narrower space of knowledge than what is done by the former definition. *Bha'sarvjna's* definition includes also तांत्रिकप्रमाणम् called चेष्टा. It goes further and includes statements uttered by any person whose veracity the hearer has no reason to doubt. These are things of very common occurence in every day life, very common to be met with in our courts of law. A very disreputable man may go in a witness-box and make a statement which a judge may believe, if he thinks that he sees no reason why that witness should not have told the truth. आप्तत्वम् necessary for the definition of शब्दः is absent in this case and yet there is the true knowledge created by a statement, or a शब्दः.

Of the six orthodox schools of philosophy five recognise the शब्द-प्रमाणम्. *Vaisheshikas* and the unorthodox philosophers such as the *Bauddhas* and the *Chârvâkas* do not give any importance whatsoever to this *pramaṇa*. Of the orthodox schools, the two *Mimânsa* schools give prominence to the *Vedâs*, which are the only *Âgamas* according to later *Paurânic* writers. The *Naiyâyikas* and the *Vaisheshikas* who more than others deal strictly with reason, treat of शब्द: logically and without any partiality towards the speaker of the word except as to his reliability.

According to *Bhâsarvajna* आगमप्रमाणम् is the instrument of right mediate knowledge acquired by convention. That a particular word should be used in a particular sense is a point to be decided not by logic but by rhetorics. But once a sense is attributed to the word, logic comes in to examine the truthfulness or otherwise of what is expressed by that word. This instrument of knowledge is classified into दृष्टार्थागम: and अदृष्टार्थागम:.

P. 22. L. 3. **तत्र दृष्टार्थानाम्** :—The authoritativeness of sentences whose meaning is open to the senses is clear by the action one takes on hearing the sentence. For such a knowledge one does not require to be told by any qualified person. Suppose a child is asked by the parent to take up a toy lying on the table. There is that conventional knowledge in the child acquired by long usage that the word *toy* means an object of a particular form and of a particular use. The word *toy*, coming out from the mouth of the parent with the instruction accompanying it, makes the child active to put in operation the knowledge he has acquired by the words of his parent. He has understood the word *toy* and has understood the word *bring* in the sense given to it by convention. The child's movement gives an indication that he has acquired the correct knowledge. The आगम: here was दृष्टार्थ: as the object intended to be known was quite clear.

But there are objects which are not so very clear. A man had gone over a long travel and returned. He narrates his experiences, describes things which are quite foreign and unknown in his country and which he has seen in a distant land. The persons, to whom this information is imparted, cannot personally see these things to make sure of the correctness of their knowledge. They have to depend on what the gentleman, who has gone to those contries, says. Here comes in the necessity of आप्तत्वम्. The man must be one who is reputed to be telling the truth. *Gautam* deals with

this class of knowledge only, and his definition of शब्दः is, therefore narrower than given by *Bhâsarvajna.* Our author cites the instances of authoritative sentences from ancient works, whose authority in things not within reach of our senses is to be upheld on account of the आप्तत्वम् of those ancient writings.

P. 22 L. 8 न नित्यत्वेन. The proper construction of this sentence should be वाक्यानां प्रामाण्यम् नित्यत्वेन न भवति तेषां नित्यत्वे प्रमाणाऽभावात्. It should not be said that a sentence is authoritative because it is eternal. There is no proof to show the eternity of a sentence. This is that old stereotyped instance of the middle age logicians of India who held disputations to prove that a word was non-eternal. We may with no disadvantage omit discussing the usefulness of such a disputation in understanding the simple rules of logic. The student, who is interested in this subject may be referred to *Vâtsyâyana's* commentary on *Gautama's* Sutra's Adhaya II Anhik II Sutras 13–33.

P. 22. L. 11. **वायुसंयोगविभागाविति.** शब्दः, the objector says, is only conjunction and disjunction of air. This, the other man replies, is not true; because all the words are understood by a man simultaneously and instantly they are uttered. Just as the eye, being an instrument of knowledge is accustomed to acquire the knowledge of the whole thing coming within its vision, so does the ear acquire the knowledge of the whole collection of words.

P. 22. L. 15. **शब्दा वा.** Can it not be said, says the objector, that the words, शब्दाः, can become the object of being taken in by the ear in the same way as the other objects are taken by other organs of sense. Different sounds strike the ear individually and not collectively, just as in the case of घटः, different parts are put in one after another individually. The other man replies that the analogy is not correct. The case of घटः is a question of कारकः (producer). In the case of शब्दः, it is the question of व्यञ्जकः (exhibiter) just as it is in a lamp.

P. 23. L. 1. **एवमेतानि त्रीण्येव प्रमाणानि.** *Bhâsarvajna* maintains that there are only three *Pramâṇas. Gautama* maintained four *Pramâṇas viz.* प्रत्यक्षम्, अनुमानम्, उपमानम् and शब्दः. It seems, however, that there are other *Pramânâs* which, though not recognised, are mentioned by *Gautama* in *Sûtra* 2-2-1. They are according to him ऐतिह्यम्, अर्थापत्तिः, संभवः and अभावः. *Bhâsarvajna* also mentions these four with उपमानम् as *Pramâṇas* which according to him need

not be mentioned separately. उपमानम् according to some is another form of अनुमानम् and the slightest consideration of different members will show that it is so. But *Bhâsarvajna* says that it can be included in शब्दप्रमाणम् which can be expressed in the form 'it is गवयः just like गौः .'

P. 23 L. 2. **तत्र यथा गौरेवम्.** From here down to line 3 on page 24 we have an interesting discussion as to the उपमानप्रमाणम् which having been objected to, has to be accounted for by *Bhâsarvajna*, as in no way different from one of the three *Pramâṇas* already discussed by him. Several authors before and after him have suggested that उपमानम् is in no way different from अनुमानम्. In this passage *Bhâsarvajna* tries to refute the theory, and to explain that उपमानम् is included in शब्दप्रमाणम्. As already explained, the reader will again see that *Bhásurvajna* is indifferent in using the words शब्दः and आगमः.

Readers of *Tark-kaumudi* will remember the distinction drawn by *Laugakshi Bhâskar* between प्रमाणम् and स्मृतिः. स्मृतिः is the result of impressions left by the knowledge acquired in the past. प्रमाणम् is the result of the present operations to acquire that knowledge. *Bhâsarvajna* thinks that when a man says that this is a गवयः because a गवयः is similar to गौः, the knowledge is not the result of any present operation but only of the impressions left on the mind by knowledge acquired in the past by the similarity of गौः and गवयः. *Bhâsarvajna* further says that the present knowledge अस्य गवयशब्दः संज्ञा is the result of आप्तोपदेशः. He would therefore include उपमानम् in शब्दः. The result, according to him, is arrived at by putting two words together which are in the capacity of the *qualifier* and the *qualified*. He further goes on discussing that it cannot be included even in the प्रत्यक्षम्, because there is not that immediate reception of the knowledge of the object which is essential in प्रत्यक्षम्. In उपमानम् we have to depend on something more for that knowledge which, according to him, is the statement of a reliable man, which becomes the last step in the operation.

P. 24 L. 3 **सूत्रविरोध इति.** From here down to P. 25 L. 4 we find an instance of the old-type discussion explaining how our author does not differ from *Gautama*, although he holds that there are three *pramânâs* only and not four as *Gautama* says in his *Sutras*.

P. 25 L. 5 **अर्थापत्तेरप्यनुमाने** :—This is a discussion of the अर्थापत्तिप्रमाणम्. The author says that this is included in the अनुमानम्. The अर्थापत्तिप्रमाणम् is the result of अविनाभावः (concomitance).

If there is no concomitance, the essential step in अनुमानम्, there would not be the form of reasoning which we call अर्थापत्तिः. The mode of arguing is by coming to an inevitable conclusion. *Vâtsyâyana's* instance is असत्सु मेघेषु वृष्टिर्न भवतीति सत्सु भवतीत्येतदर्थादापद्यते. This instance is not a very happy one, because as *Vâtsyâyana* himself explains that सत्स्वपि चैकदा न भवति–sometimes even when there are clouds there is no rain *Vâtsyâyana,* following *Gautama,* explains that अर्थापत्तिः is not a प्रमाणम् at all. *Gautama* says that अर्थापत्तिरप्रमाणमनैकान्तिकत्वात् । २–१–३ ॥ Later writers do take note of अर्थापत्तिः but they say that it is another form of अनुमानप्रमाणम्. This अर्थापत्तिप्रमाणम् is introduced in the science of reasoning by the *Mimânsakas* and the later writers of the *Naiyâyika* and *Vaisheshika* schools have tried to explain it away by taking it as another form of अनुमानम्. The typical instance of these writers is पीनो देवदत्तः दिवा न भुंक्तेऽर्थात् रात्रौ भुंक्ते । This would not be an अनुमानम् according to the *Mimânskas* but the *Naiyayikas* explain it by putting it in syllogistic form as देवदत्तो रात्रौ भुंक्ते,–दिवाऽभुंजानत्वेसति पीनत्वात्. Our author goes further and says that this is another name of केवलव्यतिरेक्यनुमानम् and nothing more.

P. 25 L. 15 **संभवः** is an additional प्रमाणम् mentioned but rejected by *Gautama.* This is explained by the phrase 'the whole includes the part.' This is also another form of अनुमानम् and not an independent प्रमाणम्.

P. 25 L. 17 **अभावः** is another प्रमाणम् mentioned by our author, which also, he says, is not a separate प्रमाणम् but one which can be included in any of the three *Pramânas* according to the circumstances under which it is used.

P. 26 L. 8 **ऐतिह्यम्** is the next *pramâṇa* about which I have already spoken in the beginning of this chapter. It is heresay evidence.

P. 26 L. 10 **चेष्टा** is another *pramâṇas* not recognised by the *Naiyâyikas* who mention it as a kind of action which forms a function of शरीरम्. चेष्टेन्द्रियार्थाश्रयः शरीरम् । १–१–११ ॥ The Tântrikas consider this as a separate *pramâna* but, as our author says, it is only a form of expression substituting a kind of action for words. It is in no way different from आगमः.

P. 26 L. 14 The result of the discussion of several modes of reasoning brings us now to the object which is to be proved or established. This object (प्रमेयम्) is defined as the knowledge of a subject which by way of being useful for further knowledge becomes the source of the highest good. This should be known and always to be thought upon.

P. 27 L. 2 The **प्रमेयम्** is of four kinds, known as हेयम्, तस्य निर्वर्तकम्, हानम् and उपायः. In these *Prameyas* हेयम् is the principal subject to be known and the remaining three are appertaining to that principal one. हेयम् is explained as हीयतेऽवश्यंपरित्यज्य इति हेयम्, a thing which is necessarily to be abandoned. Here again *Bhâsarvajna* strikes out a new line of division of the *Prameyas. Gautama* mentions twelve *Prameyas* which are enumerated as आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थबुद्धिमनःप्रवृत्तिदोष-प्रेत्यभावफलदुःखापवर्गास्तु प्रमेयम् १–९ ॥ *Bhâsarvajna* says that there are twenty-five *Prameyas* in all which can be grouped into four broad classes as mentioned. The first of them is दुःखमनागतम्, which is further stated to be of twenty one kinds. *Jayasinha* says that a *Heya* is future misery to be avoided; because it is useless to consider of past sufferings and as to the present, they have to be suffered because they are the result of past deeds which can not be avoided.

The twenty one future miseries to be avoided are (1) the body (2-7) the six *Indriyas* (8-13) the six objects of senses (14-18) the six conconsciousnesses of the objects (19) pleasure and (20-21) the two pains of restraint and torture. The body is said to be one of the miseries to be avoided, because it is the home of miseries. If there had been no body the miseries enumerated would have had no place to manifest themselves.

Our author does not enumerate the six *Indriyas* but, if we follow *Gautama* they are only five घ्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्वक्श्रोत्राणीन्द्रियाणि भूतेभ्यः १-१-१२ ॥ *Vaisheshikas* however enumerate (मनः) mind with the *Indriyas* and the later *Naiyâyika* writers like *Laugakshibhaskar* and *Vishvanâth Panchânana* have adopted that view. *Jayasinha* also follows that view and enumerates the six *Indriyas* in the same order as these writers. Corresponding to these six senses there are the six objects of senses *viz.* smell, taste, colour, touch, sound and thought. The final reception of these, consciousness of them, are the six *Buddhis* mentioned by our author. Pleasure is mentioned as one of the miseries because it is the source of future pain. Besides these miseries there is the further misery of actual pain of torture and restraint.

P. 27 L. 8. **तस्य निर्वर्तकम्**—The next point considered is the cause of these miseries which are mentioned to be अविद्या and तृष्णा on the one hand and धर्मः and अधर्मः on the other. It is curious that धर्मः by which is meant here the observance of religious duties, should be mentioned as one of the causes of misery. *Jayasinha* feels the impropriety and explains यद्यपि धर्मः सुखस्य हेतुस्तथापि सुखस्य दुःखाऽविनाभावित्वाद्दुःखहेतुरेवोक्तः॥ The definition of अविद्या given is the ordinary one we find in *Vedântic* works. The word is purely *Vedântic* and is very common in the *Upanishads.* तृष्णा means a desire for rebirth with impressions of previous life. This word got its prominence in *Buddhistic* literature. These two and the religious performances and irreligious conduct result in the *heyas* or things to be abandoned, that is the miseries. The word निर्वर्तकम् means according to *Jayasinha* जनकम्—producer or cause.

P. 27 L. 12. When we know the two sets of things *viz.* the miseries and the causes thereof, the third thing to know is the complete distruction of them. The word हानम् used here is peculiar one not to be found in dictionaries. One can understand that though this is mentioned here as one of the *Prameyas* it is the highest aim of all philosophy.

P. 27. L. 14. The last *Prameya* is the remedy of the end of all misery. This is the knowledge of *Atmâ* (self). Here the author cites passages from the *Upanishads* which say that *the self should be seen, heard about, thought of and contemplated upon.*

P. 27. L. 18. **स द्विविधः**—This self, so to be known, is again of two kinds or rather manifests itself in two forms known as the *para* and the *apara.* The *para* self is that manifestation of Him which though not affected by any quality of this world is all-knowing and the creator of the universe. This *para* self is to be known by *Anumâna* and by *Âgama.*

P. 28. L. 8. **संसारभोक्ताऽनन्तोऽपरः**—The *Apara* self is endless and the one who enjoys this world. This is to be known by *Anumana* as being the support of the work of intellect. The author further goes on explaining the effects of intellect, how these are to be understood as being supported by this *apara* self.

P. 28. L. 21. **तत्सिद्धम्.**—The author ultimately comes to the conclusion that this *Apara* self is separate from the physical body, all pervading and eternal. In the next two paragraphs the author explains how that self is all pervading and eternal.

P. 29. L. 10. **तदेवमपरात्मज्ञानं......निःश्रेयसांगम्**—The knowledge of the

Apara self is a step toward the highest good. That knowledge is useful for the attainment of परलोक: and it leads to the destruction of sin (अधर्मः).

P. 29. L. 12. **परमात्मज्ञानं च.** The knowledge of *para* self is the cause of the highest good, ledd to it by उपासना which is further described as the practice for the destruction of misery and the attainment of complete concentration.

From P. 29 L. 14. the author explains उपासना and its different forms and the various practices which go to form it. Here he enters into the details which are foreign to this subject but which shows an insight of the author in the *Yogashâstra.* At p. 30 l. 17 he cites a *Shruti* which explains that *by the knowledge of Him one avoids death, there is no other way to attain that state,* Our author, therefore says that by the knowledge of *Shiva* (which name he attributes to *para* self) a person attains the highest good (absolution–मोक्षः).

P. 31. L. 1. **कः पुनरयं मोक्षः**—The natural question arises as to the meaning of मोक्षः. What is this मोक्षः. The author discusses one definition which attributes to मोक्षः that state of things where there is nothing but the *self* standing by itself like *Akâsha* at the time of final destruction of all general and particular qualities. This is objected to by some philosophers on the ground that that state of things is like a swoon which a philosopher should not desire for. One feature of this मोक्षः is that there should be happiness because so say the Upanishads. Even *Brahma*, the highest being is explained as आनंदं ब्रह्मणो रूपम्. Thus two things are the necessary for मोक्षः. They are the absence of misery and the presence of happiness. The author after descussion comes to the conclusion that:—

P. 32. L. 36. **तत्सिद्धमेतन्नित्यसंवेद्यमानेन सुखेन विशिष्टाऽऽत्यंतिकी दुःखनिवृत्तिः पुरुषस्य मोक्षः.** The मोक्षः (highest good—absolution) of a person is that ever conscious happiness which is accompanied by complete absence of pain.

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